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 Rhetoric and Plants asks what happens when we add plants to the various 
discussions currently developing within rhetorical theory.  By taking up current botanical 
research and some of the rhetorical debates surrounding that research, I posit that plants 
are creatures and that the botanic engagement with the world has much to teach us about 
persuasion, communication, and encountering alterity.  Specifically, I argue that the 
sessility of plants makes visible a tendency in our language to privilege the language of 
going elsewhere, which I term ambulocentrism.  Further, the fact that plants engage in 
behaviors that we have previously thought only conscious beings were capable of 
engaging in suggests that we must radically rethink the mind/body binary that persists in 
rhetoric and other discourses, and that the language of mechanism must be included in 
theory that takes up this distinction.  This interrogation of the mind/body binary is 
continued through an investigation of pain as a bodily experience that only minded 
creatures are thought to have.  Finally, I reflect back on the role that anthropomorphism 
has played in all of these arguments, in order to begin a theorization of 
anthropomorphism within posthumanist studies.  Plants have only recently been taken up 
in the humanities as a site of inquiry, and this project closes by pointing toward several 
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Foreword 
When I was about eleven years old, I read Jurassic Park.  I learned quite a bit 
about dinosaurs, and about science more generally.  Most of this learning was 
informative, though; it added more bits to what I already knew about those things.  One 
minor scene, however, didn’t simply provide me with a bit of information, but radically 
changed how I thought.  It takes place early in the story, when the main characters, 
including paleobotanist Ellie, have just arrived at the park and are being given a tour 
designed to impress them.  The plants that make up the landscaping around the pool turn 
out to have been genetically engineered from ancient DNA, just like the dinosaurs.  The 
dinosaurs, however, are kept in enclosures and precautions have been taken to see if any 
of them are venomous or otherwise dangerous in ways that are not obvious, while these 
plants were simply resurrected, grown, and then planted around the pool.  This sets off a 
train of thought for Ellie, in which she reflects on the human tendency to think of plants 
as objects or as pleasing elements for constructing an aesthetic setting, rather than as 
living things that fight for resources and defend themselves against attack, with different 
methods but the same intensity as any other creature.  She makes a mental note to speak 
to the creator of the park about testing these plants for poisonous properties, though this 
task of course gets subsumed in the events that follow. 
It’s difficult to say exactly how this brief, fictional reverie on plants impacted my 
life.  Certainly, I did not decide to take up botany, nor did my considerable fascination 
with animals suddenly become redirected to plants.  My parents had made sure that my 
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brother and I received a woodsy education, so the idea that sampling the wrong berry 
could be fatal was not particularly revelatory.  It wasn’t what the character said about 
plants that was so important to me; it was the way she talked about them as creatures.  In 
this sense, this story may also be one of the first instances that I felt myself aware of 
rhetoric, even if I didn’t have a word for it.  And while my interests, hobbies, and plans 
for the future didn’t really change, my behavior certainly did.  At moments when I might 
have previously torn a branch off a sapling so I could poke something or draw in the dirt, 
or when I impulsively reached out to pick a flower so I could take it to my mother and 
ask its name, I found myself thinking, They defend themselves like any other creature; 
they aren’t just alive, they want to live.  So I’d find a stick already on the ground, or I’d 
bring my mother to the flower instead of the other way around.  I’d been convinced to 
resituate what I knew about plants, and both my thinking and my actions were altered. 
The primary goal of this project is not to inform you about plants.  You may find 
some of it informative, and it also may be the case that, just as with Jurassic Park, some 
of the things it “informs you of” turn out eventually to be untrue.  That’s okay; if for 
instance the next decade of research demonstrates that fig trees do not, in fact, selectively 
drop fruits containing the eggs of cheater wasps, if it turns out that coyote tobacco plants 
don’t actually change their flowers so drastically, even if every single plant story in the 
following pages requires updating or correction at some point, this dissertation can still 
achieve its primary goal.  That goal is to resituate what you know about plants, such that 
both your thinking and your actions are altered.  For me, this is what it means to call 
something a work of rhetoric. 
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That is as close as I’ll come to defining rhetoric here, for a few reasons.  First, I 
place great value on the adaptability of the concept of rhetoric.  It is notoriously difficult 
to pin down, to the point that I have started thinking of rhetoricians as “people who use 
the word rhetoric while insisting that they don’t know what it means.”  Though offering 
yet another definition of rhetoric would not remove that adaptability, I am more 
interested in holding the noncertainty open than in making even an ineffectual move to 
close it down.  Second, and more important at the moment: this project seeks to welcome 
plants into the realm of rhetoric.  Doing so can, must, and will change what rhetoric is, in 
ways that are not at all predictable.  While I have tried to offer some suggestions in this 
direction, codifying those suggestions into a “definition of rhetoric” that accounts for 
plants is both premature and counterproductive.  This work is a beginning, an opening of 
the door; none of its conclusions are written in stone.  In fact, I couldn’t even bring 
myself to conclude it; rather than a conclusion, I chose instead to include an 
“outroduction” that closes nothing and attempts to point the way toward everything that 
this dissertation could not—or at least does not—contain. 
Choosing what this dissertation would contain and organizing those contents has 
been the most difficult task of the whole endeavor.  I have frequently found myself 
frustrated because everything has to come first.  What I mean by that is that each of the 
conceptual concerns that call for and offer a rationale for the inclusion of plants in 
creaturely rhetorics seems necessary for the others to make sense: the ethical 
responsibility that asks us to attend to them is reliant on breaking down the easy 
distinction between mechanistic beings and minded ones, yet at the same time, the 
urgency for breaking down the distinction between mechanism and mindedness is reliant 
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on the ethical responsibility we have toward them, such that both arguments are 
“necessary” prerequisites for each other.  Both of these arguments make the most sense if 
the rootedness of plant existence is analyzed first, yet it may not be clear why we’re 
bothering to analyze plant rootedness unless the ethical and/or mechanistic arguments 
have already been made.  In what is perhaps the oddest move of the final arrangement, 
Chapter 5: Anthropomorphism and Anthropocentrism, introduces itself as an origin story 
or prequel.  Conventional academic writing suggests that this chapter should have 
immediately followed the introduction, and that is where I had originally envisioned it.  
However, I ran into both the practical problem of self-reference—that is, the chapter 
often wanted to refer to other chapters, which caused difficulty if it preceded them—as 
well as the conceptual problem of naming—that is, part of my argument about 
anthropomorphism is that it only becomes anthropocentric in the attachment of the name 
“anthropomorphism,” so I did not want to begin your reading experience by attaching 
that name to my methods.  Chapter 5 needed to precede everything, but placing it first 
would give the game away.  All of which is to say: organizing this dissertation has been 
an exercise in impossibility. 
So Rhetoric and Plants does not follow a linear, Point A-to-Point B logic (see 
Chapter 2: Sex and Ambulocentrism).  It can’t, and never could.  Adding plants to the 
discussion changes too much, and carries with it too many entry points, forks in the road, 
and graftings for a traditionally linear structure to handle.  Though on the local level I 
have tried to transition smoothly and maintain what my students maddeningly call 
“flow,” a bird’s eye view will reveal a path full of meanderings, backtrackings, and culs-
de-sac; or, rather, what a bird’s eye view will reveal is not a path at all but a garden, a 
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whole made up of many sproutings in carefully chosen but ultimately arbitrary proximity 
to each other.  To read this dissertation from the first page forward is to follow the same 
path through the garden that I took, which is to bypass (at least for now) the many other 
available paths.  What I have tried to accomplish with the final arrangement is a garden 
with 1.) a beaten path, 2.) signposts indicating other, less-beaten paths, and 3.) a 
riotousness that encourages you to beat your own path. Or maybe you could just sit in 
there a while. 
One more story: early in my graduate work, I became interested in scholarship 
that falls under the broad term “animal studies.”  This is perhaps not surprising, given the 
snapshot of my childhood offered at the opening of this foreword.  Soon after developing 
this interest, I read Jacques Derrida’s essay “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow)” for the first time, and two things happened.  First, I realized I would never, no 
matter how hard I tried, write anything that was worth a damn.  It is my sincerest hope for 
writers everywhere to find a text or writer that makes them feel this way.  I don’t mean 
that Derrida’s writing is something that I aspire to, or even that’s it’s something that I 
will always aspire to.  In other words, I don’t mean that I will never be “as good as 
Derrida.”  What I mean, instead, is that each time I consider taking up this text, The 
Animal That Therefore I Am, I can only refer to it or endlessly quote it.  It is a text that 
has so fully infiltrated my thinking that I can say nothing to it or about it.  John 
Muckelbauer once told me of a writer that he felt much the same way toward; that he 
couldn’t write about Nietzsche because he had always been writing through Nietzsche.  
This entire dissertation has been written through The Animal That Therefore I Am, though 
the only contexts in which it is mentioned here are as epigraphs or as brief references that 
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never get taken up and worked.  Each time I tried to address this text, I found that I had 
turned away from a work on rhetoric and plants and turned instead toward a work on The 
Animal That Therefore I Am.  That work may or may not lay in the future for me, but this 
work is not it.  At this particular moment, I have very little I can say about it, which 
brings me to the second of the two things that happened.   
The first time I read the essay that opens The Animal That Therefore I Am, I had a 
crisis of responsibility on page twenty-six.  This is the moment where Derrida says that 
the commercial meat industry would be like the Nazi gas chambers, if the Jews were not 
simply fed to the gas chambers but were fattened and bred so that we never had to stop 
feeding them to the gas chambers.1  Everything stopped for me, and all I could do was 
wander around the house in agony.  In hindsight, it was at this moment that I became a 
humane-itarian, which is the insufferably pretentious term for someone who only eats 
meat taken from an animal that has lived its life and received its death under humane 
conditions.  I was primed to have this response, as someone who had already spent 
considerable time thinking about eating ethically, but it was nevertheless these words in 
Derrida’s essay that did this for me. 
If it does nothing else, the ultimate goal of this dissertation is that the words in it 
do something for you.  If not wandering around the house in agony, then perhaps being a 
little more cautious accusing others of anthropomorphism.  If not reaching for the stick 
on the ground instead of the one of the tree, then perhaps being a little more conscious of 
                                                          
1 “As if, for example, instead of throwing a people into ovens and gas chambers (let’s say Nazi) doctors and 
geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and 
homosexuals by means of artificial insemination, so that, being continually more numerous and better fed, 
they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that of the imposition of genetic 
experimentation, or extermination by gas or by fire.  In the same abattoirs.” Derrida, Jacques. The Animal 
That Therefore I Am. Edited by Marie-Luise Mallet, translated by David Wills, Fordham UP, 2008, p. 26. 
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how much your thinking privileges ambulation.  Actually, scratch that—the ultimate goal 
of this dissertation is for you to learn one thing: always bring your mother to the flower. 
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to Rhetoric and Plants 
After spending much of my professional life teaching rhetoric,  
I began to wonder what I was talking about. 
—George A. Kennedy, “A Hoot in the Dark” 
[R]hetoric, at its most elemental, takes place at the level of the creature. 
—Diane Davis, “Creaturely Rhetorics” 
In my opinion, this choice [to return to the plant world] is more relevant than the very 
fashionable return to the animal world, because not only does it concern a world that is 
able to ensure our survival but it also has many things to teach us… 
—Luce Irigaray, Through Vegetal Being 
Foreign Familiars 
In “Pushing the Limits of the Anthropos,” their guest introduction to the 
Philosophy and Rhetoric special issue Extrahuman Rhetorical Relations: Addressing the 
Animal, the Object, the Dead, and the Divine, Diane Davis and Michelle Ballif focus 
their push on the limits of the anthropos in the direction of (of course) the animal, the 
object, the dead, and the divine.2  These four concepts constitute the loci of the 
investigations within the special issue, chosen by each individual contributor but 
encouraged in the original contributor invitation, of which Davis and Ballif include an 
excerpt.  That invitation described the anthropocentric model of rhetoric that requires “at 
                                                          
2 Davis, Diane and Michelle Ballif. “Pushing the Limits of the Anthropos.” Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 
47, iss. 4, 2014, pp. 346-53. 
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least one discrete human subject” and called for “essays that take it up in order to expose 
its limits and presumptions.”3  Though plants make an appearance in the invitation within 
a list of nonhuman others (along with animals, deities, ghosts, objects, and machines), 
they have fallen by the wayside by the time the invitation turns to the specifics of its call 
for essays.  As we might expect, then, plants do not appear as a focus of investigation in 
the published special issue that resulted from the invitation, even though each of the other 
nonhuman others in the list do.  Why? 
Perhaps this absence can be considered an example of what Jeffrey Nealon calls 
“dedicated swerves around the question of vegetable life,”4 or perhaps the swerve is 
undedicated, a blind spot rather than a turning away.  In either case, the result is that 
plants occupy a gap as one of the few uninvestigated others within current posthumanist 
rhetoric, though they share traits with many of the nonhuman others that have been taken 
up: like animals, plants are living creatures that interact with the world; like objects, 
plants are seemingly mindless material that nevertheless exhibit the force of agency. We 
might say that plants constitute the limit between animal and object, at least conceptually, 
so that they never strike us as the appropriate focus of any particular rhetorical 
investigation of otherness.  But it is that very occupation of the limit between animal and 
object, between animate and inanimate, between acting and acted upon, that calls for 
rhetorical attention. 
 The nonhuman others listed in Davis and Ballif’s call for essays share a 
commonality, and they share it with plants as well: they are nonhuman others.  This 
commonality brings together many seemingly disparate scholarly and rhetorical concerns, 
                                                          
3 Ibid., pp. 348-9. 
4 Nealon, Jeffrey T. Plant Theory: Biopower & Vegetable Life. Stanford UP, 2016, p. x. 
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such that this dissertation engages with the broader motivations and interests of much 
current rhetorical theory while sharing an object of analysis with virtually none.5  Diane 
Davis’s work on otherness and “foreigner relations,” Thomas Rickert’s work on 
materiality and the ambient conditions of possibility for rhetoric, and Michelle Ballif’s 
investigation of the obvious, particularly the “obvious” distinction between the living and 
the dead, together triangulate a space in which my project has come to be. 
Rhetoric and Plants is, in many ways, taking up the “task” set forward by Davis 
at the outset of Inessential Solidarity: “to examine the implications of this always prior 
relation to the foreign(er) without which no meaning-making or determinate (symbolic) 
interaction would be possible.”6  Davis herself approaches this task by way of Emmanuel 
Levinas; she describes Levinas’s concept of “face” as “the site of “my” encounter with 
the inassimilable alterity of the other, which provokes an interruption in identification 
and cognition.”7  To encounter the face of the other is to experience the impossibility of 
understanding or grasping otherness, to encounter an excess that cannot be 
conceptualized.  Simultaneously, an encounter with the face necessitates response: “Not 
every communication with an other signals an encounter with the face.  However, once 
encountered, the face (re)sounds a rhetorical imperative, and nonresponse is not an 
option.”8  Later, Davis again takes up the rhetorical imperative that she sees emanating 
from Levinas’s insistence that “the face of the Other first of all speaks to me,” that “the 
encounter with Autrui occurs solely in the language relation.”9  Of this “appeal to which I 
                                                          
5 To my knowledge, the only published work on plants by a rhetorician is Richard Doyle’s Darwin’s 
Pharmacy: Sex, Plants, and the Evolution of the Noösphere, discussed later in this introduction. Doyle, 
however, is more centrally focused on the noösphere than on plants themselves. 
6 Davis, Diane. Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations. U of Pittsburgh P, 2010, p. 2. 
7 Ibid., p. 12. 
8 Ibid., p. 12. 
9 Ibid., p. 57. 
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cannot not respond,” she asks, “What else is [Levinas] describing but an exemplary 
instance of persuasion without a rhetorician?”10  
I wish to naively literalize (to borrow a phrase from Stacy Doris) the notion of 
“persuasion without a rhetorician,” which I choose to read as “persuasion without a 
rhetor;” without a speaker, or without intent, or without a subject—without a human.  If 
encountering the face of the other is experiencing the impossibility of understanding 
otherness, then the face of the plant is the most difficult for us to encounter, since for 
most of us they don’t even yet qualify as “others.”  Far more often, plants are conceived 
as something closer to objects than to creatures, a conception that renders our ability to 
encounter them as others even more difficult.  In this sense, my project takes up Thomas 
Rickert’s interest in elevating the priority of the material environment so that it is “no 
longer simply complementary to rhetorical theory but rather absolutely integral to it.”11  
For Rickert, “rhetoric is not, finally, a shift in the mental states of subjects but something 
world-transforming for individuals and groups immersed in vibrant, ecologically attuned 
environments.”12  Plants have traditionally been conceived of as “environment” that 
human “individuals and groups [are] immersed in;”13 Rhetoric and Plants argues that 
they also constitute “individuals and groups” that are “immersed in…environments” of 
which humans are a component.  As such, rhetoric is “something world-transforming” 
not only for humans but also for plants and, indeed, for all nonhumans. 
                                                          
10 Ibid., p. 57. 
11 Rickert, Thomas. Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being. U of Pittsburgh P, 2013, p. 
xiii. 
12 Ibid., p. xv. 
13 I have been unable (so far) to source the reference, but gardeners, naturalists, and other plant enthusiasts 
frequently use the phrase “big green wall” to describe how most people perceive the plant life around them. 
I have even heard ethnobotanist Marc Williams suggest that simply being able to identify the plants in a 
particular area by name can allow people to distinguish shades of green that were previously 
indistinguishable to their eyes. 
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Much work is needed, however, to even begin seeing plants as individuals or as 
others that we might encounter through rhetoric.  One method that Rhetoric and Plants 
employs in order to begin this task is a deliberate questioning of the received or assumed 
knowledge that underwrites common conceptions of botanicity or “plantness.”  In some 
instances, this questioning may initially come across as splitting hairs, as mere thought 
experiment, or even as totally asinine.  However, such impressions may be based in 
deeply rooted and long-held assumptions about botanicity that have been or are being 
seriously challenged, even if they haven’t yet significantly changed our general concept 
of plantness. Michelle Ballif makes a similarly “asinine” claim when she posits a “certain 
uncertainty…regarding the border between the living and the dead,”14 a border that, for 
most of us, could not be more certain than it appears to be.  It is that very obviousness, 
though, that seems to draw Ballif’s attention; in seeking to produce a new way of 
thinking, Ballif chooses as her starting point the serious interrogation of a deeply 
assumed knowledge.  This strategy appears as a necessity in Rhetoric and Plants, since 
the resistance to changing our thinking about plants is so strenuous that actually effecting 
that change requires some pretty bold claims—for instance, that plants can remember and 
learn, that they can make decisions, and that they can feel pain.  In each case, I proceed 
by positing a “certain uncertainty” and following where it leads. 
Plants are simultaneously foreign and familiar.  They are so unlike us that we 
must often be reminded that they are living creatures, and even when we remember that 
they are alive, we tend to believe that this “aliveness” is the only thing we share in 
common with them.  At the same time, they are familiar in the sense of being ever-
                                                          
14 Ballif, Michelle. “Zombies / Writing: Awaiting Our Posthumous, Monstrous (Be)Coming.” Writing 
Posthumanism, Posthuman Writing, edited by Sidney I. Dobrin, Parlor Press, 2014, pp. 79-98. 
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present.  For those of us fortunate enough to live in areas where plants grow abundantly, 
they easily slide out of our purview and into the realm of vague “scenery.” Even those 
who spend most of their time in the concrete jungle are nevertheless surrounded by 
plants, or at least plant body parts: cotton clothes, paper cups, wooden floors and 
furniture, and, of course, most of the food in your apartment were all, at one point, rooted 
and growing.  They are familiar in a second sense as well, though: we think we know 
them.  Or, at least, we tend not to be curious about them. To some extent, it’s easy to see 
why—humans, and especially human children, tend to be curious about things that they 
can observe.  You can poke a bug and watch it do interesting things, but you cannot 
easily watch the interesting things that a shrub does when poked.  Children assume they 
know the shrub, because there does not seem to be anything beyond the surface to be 
known.  Foreign and familiar, alien and ubiquitous, plants are known and dismissible 
things.  As such, they offer an excellent point of intersection between Davis’s ethics, 
Rickert’s ambience, and Ballif’s uncertainty.  In the beginning, though, this project began 
to take its shape out of inquiries into another group of nonhuman others—that is, out of 
animal studies. 
Other Animals; Other Creatures 
It could be said that animals entered the field of rhetoric in 2011 with the 
publication of Philosophy and Rhetoric’s forum “Addressing Animals,” which is made 
up of short meditations on animality in rhetoric by Debra Hawhee, Diane Davis, and John 
Muckelbauer.  These introductory meditations—one might even call them sketches—
attempted to open the question in a few specific directions.  Hawhee’s “Toward a Bestial 
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Rhetoric”15 zooms in on George A. Kennedy’s “A Hoot in the Dark” and calls for 
furthering the work he began by considering the actual animals (that is, not only and not 
especially the metaphorical ones) that have populated rhetorical texts from the very 
beginning.  Indeed, Hawhee has taken up her own call in her most recent book Rhetoric 
in Tooth and Claw,16 a full-length treatment of the interest in classical rhetoric’s animal 
familiars that we can see germinating in “Bestial Rhetoric.” 
Muckelbauer’s “Domesticating Animal Theory”17 sniffs after several 
crisscrossing trails of thought and arrives at four potential paths for animal rhetoric going 
forward: problematizing the distinction between instinctive/mechanistic/animal reaction 
and deliberate/reasoned/human response; dethroning symbolic communication as the 
“primary and definitive” concept of communication; learning to treat “rational political 
discourse” as one force among others, rather than as the only and final arena for civic and 
social concerns; and resisting the impulse to continue extending humanist qualities or 
positionalities, particularly “rights,” out to include animals.  In other words, Muckelbauer 
here insists that an animal rhetoric would not simply take up animality and continue 
along the same path it was already on; rather, taking animals seriously requires 
fundamental reconceptualizations of some of rhetoric’s most basic assumptions, 
practices, and curiosities. 
Davis’s “Creaturely Rhetorics”18 continues her interest in the prior rhetoricity 
(that is, prior to speech, or reason, or intent) on which rhetoric always depends, and 
                                                          
15 Hawhee, Debra. “Toward a Bestial Rhetoric.” Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 44, iss. 1, 2011, pp. 81-7. 
16 Hawhee, Debra. Rhetoric in Tooth and Claw: Animals, Language, Sensation. U of Chicago P, 2017. 
17 Muckelbauer, John. “Domesticating Animal Theory.” Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 44, iss. 1, 2011, pp. 
96-100. 
18 Davis, Diane. “Creaturely Rhetorics.” Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 44, iss. 1, 2011, pp. 88-94. 
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which she describes as an ability to be persuaded, affected, or called to respond rather 
than an act of persuasion, affection, speech or response.  She locates the site of this 
common human/animal rhetoricity not in DNA or evolution, as Kennedy does, but in 
corporeality, shared among all living creatures.  While this dissertation responds to a 
greater or lesser degree to each of the calls put forward by these three sketches, it is 
Davis’s corporeally located prior rhetoricity that truly demands an encounter with plants.  
If rhetoric is “an underivable obligation to respond that issues from an irreducible 
relationality;”19 if “[a]ny creature capable of even minimal self-reference is already in 
language…already practicing rhetoric;”20 if “rhetoric, at its most elemental, takes place 
at the level of the creature,”21 then we can no longer justify writing plants out of the 
rhetorical discussion.  One goal of this dissertation is to establish plants as encounterable 
others, fellow corporeal creatures with whom we share certain fundamental aspects of 
corporeality and with whom we are always in relation. Unlike animals, however, the 
particular “rhetorical imperative” issued by plants is rarely heard and even more rarely 
answered.  It is for this reason that we must begin to turn in their direction. 
Scholars engaged in animal studies have in many ways begun this investigation 
already, asking us to consider the ways that we speak to and about other animals, and the 
ways they might “speak” to us, even though we are unable to easily claim intention or 
subjectivity on their part.  Donna Haraway’s When Species Meet considers the 
entanglements with other animal species that make “my” consciousness possible, and 
approaches other animals from the position that philosophical angst over whether we can 
                                                          
19 Ibid., p. 89. 
20 Ibid., p. 92. Original emphasis. 
21 Ibid., p. 89. 
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know anything about the interiority of an animal mind is just so much wheel-spinning.  
She is responding, of course, to Jacques Derrida’s question of “whether one can know 
what respond means.”22  Haraway wants to see Derrida “become curious,”23 to “respond 
to [the] invitation”24 that his cat may have been offering on that morning in that 
bathroom.  Haraway’s critique of Derrida is interesting to me for two reasons.  First, 
perhaps he did accept the invitation.  The Animal That Therefore I Am, in which Derrida 
records this encounter with his cat, is concerned with certain philosophical questions and 
uses the cat-encounter as a method of framing the discussion.  It would not be necessary 
or useful for Derrida to include the fact that, in addition to feeling shame at his nudity, he 
also blurted out “Who’s a fwuffy kitty?” (although it would have been delightful).  The 
second and more important reason that I’m interested in Haraway’s critique is that it 
dismisses the project that Derrida is engaged with, dismisses the very question that 
Derrida sees as central: Derrida asks, “Can I know what respond means?” and Haraway 
answers, “Why are you asking that instead of responding?” 
I belabor this exchange because it gives voice to what I see as the twin anxieties 
within animal studies, anxieties that are worthwhile to maintain and that I wish to carry 
into an investigation of botanicity.  Derrida sits on one shoulder and whispers that we 
can’t ever know the other, and to presume that we can is dangerous both to our thinking 
and to real living bodies in the world.  Haraway sits on the other shoulder and whispers 
that we still have to do stuff.  The tension between these two positions seems to arrest 
both action and thought: how can we act before we understand, and how can we begin to 
                                                          
22 Derrida, Jacques. The Animal That Therefore I Am. Edited by Marie-Luise Mallet, translated by David 
Wills, Fordham UP, 2008, p. 8. 
23 Haraway, Donna J. When Species Meet. U of Minnesota P, 2008, p. 20. 
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understand without having actively engaged?  If we can make this double-bind of twin 
anxieties function to slow down thought and action, rather than arresting them, we might 
make some progress.   
One way that we might—temporarily, in order to avoid arrest—get out of this 
double-bind is to choose a site of inquiry in which questions of intent and subjectivity do 
not immediately rear their heads (although such questions will eventually become 
necessary, as I hope to show).  To do this, I turn to plants, to the group of beings that so 
many taxonomic systems place furthest away from us while maintaining that we share 
something more than atoms in common.  Plants are the living things that Aristotle 
perceived as having only the minimum necessary capacities for qualifying as “alive.”  
They have never been granted intent, subjectivity, or consciousness.  Throughout most of 
the history of Western thought, they have not even been granted the capacity to feel or to 
move their own bodies.  Even referring to their bodies as bodies seems odd, inaccurate in 
some way—the phrase “their bodies” carries with it the unspoken baggage of “their 
minds,” and everyone knows that plants don’t have minds (since they obviously don’t 
have brains).  Although we know that plants are living beings that change and adapt to 
their surroundings, we tend to conceptualize them as objects—as part of the scenery or as 
a resource to exploit.  We do not tend to see them as creatures.  Some scholarly and 
popular work coming out of various scientific and philosophical traditions is, however, 
making some headway in changing this conceptualization. 
Plant Rhetorics  
 Academic interest in the relationships between humans and plants has begun to 
proliferate over the last few years.  Although most of the relevant work I have found is 
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coming out of the fields of science and philosophy, each of the following works is in 
some sense concerned with language and its effects.  That is, each can and must be read 
as a work of and on plant rhetoric, though with varying degrees of explicit awareness of 
the rhetorical concerns being raised.  For example, Eduardo Kohn, in his provocatively 
titled work How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human,25 seeks a 
posthumanist anthropology but has not yet investigated the rhetorical implications of his 
own title for the nonhumans to whom he wishes to attend. This “anthropology beyond the 
human” is investigated within the forest surrounding Avila, a village in the Upper 
Amazon region of Ecuador.  Kohn takes into account the relationships between the Runa 
villagers and animals, and between Runa villagers and “spirits,” but the relationship 
between Runa villagers and plants is left uninterrogated; the “forest” of the book’s title is 
setting, not the site of inquiry, and while Kohn’s attention to animals and spirits may 
produce an anthropology beyond the human, its omission of plants prevents it from fully 
charting the ecosystem in which the Runa live. 
Simply choosing plants as an object of study does not fully solve this problem, 
though.  Richard Doyle’s Darwin’s Pharmacy26 offers an entry point for thinking about 
plants seducing animals.  The success of this seduction has made cannabis arguably the 
most widespread plant in the world, not only growing but flourishing everywhere that 
humans live.  However, in Doyle’s project, the animal being attended to is the human, so 
that the seduction is read from a perspective of human sexuality.  As the first chapter of 
this dissertation argues more thoroughly, Doyle’s reading of “cannabinoid porn” serves to 
                                                          
25 Kohn, Eduardo. How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human. U of California P, 
2013. 
26 Doyle, Richard M. Darwin’s Pharmacy: Sex, Plants, and the Evolution of the Noösphere. U of 
Washington P, 2011. 
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highlight the pointedly human perspective from which Doyle views plant-human 
relationships, overturning the notion that plants are servile but leaving firmly in place the 
notion that our point of view is the meaningful one.  I think the argument could be made 
that our point of view is the meaningful one; I don’t think I’d fully agree with such an 
argument, but the case could be made.  What we see here, however, is not a defense of 
this notion that the human perspective is the one that counts, but an absence of attention 
that allows the notion to stand, at work but uninterrogated. 
In some ways, works of popular science tend to avoid this particular slippage by 
virtue of their attempts to “objectively” examine some aspect of the natural world.  
Though the meat of his discussion takes up this approach, Stefano Mancuso frames his 
popular science book Brilliant Green27 around several rhetorical concerns.  Seeking to 
translate plant neurobiology into layman’s terms, Mancuso associates plant intelligence 
with the ability to communicate, devoting one of five chapters to the question of plant 
communication.  Mancuso also traces the debate over plant intelligence back to ancient 
Greece, claiming that many of the historical arguments within this debate “hinge not on 
science but on sentiment and cultural preconceptions that have existed for thousands of 
years.”28  He returns to ancient Greece in the conclusion of the book, describing 
immobility and insentience as attributes that “are not innate properties of plants, but a 
simple and enduring cultural construct that originated with Aristotle.”29  The central 
claim of the book—that plants are intelligent—is for Mancuso a question that “comes 
                                                          
27 Mancuso, Stefano and Alessandra Viola. Brilliant Green: The Surprising History and Science of Plant 
Intelligence. Translated by Joan Benham, Island Press, 2015. 
28 Ibid., p. 1. 
29 Ibid., p. 155. 
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down to terminology [and which] depends on how we choose to define intelligence.”30  
After raising these rhetorical concerns, Mancuso—perhaps unsurprisingly—addresses 
those concerns by presenting us with facts, presuming that if only he can show readers 
that their conceptions are really misconceptions, then the two-thousand-year-old “simple” 
cultural construct will be easily rectified and overcome. 
  Matthew Hall’s Plants as Persons: A Philosophical Botany31 tracks human-plant 
relationships through several schools of moral and religious thought, including classical 
Greek philosophy, Hinduism, and paganism, among others.  Hall seeks “to survey a 
number of plant knowledges in order to uncover the most appropriate human rendering of 
plant life…[as well as] to locate the most appropriate human behavior toward plants.”32  
His concern for, on the one hand, an “appropriate” human conceptualization of plants 
and, on the other, an “appropriate” human ethics towards them serves to illustrate how a 
project can move forward through the twin anxieties posed by Derrida and Haraway: the 
anxieties of thought and of action.  I don’t, however, necessarily share Hall’s view that 
productive concepts and behaviors can be “uncovered” or “located” within established 
moral traditions.  Instead, our very orientations toward thinking and toward ethical action 
are called into question by botanicity, such that we must be prepared to forge new 
renderings of plants and new behaviors toward them.  Relying too heavily on previously 
developed concepts risks a shallow or inaccurate depiction of the very beings that are 
ostensibly under investigation. 
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This risk is made manifest in Elaine Miller’s The Vegetative Soul,33 which sets its 
sights on “the metaphorical use of language to describe political subjects when it is 
applied to the realm of nature, and, conversely, the language used to describe nature 
when it is employed to legitimate particular descriptions of human subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity,” referring to this site of inquiry as a “rhetoric of description.”34  Miller 
is interested in descriptions due to the fact that “such uses of rhetoric, because of their 
subtlety, are often overlooked.”  Miller sees a potential in plant metaphors for a feminine 
subject that can be differentiated from the masculine “animal” figuration of subject.  
Miller’s book locates itself in the works of Kant, Goethe, Hölderlin, Hegel, and 
Nietzsche, with a final chapter devoted to tracing the vegetative soul through some 
twentieth-century continental philosophy such as Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, and 
Irigaray.  One consequence of focusing her inquiry on metaphors of plants and animals is 
that a concern for actual, particular plants (and, with the exception of the human, 
animals) is noticeably absent from Miller’s work.  While such concerns might be outside 
the scope of her project, Miller does not address this choice as a choice, instead 
remaining silent on the question of whether the metaphorical appropriations of plantness 
within philosophy are in any way an accurate depiction of plant existence.  Further 
complicating this issue is the gendered nature of her project; the alignment of the 
feminine with the botanic has long existed (often to the detriment of both women and 
plants) and utterly ignores the very different, very nonhuman registers of sex and gender 
inhabited by plant bodies. 
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Michael Marder’s Plant-Thinking: A Philosophy of Vegetal Life35 describes itself 
as being grounded in animal studies, much as my own project does.  Marder finds the 
most engaging works on animality to be the ones that are interested in the “intersection of 
ethics and ontology,”36 and this intersection serves as the site from which Marder’s 
argument begins.  Thus Plant-Thinking asks: “How is it possible for us to encounter 
plants? And how can we maintain and nurture, without fetishizing it, their otherness in 
the course of this encounter?”37  Marder offers a succinct run-down of some of the most 
common problematic moves in thinking about plants, drawing attention to the ways that 
we often relegate them to mere scenery, attend to them only for their use value, 
nominalize them into classificatory systems, or position them as a “vanishing mediator” 
(via Hegelian conceptualism in particular) rather than as living beings.38  In its attempt 
“to give a new prominence to vegetal life … and, second, to scrutinize the uncritical 
assumptions on the basis of which this life has been hitherto explained,”39 Plant-Thinking 
accomplishes its goal, simultaneously performing a sweeping critique of metaphysics and 
offering a fascinating vegetal reconstruction of the notions of identity, autonomy, and 
relationship to world.   
However, this work suffers from a problem similar to that identified in Miller’s 
The Vegetative Soul, in that it rarely if ever spends any time considering an actual, 
specific plant.  This problem, though, manifests differently here; while Miller’s 
articulated interest in metaphor seems to offer something of an unarticulated justification 
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for the omission of actual plants, Marder actively argues for attention to particularity and 
difference: 
What does metaphysics have to do with plants? What can this group of 
heterogeneous beings, as different from one another as a stalk of wheat and an 
oak tree, tell us about being “as such and as a whole,” let alone about resisting the 
core metaphysical values of presence and identity that the totality of being 
entails? A pessimistic response to these questions is that metaphysical violence 
seeking to eliminate differences—for instance, between a raspberry bush and 
moss, or a mayflower and a palm tree—results in a reduction of the bewildering 
diversity of vegetation to the conceptual unity “plant.” The plant cannot offer any 
resistance to metaphysics because it is one of the impoverished products of the 
metaphysical obsession with primordial unity[.]40  
This sounds like an introduction to a piece that will be characterized by deep 
engagements with particular plants and attention to the differences between them.  On the 
contrary, Marder proceeds to argue that in constructing the unity “The plant,” the 
metaphysical tradition “inadvertently confers on [plants] a crucial role in the ongoing 
transvaluation of metaphysical value systems.”41  In other words, Marder’s response to 
his own call for attention to difference is to continue collapsing plants into a general unity 
that simply offers a “different” value system.   
Offering up a few specific examples of different plants (“a raspberry bush and 
moss”), while perhaps acknowledging their difference, does not constitute attention to 
difference.  Nowhere in the following pages does Marder investigate the ways that a 
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raspberry bush might figure autonomy differently than moss, say.  Though Marder’s 
generality renders The plant as a positive unity rather than a negative one, the practice 
leads him to idealize plantness in a way that does not stand up to close scrutiny.  For 
example, the fig-wasp—whose offspring are incubated by the fig tree on the condition of 
pollination and killed by the fig tree if this condition is not met—might take exception to 
Marder’s claim that “the non-economic generosity of the plant-soul, giving itself without 
reserve to everything and everyone that lives, transcribes vegetal democracy into an 
ethical politics, free of any expectations of returns from the other.”42 
Jeffrey Nealon’s Plant Theory: Biopower & Vegetable Life43 takes up a similar 
approach to Marder’s in that Nealon is concerned with the presences and pointed 
absences of plants in certain philosophical texts; in this case, Nealon is interested in 
Foucault, Derrida (by way of Aristotle and Heidegger), and Deleuze and Guattari.  Unlike 
Marder, Nealon’s focus is solely on those texts; although he concludes by pointing to 
some of the shifts in thinking that his investigation suggests are now necessary within the 
larger discussion of biopolitics, he is not looking to describe a “botanopolitics,” nor is he 
treating plants as the solution for a dissatisfying political atmosphere.  As such, the fact 
that the work contains no extended examinations of how certain plants engage with the 
world does not come across as a risky omission, as it sometimes does in Marder.   
What Nealon’s book does make clear is that the growing community of plant 
theorists can no longer get away with mentioning but not engaging with each other.  As 
the most recent publication in this section, it mentions all of the aforementioned works on 
plant rhetorics, but it does so primarily in the preface and almost entirely on a single 
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page.  This conversation has grown large enough that is no longer sufficient to simply list 
out the scholars working with plants as a nod to the scholarship that exists.  Just as 
Nealon recognizes that he must make space within an existing community for his own 
contribution to biopolitics, the sub-field of plant studies has reached a point—just—at 
which no plant theorist is working in isolation.  In order for us to begin to work through 
some of the problematics outlined above that botanicity has brought to the surface, 
engagement with the community as a community is necessary. 
 To close, we turn from the most recent publication to the oldest and, possibly, the 
strangest.  Francis Hallé’s In Praise of Plants44 differs substantially from all of the 
aforementioned works in several ways.  In fact, it is a difficult book to describe due to the 
ways it resists easy classification as a type of book.  It is a work of pop science that 
nevertheless delves into both current biochemical research and philosophical questions of 
immanence and transcendence, expecting its readers to keep up.  It is a polemic against 
the “bias bordering on injustice”45 that erases plants from so many conversations about 
life and living things, but it spends very little time either presenting or arguing with its 
opponents, instead launching itself into a proliferation of investigations and meditations 
that functionally argue rather than explicitly arguing Hallé’s case.  It is an informational 
book, collecting previous scientific and scholarly knowledge rather than posing new data 
or ideas, yet it is structured not as a set of progressive informational lessons but as a loose 
configuration of minute inquiries that delve quite deeply into a specific idea, but only for 
two or three pages; then it whisks the reader off to some other minute inquiry that may or 
may not have been suggested by the previous one.  In Praise of Plants is, in short, the 
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most botanic piece of writing described here.  Plants are not only the subject matter being 
discussed (in great detail and with a deft movement between specific description and 
theorization); plants are also the models on which Hallé’s approach to writing is based.  
While my project may end up looking quite a bit like a standard academic argument, my 
process of writing is taken directly from my process of reading Hallé. 
Botanicity 
Plants are rooted, fixed, non-ambulatory.  Though they do move, they do not go 
elsewhere of their own volition.  When we begin to consider botanicity, rootedness is the 
quality that makes itself known again and again, in various manners and intensities.  It 
conditions the ways that plants sense, take in energy, defend themselves, and reproduce.  
Plant reproduction, in particular, makes visible the significance of being rooted; as such, 
Chapter 2: Sex and Ambulocentrism, takes up plant sexual behavior as its starting point.  
The most common type of plant by far is the angiosperm or flowering plant, and the most 
common form of pollination for flowering plants is by far biotic pollination, or 
pollination via third-party organism.  In other words, “normal” plant sex involves two or 
more plants that stay where they are and persuade some animal pollinator to approach 
them.  All available means are deployed: the shape, color, and scent of a flower all work 
together to seduce certain pollinators, often very specific ones.  Food is offered in the 
form of nectar.  The fly orchid even goes so far as to mimic not only the appearance but 
even the scent of female wasps in order to seduce male wasps into pseudocopulation, a 
sexual act that is unfulfilling for the wasp but quite satisfying for the orchid.46  After 
pollination occurs and a seed develops, the plant once again persuades ambulatory 
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organisms to do its bidding, again offering food in the form of fruit so that a hungry 
animal will intentionally eat the fruit and unintentionally drop the seed further from its 
parent than gravity would allow.   
Botanic persuasion, rooted in rootedness, seeks first to influence distance.  It 
works upon desires that are already present within its others and convinces them to come 
closer or to move away.  The relationship between a botanic self and an other is not 
fundamentally a linguistic one, but a spatial one, which nevertheless also necessitates 
response.  Of course, there is already an implicit relationship between language and 
space.  As Derrida makes visible in “Signature Event Context,”47 the word 
“communication” indicates not only verbal communication but spatial communication as 
well, as in a passage that communicates between rooms or a disease that is communicable 
between people.  We carry this figure of moving across space into even our casual 
discussions of speaking and writing, describing ourselves as trying to get an idea across, 
or to reach a particular audience.  We make moves in our academic work, and we follow 
lines of thinking.  We go into detail.  We walk through an idea, explaining it step-by-step.  
The metaphors of moving from one place to another are certainly not the only metaphors 
we use to discuss writing, but they are pervasive.  They indicate a largely unrecognized 
prejudice within the English language, a prejudice I call ambulocentrism.  Our bias in 
favor of that which goes elsewhere is only made visible through attention to creatures that 
do not. 
Chapter 3: Mechanism and Mindedness seeks to simultaneously decouple mind 
from brain in the general sense while reinstituting mind as embodied in the case of 
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humans.  In other words, we closely associate mind with brain such that creatures without 
brains or with “inferior” brains are written out of mindedness, even while we continue to 
conceptualize our own minds as somehow distinct from the body part that primarily 
produces it.  Chapter 3 troubles both these tendencies, offering ways that brainless 
bodies, including plants, demonstrate evidence of mind or what we might want to call 
response, while gesturing toward brain research that suggests our human, minded 
responses are simply one subtype of mechanistic, embodied reaction.  The goal is not to 
jettison response or reaction, mind or mechanism, nor is it the goal to “grant” mind to 
plants or unproblematically bring them into the category of minded or conscious beings.  
Rather, the goal is to reconfigure the ways we think about mind, body, purposiveness, 
and mechanism, such that humans no longer get to claim ownership over response and 
distance from reaction. 
Chapter 4: Pain and Ethics attempts to reconfigure some of the assumptions 
underlying our creaturely ethics.  If we wanted to trace the history of modern animal 
ethics to a starting point, we could do worse than to locate that starting point in Jeremy 
Bentham’s famous footnote to An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, which states that “the question is not, Can [animals] reason? nor, Can they 
talk? but, Can they suffer?”  Animal ethics begins with a question about the capacity to 
experience pain.  From our perspective in 2018, this may seem like a question with a self-
evident answer, and I believe Bentham intended it that way.  Of course animals can 
suffer.  The risk of asking a rhetorical question, however, is that your audience may 
answer it differently than you assume they will.  At certain times and in certain places, 
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the answer to this question was no, animals do not feel pain.48  The enormity of the 
consequences of this attitude, of defining a living being as incapable of experiencing 
pain, can be seen even with the most cursory glance at the practice of anesthesia-free 
vivisection. 
Suggesting that plants might feel pain is, of course, absurd on the face of it.  The 
very fact that everyone knows that they do not, though, is precisely what makes it a 
question worth examining in this project.  Just as Michelle Ballif posits a “certain 
uncertainty”49 about the border between the living and the dead in order to interrogate the 
construction of that border, Chapter 4 posits a certain uncertainty about whether plants 
can feel pain.  Since there is so much inertial resistance to this idea, the method here of 
positing uncertainty is to attempt to make the best possible case that there is certainty that 
plants do feel pain, with the goal of breaking through the resistance by applying enough 
force in the opposite direction. 
If plants can feel pain or something like it—and I would argue that unilaterally 
and unequivocally denying them this capacity is a rhetorical move that is ultimately self-
serving—then they have a different relationship to pain than we and probably most other 
animals do.  Plants offer their body parts as a method of persuasion, a method that has 
been so successful for certain plant species that they have persuaded us to pollinate them, 
protect them from harm, spread their seeds far and wide, and to feed and water them.  
Though they seem to be passive, this survival strategy is a source of great power for these 
beings who are, each of them individually, entirely at our mercy.  This is a form of power 
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that proceeds entirely from persuasion, a persuasion without a rhetor, rooted in 
rootedness and accomplished by sacrifice rather than by reason.  Considering botanicity 
as a form of alterity challenges us to develop a new understanding of ethics even as it 
offers us a new ethical model. 
Finally, Chapter 5: Anthropomorphism and Anthropocentrism takes up a question 
that has been more or less implicitly raised at many points throughout Chapters 1-4, both 
argumentatively and methodologically—the question of whether anthropomorphism has a 
place in posthumanist work generally and this work specifically.  Though 
anthropomorphism has been addressed in posthumanist rhetoric and science studies, it 
most often is addressed in passing and usually with an eye toward simply defending one’s 
work from the critique that its language is too humanizing, a critique that I identify as 
“the anthropomorphism accusation.”  Chapter 5 begins a fuller treatment of how the 
anthropomorphism accusation functions, as well as how anthropomorphism functions, of 
its relationship to anthropocentrism, and of its potential role in science studies. 
Rather than closing with a “conclusion,” the dissertation opens up yet more 
avenues of pursuit in Chapter 6: Outroduction.  One goal of this project has been to bring 
plants into the posthumanism discussion, because thus far they have been largely absent 
from that discussion.  That absence means that there were numerous potential entry 
points for the case that we should attend to plants, and quite a few of those entry points 
had to be weeded out.  As an invitation for further study, Chapter 6 attempts to articulate 
that weeding out process while showcasing the “weeds,” in the hopes that they can be re-
planted in the future. 
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Another way to think of this structure is that we first begin, in Chapter 2, with an 
investigation of the ways that rhetorical attention to plant bodily capacities, particularly 
reproduction, can provide us with new ways of thinking about language such that features 
of the language like ambulocentrism become visible.  Chapter 3 then investigates the 
ways that the language of mechanism and mindedness (which is of a piece with the 
language of reaction and response) figures our categorizations of plant bodily capacities 
(as well as other creatures’ capacities, including our own).  Chapter 4 addresses the nexus 
point of mind and body, interrogating the difficulties and ramifications of presuming 
what bodies are capable of experiencing.  Chapter 5 steps back to consider one of the 
fundamental questions raised by this project, while the Outroduction gestures toward 
other projects that have now become possible. 
The basic assumption of this dissertation is that plants are creatures.  We must 
begin to turn toward them, not only in creaturely rhetorics but in posthumanist rhetorics 
more broadly.  This is not simply a matter of coverage; as I hope to show here, rhetorical 
attention to botanicity is “something world-transforming” for all involved. 
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Chapter 2: Sex and Ambulocentrism 
All species have a notion of emptiness, and yet / the flowers don’t quit opening. 
—Terrance Hayes, “Lighthead’s Guide to the Galaxy” 
And from the vantage of this being-there-before-me it can allow itself to be looked at,  
no doubt, but also—something that philosophy perhaps forgets, perhaps being this  
calculated forgetting itself—it can look at me. It has its point of view regarding me.  
The point of view of the absolute other… 
—Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am 
Compiling and engaging rhetorical bestiaries might help us to better understand  
the absolutely unfathomable range of rhetoric without pretending to make it  
fathomable, and to better appreciate all the “whos” we are here with  
without presuming to homogenize this radical heterogeneity. 
—Diane Davis, “Some Reflections on the Limit” 
Perspective 
In her afterword to Rhetoric Society Quarterly’s 2017 special issue A Rhetorical 
Bestiary, Diane Davis’s call for “new compendiums of bestial rhetorics”50 invites a 
collective effort to interrogate the perceived limit between animal and human, and to 
thereby open the perceived limit of rhetoric.  In many ways, the present work takes up 
that call, though it would be a misnomer to call it a bestiary.  Instead, let’s call it a 
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topiary, a field or little place composed of plants that have been trimmed and shaped by 
human (in this case, my) hands.  In this topiary, as in all topiaries, animals are present but 
plants are the main event; certain plants have been selected for cultivation while others 
have been weeded out; the selected plants do not appear in their “natural” form, nor could 
we know what their “natural” form might have been simply by looking at them here; and 
the forms they do take have been shaped in order to establish a pattern, suggested by their 
own growth and behavior but ultimately produced by human desire and labor.  The 
constant presence of the human in this description may seem to run counter to the post-
humanist goal of dislodging the human from the center of rhetoric; however, decentering 
the human does not mean jettisoning the human from posthuman studies entirely.  To 
attempt such an erasure would be to risk erasing the conceptual and material impact of 
human presence on the very nonhumans we wish to attend. 
Case in point: say we wanted to study the sexuality of the garden cucumber.  
Cucumis sativus prefers to grow as a monoecious individual, which means that an 
individual plant will produce some flowers with functional (male) stamens and some 
flowers with functional (female) carpels.  In 1960, C.E. Peterson published his 
development of a gynoecious cultivar of the garden cucumber, allowing growers to plant 
fields full of wholly female individuals, with a few monoecious individuals kept around 
for pollinating purposes.51  Thinking from the perspective of “the plant itself,” it is 
tempting to read this as a normalizing intervention by human cultivators into a group of 
bodies whose sexual organs do not suit our needs: we want large quantities of offspring, 
so we force femaleness onto cucumber bodies in order to reap the rewards of their newly 
                                                          
51 Wehner, Todd C. “A Brief History of the Development of Cucumber Cultivars in the U.S.” Cucurbit 
Genetics Cooperative Report, vol. 14, 1991, pp. 1-4. 
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designed sexual relationships.  However, the sexuality of the original(?) monoecious 
garden cucumber also cannot be separated from human intervention, as it has been 
domesticated for over 5,000 years; we can’t trace the cucumber’s “wild” progenitor with 
anything approaching certainty.  This does not mean that we should try harder to consider 
“the plant itself” in isolation from the human—quite the contrary, any analysis of 
cucumber sexuality must take the intervention of humans into account.  As far back as 
our knowledge reaches, there is no “plant itself” for us to consider. 
So if we don’t want the human to be the center, and we can’t simply think about 
the plant in isolation from the human, then our impulse might be to focus on the 
relationships between plants and humans; that is, to think about the site of interaction, 
conflict, and collaboration between the two.  Richard Doyle’s Darwin’s Pharmacy takes 
just such an approach, offering a way of thinking about plants seducing humans.52  
For example, in chapter 6, “The Transgenic Involution,” Doyle investigates the 
ways in which images of cannabis buds function as “cannabinoid porn,” emphasizing 
that, while enthusiasts will be enthusiasts, “there is a function to images of cannabis in 
the community of growers and users that is simply absent in many other demographics of 
intoxication.”53  The function that is present in these images and not in others is 
something much more like the pleasurable gratification of pornography than 
demonstration, community bonding, or art, as images function in other substance-
centered communities.  While cannabis communities certainly use images to pass along 
                                                          
52 Doyle, Richard M. Darwin’s Pharmacy: Sex, Plants, and the Evolution of the Noösphere. U of 
Washington P, 2011. Though the main project of the book is an investigation of the ways that plants have 
contributed to the development of human consciousness, “plants seducing humans” is the subset of that 
investigation that I am here interested in. 
53 Ibid., p. 238. 
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information, to make people feel like part of the group, and to share creative ideas that 
have been inspired by the object of their enthusiasm, this community also shares pictures 
of cannabis plants that are simply meant to be drooled over.  Doyle also goes out of his 
way to ensure that, in calling these kinds of images “porn,” the connotation of this 
pleasure as a specifically sexual one is not lost, suggesting that the frequency of close-up 
images of cannabis buds function to map a “veritable becoming insect”54 of the human 
viewer—that is, a becoming-sexual-partner to the plant.   
Doyle’s approach decenters humans in many ways, figuring the human as 
pollinator, servicer, even worshipper rather than as the consumer, the served, god-like 
and in control.  Even so, it is also worth remembering that, from the perspective of the 
plant, there is no “human becoming insect” happening here—that is, there’s nothing 
perceivably sexual happening to the plant at all when it’s getting its picture taken, and 
who knows what is happening to the plant by the time a human is looking at the picture.55  
The idea of the human viewer “becoming insect” in response to cannabinoid porn makes 
sense only from a pointedly human perspective.  Of course, there is nothing inherently 
wrong with this; if we are to understand humans as situated within relationships with 
other living things, then we must consider how those relationships work on us. 
This example does, however, demonstrate a risk that is always present in the work 
of posthumanist rhetoric, which is the risk of maintaining a purely human position of 
observation when nonhumans are the observed.  Would we find it so easy to describe the 
event of a human viewing human pornography as a “veritable becoming-lover?” What 
                                                          
54 Ibid. 
55 This observation offers an opportunity to say something about all pornography and its relationship to 
time and distance that, unfortunately, I do not have the space to delve into here. 
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might such a description erase or eclipse with regard to the lived experience of the 
photographed?  Doyle echoes others, notably Michael Pollan, in championing the 
cannabis plant’s desirability as a survival strategy and in pointing to our widespread 
cultivation and maintenance of these plants as an opportunity to ask “who is really 
domesticating whom?”  In our human-viewing-human-porn scenario, can we still come to 
the simple conclusion that the porn “star” has found a wildly successful survival strategy, 
since our desire for porn means that we will never allow porn stars to go extinct?  Do we 
still find it easy to unproblematically assert that the ubiquity of the adult film industry 
should have us asking who is really subjugating whom? 
This line of questioning is not intended as an argument that taking or looking at 
pictures of plants is the same as producing or looking at human pornography, nor that the 
consequences are the same for the cannabis plant as they are for the sex worker, or for the 
viewer of the two images.  Rather, it serves to illustrate that we are capable of 
immediately recognizing the problematic nature of a singular perspective when the 
“other” possible perspective is a human one, but it’s easy, all too easy, to forget that 
nonhumans have perspectives as well, and that attending to theirs will vastly complicate 
any given analysis that involves them.  Whether it has eyes to look or not, “the absolute 
other” “has its point of view regarding me,”56 and not only me but everything else that it 
is in relation with.  Holding that reminder in mind, then, this chapter will attempt to think 
plants from a vantage point that more closely approximates their own.  It is impossible, of 
course, for any of us to actually stand at such a vantage point, or to know whether we 
“really” stood there or not (this impossibility is taken up in greater depth in Chapter 5).  I 
                                                          
56 Derrida, Jacques. The Animal That Therefore I Am. Edited by Marie-Luise Mallet, translated by David 
Wills, Fordham UP, 2008, p. 11. 
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don’t think the exercise is less valuable for its impossibility; quite the contrary, since the 
goal of attempting this impossible task is not to know but to learn, and learning happens 
in the doing rather than the having done.  What we will do, then, is consider the bodies 
and behaviors of certain kinds of plants, as well as the words we use (and the words we 
could use) to describe them.  In order to place a limit on the endless possible paths 
available to us, we will focus on that part of plants’ lives that, due to our own human 
interests and desires, is arguably the most readily available to us: their sex lives.  Such an 
investigation begins with the material realities of plant bodies which allow/encourage and 
disallow/inhibit certain kinds of behaviors. 
Plant Sex and Sexuality  
Our categories of plant sexual identities rely on a collapsing of the concepts of 
male and female even as we maintain the words themselves.  Plant maleness and 
femaleness are rarely manifested as explicitly demarcated male individuals and female 
individuals.  Instead, most plants have both “male” and “female” body parts. In some 
cases, male flowers and female flowers are produced by the same individual plant, as in 
the monoecious cucumber; in most cases, though, an individual plant produces flowers 
that are “hermaphroditic,” having both functional (male) stamens and functional (female) 
carpels. Botanical discourses, including agricultural and gardening discourses, have 
maintained the archaic synonymy of “hermaphroditic” and “bisexual,” terms that have 
diverged in the discourse of human sexuality.  When referring to humans, “bisexual” now 
indicates the object choice of the individual being described; when referring to plants, 
“bisexual” continues to indicate a body type rather than an object choice, as it once did 
for humans as well.  Further, botanical discourse offers a third synonym for 
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“hermaphroditic” and “bisexual:” perfect.  A perfect flower is a bisexual flower, a 
hermaphroditic flower, a flower that is both male and female—and the most common 
kind of flower.  Bisexual bodies are the norm for plants.  Even in the comparatively few 
cases where individual plants are demarcated as rigidly male or female (referred to as 
dioecious plants), the notions of male and female must be rethought in order to account 
for the bodies and behaviors they describe.  Sexuality in plants, regardless of whether the 
plant or even the flower in question is male or female, is invasive and receptive, active 
and passive, cooperative and manipulative, exploiting and exploited. 
The most common form of pollination is biotic pollination, which is when a third-
party organism (usually an insect) is required.  This means that a hermaphroditic 
interspecies threesome is the plant version of “vanilla.”  In order to actuate this practice, 
plants must seduce the animal, a seduction that is most often accomplished through an 
offering of some part of the plant for the animal’s consumption; indeed, to be consumed 
by an animal seems to be the sole function of nectar. Seducing the animal pollinator to 
actively penetrate the flower is non-“gender”-specific: whether for the purpose of having 
pollen collected (from “male” stamens) or having it delivered (to “female” carpels), the 
plant passively receives the pollinator’s intimate touch upon its flower.  Simultaneously, 
the plant actively manipulates the pollinator in order to produce the sort of intimate touch 
that most benefits the plant. 
Trumpet pitchers are an excellent example of this.  Due to their bisexual bodies, 
most flowers, unlike most animals, are capable of self-fertilization (even if they need or 
prefer a bit of bestiality to accomplish it).  Even with this capability, however, plants 
have elaborate mechanisms and behaviors to avoid self-fertilization.  Trumpet pitchers 
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are carnivorous plants that must negotiate attracting insects for food and attracting insects 
for pollination.  In order to avoid accidentally eating the pollinator, the flower grows at 
the end of a long stalk, well away from the deadly pitcher.  The flower hangs down from 
the stalk like a lampshade, so that the pollinator tends to enter it by moving upward from 
below.  As it does so, it must force its way up and over the lip of the style, on which are 
located the stigmas.  If the pollinator is already carrying pollen from another individual, 
some of the pollen will be brushed off against the stigmas, ensuring cross-fertilization.  
After the pollinator deliberately collects nectar and inadvertently gets invaded by new 
grains of pollen, it instinctively heads toward a sliver of light to get out of the flower—a 
sliver that appears above the pollinator’s head, again encouraging it up instead of down.  
This keeps the pollinator from brushing the stigmas on its way out, thereby avoiding the 
self-fertilization of the individual.   
Like most other flowering plants, trumpet pitchers are perfectly capable of re-
producing—producing the same again—in the strictest sense: producing an offspring that 
is as close to a clone as can be achieved through sexual methods.  However, plants go to 
great lengths to resist re-producing in this way, instead favoring cross-pollination, a kind 
of creation via remixing.  Strict re-production is the least desirable kind of production, so 
the plant avoids it by orchestrating a very precise interaction based on the animal 
pollinator’s already present tendencies (like flying toward light to get out of an 
enclosure). 
When plants develop a monogamous relationship with one pollinator species, 
pollination itself can take some very odd forms.  Orchids of the Ophrys genus are known 
for their unusual pollination method, which is referred to as “pseudocopulation.”  
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Pseudocopulation is exactly what it sounds like.  The orchids each have a specific 
pollinator species; they produce flowers that look very much like the females of their 
pollinators, and they emit scents that mimic the females’ pheromones, which is even 
more powerfully attractive than the visual mimicry offered by the petals.57  The pollinator 
is fooled into attempting to copulate with the flower, and in so doing it inadvertently 
becomes covered with pollen.  It then passes along the pollen when it tries to have sex 
with the next flower, completing and extending the pollination cycle.   
The orchids described in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus are 
probably members of the Ophrys genus, as some Ophrys species specialize in attracting 
particular wasps as pollinators.  Deleuze and Guattari equalize the power balance 
between orchid and wasp, describing “a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the 
orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp,”58 in which the two simultaneous becomings 
form a reciprocal loop of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.  This analysis 
provides us with a way of thinking the wasp and the orchid as forces within an 
assemblage, becoming-orchid-wasp, rather than as fully distinct entities that sometimes 
interact with each other: a wasp and an orchid.  The equalizing of the power balance is 
misleading, however.  As far as we know, the fooled wasp gets nothing but sexual 
frustration from the orchid, which does not even bother to produce nectar.59  The 
frustrated wasps will eventually wise up and stop visiting the orchids, but they have 
solutions for that, as well: a single orchid produces an enormous number of seeds to 
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mitigate the risk of a low pollination rate, and some species develop slight variations 
within individuals to prevent their pollinators from learning to avoid them.60  In this 
relationship, the orchid’s desire is the driver of both its own becoming-wasp and the 
wasp’s becoming-orchid—the orchid, not the wasp, is calling the shots. 
But the best example of a plant in a position of power is the case of the fig tree-fig 
wasp mutualism.  A “fig” is best understood not as a fruit, but as a kind of inside-out 
flower cluster.  That is, if we were to cut open an unripe fig, we would find many small 
flowers, with their “heads” toward the center of the fig and their “stems” attached to the 
inner wall.  The pollinator wasp seeks out an unripe fig, which is said to be in its “female 
phase,” and pushes its way into the fig through an opening that exists for this purpose.  In 
actively pollinated figs,61 the wasp then lays its eggs while distributing the pollen it has 
collected.  Then the wasp dies and the fig begins its “interfloral phase,” in which both fig 
seeds and wasp larvae develop.  Finally, during the fig’s “male phase,” the wasp eggs 
hatch, mate, collect pollen, and tunnel their way out to search for an unripe/female-phase 
fig to start the cycle over again.62  In their study of this relationship across several fig tree 
species, Charlotte K. Jandér and Edward Allen Herre found that when wasps “cheat,” or 
lay eggs while choosing not to perform their pollinating duties, the tree drops the fig 
containing the “cheater” wasp’s eggs and kills them.  They further found that the stricter 
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these “sanctions” are, the less likely that individuals within the pollinator wasp species 
will choose to cheat.63 
 I want to take a moment to step away from plant behaviors themselves and 
expand on the ways that we talk about those behaviors.  Before getting into that, though, 
it seems useful to clarify and summarize the fig tree-fig wasp relationship described 
above.  Normally, the wasps actively pollinate the tree, and in exchange are allowed to 
lay their eggs within some of the figs.  The wasps are capable of choosing not to 
pollinate, but if they do choose to cheat in this way, the tree will drop the figs containing 
wasp eggs.  Not all of the figs, but specifically the ones with baby wasps inside.  The 
stricter the tree is about killing baby wasps, the more likely the wasps are to collect and 
distribute that tree’s pollen.  The tree’s strong-arm tactic tends to work. 
Within this study that demonstrates a remarkable manifestation of agency in what 
has largely been presumed to be a passive species, authors Jandér and Herre go out of 
their way to avoid using sanction as a verb; the tree never sanctions the wasp to influence 
its behavior, rather the tree has sanctions and the sanctions influence the wasp’s behavior.  
The closest the authors come to using sanction as a verb is in the final section, while 
speculating on the reason “for trees to apply ‘sanctions.’”64  Although sanctions is still 
being used as a noun, this sentence constructs the trees as actively doing something, 
unlike the other sentences in which the term sanctions appears.  In this sentence that 
figures the tree as capable of applying sanctions, the word sanctions is suddenly in 
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quotation marks,65 as if the term must be marked as figurative the moment it begins to 
sound like it’s something the trees are choosing to do, or even just doing.  Even more 
telling is the paragraph that begins the paper’s final section, in which the authors turn to 
other mutualistic relationships as a way of contextualizing their findings.  In this 
paragraph, the creatures that are named as examples of mutualisms are fish, insects, and 
humans.  In this paragraph that is empty of plants, the term punish entirely takes the place 
of the term sanctions, and it is the only paragraph in the entire paper where any term at 
all replaces sanctions.  Apparently, animals can punish cheaters, but plants cannot, even 
though the other aspects of these mutualisms are considered analogous enough that the 
authors consider their plant study to be a contribution to scientific understanding of 
animal mutualisms as well. 
 We can tell this story differently.  We can figure the fig tree as prostitute, offering 
the use of its body as an exchange commodity.  Or we can describe the fig tree-fig wasp 
relationship as a landlord-sharecropper relationship, in which the landlord/tree always 
holds the power to boot the sharecropper/wasp off its property.  Or we can imagine the 
fig tree as a Hollywood crime boss; in this you-scratch-my-back-I’ll-scratch-yours story, 
everyone happily prospers together until the boss gets crossed, at which point he murders 
your whole family.  Or—and this might or might not sit more easily with some—we can 
go ahead and use the verb punish to describe what the fig tree is doing, just as we use it to 
describe the behavior of reef fish, social insects, and humans.  My goal here is not to wag 
a finger at Jandér and Herre themselves, which would suggest that the problem would be 
solved if these two people had just used their words differently.  Rather, the example of 
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Jandér and Herre functions to throw this tendency into stark relief, providing an 
especially visible instance of a pattern that pervades botany in particular and discourse on 
plants more generally. 
Scientific Metaphor 
 Within botany, the reluctance to describe plants in terms that do not “properly” 
belong to them can be sketched by examining the intense and ongoing reaction against a 
single book published in 1973: The Secret Life of Plants by Peter Tompkins and 
Christopher Bird, which argued among other things that plants can read human 
thoughts.66  Perhaps the best testament to the book’s pop influence is that it is credited 
with the craze of talking to your plants to improve their health, a myth that probably 
everyone is familiar with to some extent, even if that familiarity derives from films or 
novels rather than directly from Secret Life.  Among botanists, this book has become 
almost a metonym for plant pseudoscience, in large part because it was so popular and 
therefore influential on the social imagination.  It is invoked either with derision—if you 
want to dismiss someone else’s botanical research, just say that it sounds an awful lot like 
Secret Life—or with lamentation:  
[P]ublicity from pop culture in the 1970s, generated by the controversial book 
‘The Secret Life of Plants’ (including paranormal claims that plants are attuned to 
human emotional states), stigmatized any possible similarities between plant 
signaling and animal neurobiology. Many plant biologists, wittingly or 
unwittingly, practiced a form of self-censorship in thought, discussion and 
research…The prohibition against anthropomorphizing plant function perpetuated 
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ignorance of the work of [certain] outstanding researchers…and so prevented the 
investigation of the roles of electrical long-distance signals [in plant 
physiology].67 
Brenner et al. here make some pretty strong claims about bias and stigma in the history of 
plant signaling research, and link those claims directly back to Secret Life, as it is the 
only work mentioned by name as contributing to this stigma.  Jandér and Herre’s decision 
to toggle between sanctions when describing trees and punish when describing fish, 
insects, and humans exemplifies the anxiety that Brenner et al. are concerned about.  To 
say that “fig trees punish cheater wasps” sounds an awful lot like Secret Life; saying 
instead that “cheater wasps face sanctions” is a lot safer, even if sanctions has just as 
much metaphorical connotation as punish. 
It is, not, of course, a novel idea to suggest that science is rife with metaphors that 
it does not always choose to recognize as such, and that it might do well to think long and 
hard about them.  Emily Martin’s “The Egg and the Sperm” famously critiques the 
tendency in biology texts to describe human reproduction in stereotypically gendered 
terms, such as the inherent passivity of the egg/female and the inherent activity of the 
sperm/male.  The hope is that her exposure will cause the stereotypes to “lose much of 
their power to harm us.”68  Martin is not claiming that her work on these biology texts 
will completely disempower all the sexist stereotypes that appear within them; instead, 
she hopes that the cultural stereotypes that she uncovers in her work will no longer be 
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presented as inherent and natural with the full backing of biological science.  As she 
notes toward the end of her essay, “the models that biologists use to describe their data 
can have important social effects,” including the continued entrenchment of “some of the 
hoariest old stereotypes about weak damsels in distress and their strong male rescuers.”69  
Her final call to action is a call to “wake up sleeping metaphors in science,”70 a 
description that is itself a metaphor casting the feminist scholar in the role of Prince 
Charming and scientific metaphors in the role of the sleeping princess. Once woken, the 
metaphors/princess will have been robbed “of their power to naturalize our social 
conventions about gender.”71  While it’s unclear whether Martin prefers a scientific 
language that is metaphor-free, she is certainly suspicious of metaphors that humanize: 
“Even if we succeed in substituting more egalitarian, interactive metaphors to describe 
the activities of egg and sperm…we would still be guilty of endowing cellular entities 
with personhood. More crucial, then, than what kinds of personalities we bestow on cells 
is the very fact that we are doing it at all.”72  Martin warns that the power of science to 
bestow personalities—and therefore personhood—on cells “could ultimately have the 
most disturbing social consequences,” especially regarding women’s reproductive 
rights.73 
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 47 
Martin’s insightful analysis works to bring attention to the ways that cultural 
norms are embedded in scientific discussions as well as interpretations of scientific 
results.  That is, metaphor and stereotype not only affect the ways that scientists are able 
to talk about their findings—they also affect what those scientists are able to “find” in the 
first place, as Martin notes in her discussion of the research that, using technologies that 
had been available for a century, finally countered the idea of sperm as strong and 
penetrating and instead showed that the egg is the more “forceful” and active party in the 
sperm-egg encounter. 
However, as Martin’s call to “wake up sleeping metaphors” demonstrates, it’s not 
so easy to avoid “bestowing personalities” or granting intentionality. The problem with 
the metaphors that Martin identifies in biology is not that they are the “wrong” metaphors 
or even that they’re damaging, but that they work to produce a single, monolithic view 
that preempts new ways of thinking about sperm, egg, ovulation, fertilization, and all the 
other components of human reproduction that are under scrutiny here.  We should take up 
Martin’s call to disentrench these metaphors and the assumptions that both constitute and 
follow from them, not because they are unworthy of entrenchment (which might imply 
that some other metaphor is), but simply because they are entrenched.  In Martin’s case, 
the damsel-in-distress/knight-in-shining-armor narrative was the dominant metaphor that 
required scrutiny; in botany, humanizing/animating metaphors are stringently avoided in 
favor of mechanizing/passivizing ones, which means that an attempt to take Martin’s 
work seriously within an essay on plants produces a piece of writing that is everywhere 
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bestowing on nonhumans the very “personalities” and “intentional actions” that Martin 
would have us avoid.74 
Ambulocentrism 
 At least in part, we tend to avoid describing plants with humanizing/animating 
metaphors in favor of mechanizing/passivizing ones because we associate animatedness 
with movement, and especially with ambulation.  We now recognize that plants move 
their own bodies in various ways, such that even laymen who don’t have much interest in 
plants tend to understand that phototropism is a movement the plant is performing.  This 
understanding is surprisingly recent, though; until Erasmus Darwin began publishing his 
wildly popular botanical work near the turn of the 18th century, the broadly accepted 
explanation for phototropism was that the sun dried out the side of the plant that was 
nearest to it, which caused the plant to seem to bend toward the sun—the plant was acted 
upon by the sun, rather than acting itself in response to the sun.  Similar mechanistic 
explanations were provided for other observable plant movements as well: they’re not 
moving, they’re being moved.  The notion that plants were essentially insensitive and 
immobile had been handed down from Aristotle and Theophrastus—who had never seen 
a Venus flytrap or a Mimosa pudica—and persisted even as seventeenth-century 
experimental evidence of sensitivity and mobility was growing.75  The work that really 
began to unseat this notion was Erasmus Darwin’s The Loves of the Plants,76 which 
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personifies various plants as human lovers based on their varying reproductive organs 
and habits, and contains copious footnotes and endnotes which offer scientific 
explanations of particular plants as they appear in the poem.  It was not scientific 
evidence alone that began overturning the “motionless” conception of plants, but the 
power of a work that treated scientific research as a backgrounded supplement to an 
extended, meticulously crafted metaphor that reveled in its anthropomorphism. 
 Bolstered in the twentieth century by filming techniques that make slow 
movements more visible to us, plant mobility is now accepted as the rule rather than the 
exception (as Venus flytraps and Mimosa pudica were once considered exceptions after 
their discovery in the Americas).  Rootedness, though, remains an aspect of botanicity 
that is central to plants’ engagement with the world.  With very few exceptions,77 plants 
move but do not locomote—they do not go elsewhere of their own volition.  As such, 
plant persuasion is based primarily in getting someone else to come to them.  It is a 
sessile persuasion, an attraction or seduction that asks another creature to approach by 
offering something to that creature, whether nectar or the (false) promise of copulation or 
a tasty body part that can be torn away and eaten.  The rootedness of plants is one of their 
defining features, such that any rooted or seemingly rooted creature, like sponges or sea 
anemones, were once thought to be plants.  Even so, it is surprisingly easy to forget this 
fundamental difference between plants and human animals, as Francis Hallé reminds us 
when he demonstrates that plants are not “lacking” in capacities or inferior to animals, 
                                                          
77 Some algae locomote via flagella, for instance.  However, like fungi, algae are considered a separate 
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their new location and then right themselves. 
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but instead have exactly those body parts and abilities that one would expect in a rooted, 
photosynthesizing creature.78 
 More importantly for our purposes here, it is easy to forget or to never have 
recognized the force that locomotion, and specifically ambulation, wields in our 
discourse.  Especially with regard to discourse about thinking, writing, communicating, 
and rhetoric more generally, our language is pervaded by what I am calling 
ambulocentrism.  “Ambulocentrism” refers to the linguistically embedded tendency to 
describe communication in terms of going elsewhere, of someone or something moving 
from Point A to Point B.  “Ambulo-” specifically refers to walking in order to highlight 
the greater force of ambulatory terms as compared to other forms of locomotion (and, I’ll 
admit, for aesthetic reasons as well—“locomocentrism” sounds like a postmodern Beach 
Boys cover band); however, since the concept developed from attention to sessility, any 
form of going elsewhere is included in “ambulocentric language.” 
Together with the metaphorics of vision, the metaphorics of going elsewhere 
dominates rhetorical discourse.  Consider the following paragraph from the preface of 
Thomas Rickert’s Ambient Rhetoric, in which I have bolded instances of ambulocentric 
language: 
Terroir conveys a great deal about the subject of this book, which is ambient 
rhetoric.  Rhetoric, while traditionally taken as a discursive, intentional art, can 
and indeed must be grounded in the material relations from which it springs, not 
simply as the situation giving it its shape and exigence, but as a part of what we 
mean by rhetoric.  Rhetoric in this sense is ambient.  It surrounds; it is of the 
                                                          
78 Hallé, Francis. In Praise of Plants. Translated by David Lee, Timber Press, 2002. 
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earth, both in the most mundane of senses and in the Heideggerian idiom, as that 
which withdraws from meaning and relationality, which I will address later in 
the book.  Rhetoric impacts the senses, circulates in waves of affect, and 
communes to join and disjoin people.  It gathers and is gathered by things not 
as a denial of the social but as an essential complement to it.  Rhetoric may give 
priority to the expressly salient, but the salient must take part in and emerge from 
the ambient.  We can think this in terms of Richard Lanham’s notion of rhetoric 
as the economics of attention, provided we expand the concept of attention 
beyond that which is limited to the subjective, intentional, or merely cognitive; 
attention would thereby come to include the materiality of our ambient environs, 
our affective comportments, the impact of that which escapes conscious notice, 
and the stumbling block presented by the finitude of knowledge when facing the 
plenitude of the world and its objects.  Attention attends to the salient, but the 
bringing forth of salience is itself a complex activity that has ambient 
dimensions.  This poses a problem, as I will show, when the salient is taken for all 
that there is or all that matters.  It poses a problem precisely because it excludes 
from discussion how the ambient dimensions of a rhetorical situation constitute 
the ways things emerge and show up for us in the first place.  Thus, to attend to 
the sensory and meaningful characteristics of a wine (or any food or drink, 
actually) leads from subjective experience back to “the surroundings and 
settings,” as Amy Trubek puts it in her discussion of terroir.79 
                                                          
79 Rickert, Thomas. Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being. U of Pittsburgh P, 2013, p. x-
xi. Please forgive the lengthy passage; since I’m interested here in a pattern within the “minor” language, 
the bits and pieces that connect the more substantive ideas, quoting small passages and unpacking them 
doesn’t exactly do the trick. 
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While it’s true that some of these instances of ambulocentric language are arguable—is 
“bringing forth” or “gathering” really a metaphor of going elsewhere?—it’s also true that 
there are other instances, like the various uses of “taken,” that arguably should be 
included.  I’m less interested in digging up etymologies in order to decide for certain 
which words and phrases “truly” count as ambulocentric than I am interested in simply 
demonstrating the pattern.  The pattern tends to be even more ambulatory when we talk to 
students about their writing, especially when we are critiquing their writing for 
improvement.  We say things like, “Where is this essay going? Who are you trying to 
reach? I feel like it’s missing a step or two.  Walk me through your thinking. We haven’t 
yet arrived anywhere; what’s your landing place?  I see where you’re headed, but I’m not 
quite on board yet.”  In other words, ambulocentrism is often amplified when we’re 
discussing what writing should do.  Yet, in the above passage we can see that it persists 
to a lesser degree even in a work that seems well-situated to have noticed this tendency.  
This says less about Rickert or ambient rhetoric than it does about plants: thinking about 
plants and thinking from the perspective of plants is what makes ambulocentrism visible. 
 It’s not that ambulocentric language is inherently a bad thing, and I’m not calling 
for it to be scrubbed from our discourse; I doubt that would be productive even if it were 
possible.  I am suggesting, though, that it is an aspect of our language that has been at 
work for quite a while, unacknowledged by us and therefore, perhaps, working against us 
at times.  For instance, I can imagine a non-teleological argument, one that is not 
concerned with arriving at any particular telos, allowing telos back in the door via 
ambulocentrism, all unaware and to the argument’s detriment (“telos,” of course, being 
one way of describing “Point B”).  I can also imagine that same argument intensifying its 
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ambulocentrism in order to create a tension between the goal and the method of achieving 
the goal.  Before that can happen, though, the writer must notice, must become aware of 
ambulocentrism—otherwise, it isn’t available for crafting.  Similarly, I can imagine 
different versions of Rickert’s passage above: one in which ambulocentric language is 
avoided in favor of non-ambulocentric language in order to intensify the decoupling of 
rhetoric from an intentional, conscious, (i.e., locomoting) subject, and I can just as easily 
imagine one in which the ambulocentrism is cranked up to eleven as yet one more 
method of emphasizing the vibrant agency of the environs that surround us.  In either 
case, attention to ambulocentrism is the prerequisite, and attention to the sessility of 
botanicity is what has, at least here, conditioned that possibility.   
The sessile nature of plant existence has far-reaching impact on the ways we 
conceive of and categorize them.  The next chapter, “Mechanism and Mindedness,” 
investigates how plant sessility and presumed immobility have contributed to the 
construction of plants as non-minded beings, as well as how the recognition of plants as 
moving beings raises questions about their internal communication systems.  This 
curiosity in turn raises the possibility of something like a plant “mind,” but does so in 
such a way that “mind” itself is rethought.  As we come to understand human 
consciousness as something produced by “mechanistic” functions, it becomes more and 
more difficult to relegate other creatures to the category of mechanism while reserving 
the notion of “mind” for ourselves. 
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Chapter 3: Mechanism and Mindedness 
To understand the brain, claimed Turing, all we have to do is to  
simulate its numerous functions by just writing enough code. 
— György Buzsáki, Rhythms of the Brain 
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,/ 
How can we know the dancer from the dance? 
—W.B. Yeats, “Among School Children” 
The said question of the said animal in its entirety comes down to knowing  
not whether the animal speaks but whether one can know what respond means. 
And how to distinguish a response from a reaction. 
—Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am 
Minds, Bodies, and Brains 
The previous chapter referred to Erasmus Darwin’s writing as a pivotal factor in 
overturning the widespread assumption that plants do not move.  Darwin’s The Loves of 
the Plants was published in 1789 and was so popular that he received an advance roughly 
equivalent to 180,000 current US dollars for his next work, The Economy of Vegetation, 
published in 1791.80  The same year, these two works were collected in The Botanic 
Garden.  The book’s juxtaposition of poetry and natural history results in a hybrid work 
that may seem more at home in the postmodern era than at the turn of the 19th century.  
                                                          
80 King-Hele, Desmond. “Note [foreword].” The Botanic Garden 1791, The Scolar Press, 1973. No 
pagination. 
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Both Part I, The Economy of Vegetation, and Part II, The Loves of the Plants, are poems 
with extensive “philosophical notes.”  In The Economy of Vegetation, the goddess of 
botany speaks through the poet to address the nymphs of fire, the gnomes of earth, the 
nymphs of water, and the sylphs of air; the footnotes and endnotes that accompany it 
expound on all sorts of scientific subjects, from hydrogen to sea-ice to magnets, which 
are referenced in the poem.  The Loves of the Plants follows a similar form; the poem 
personifies various plants as human lovers based on their varying reproductive organs 
and habits, and nearly all of the notes comprise scientific explanations of particular plants 
as they appear in the poem.  The poems are meticulously crafted, and the science is 
meticulously researched.  Due to the popularity of The Botanic Garden, Erasmus 
Darwin’s ideas and insights were widely disseminated to popular, literary, and 
intellectual audiences.  However, Darwin’s full theory of the nature of plants does not get 
articulated until the publication of Phytologia in 1800, in which his study of plant 
physiology and mobility leads him to consider whether plants might have a brain. 
Phytologia; or The Philosophy of Agriculture and Gardening, begins with a truly 
astounding claim: “that vegetables are in reality an inferior order of animals.”81  To 
demonstrate this proposition, Darwin first argues for the individuality of buds, rather than 
the entire plant constituting a single individual.  He then argues that since plants are 
“immoveably fixed to the soil, from whence they draw their aliment ready prepared, and 
this uniformly,” while animals move about “in search of food, and take that food at 
considerable intervals of time,” it makes no sense to deny animality to plants on the basis 
                                                          
81 Darwin, Erasmus. Phytologia; or the Philosophy of Agriculture and Gardening. With the Theory of 
Draining Morasses, and with an Improved Construction of the Drill Plough. J. Johnson, 1800, p. 1. 
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of their lacking “muscles of locomotion” or “mouth, throat, stomach, and bowels;”82 no 
stationary, continuous eater would need any of these parts.  Instead, the parts that would 
be expected if plants were indeed “an inferior order of animals” are absorbent vessels, 
umbilical vessels, a pulmonary system, an arterial system, glands that separate fluids and 
secretions, reproductive organs, and a system of muscles, nerves, and “common 
sensorium,”83 which we will return to later.   
After completing the section arguing for the individuality of buds, Darwin spends 
the next 130 pages performing physiological analyses of exactly those parts and systems 
that comprise the above list, devoting a section to each.  Throughout these analyses, 
Darwin persistently claims that each particular plant part is analogous to parts found in 
animals: “The existence of that branch of the absorbent vessels of vegetables, which 
resembles the lacteals of animal bodies[…];”84  “The seeds of vegetables are a sexual 
offspring corresponding with the eggs of animals[…];”85  “Their [i.e., plant glands] 
effects are however as evident as those of the glands of animals in the secretion or 
production of various fluids[…];”86  “After the seeds are thus produced, the parent bud 
dies; and in this respect the buds bear a very great analogy to those annual insects, which 
change from their caterpillar or larva-forms, putting forth painted wings and organs of 
reproduction, and after deposing their eggs cease to exist.”87  Throughout these sections, 
Darwin claims animality for plants boldly and often.  However, he is much more careful 
in “Section VIII: The Muscles, Nerves, and Brain of Vegetables.” 
                                                          
82 Ibid., p. 5. 
83 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
84 Ibid., p. 10. 
85 Ibid., p. 21. 
86 Ibid., p. 72. 
87 Ibid., p. 91. 
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Here, Darwin must move further away from direct anatomical evidence and 
instead argue by logical reasoning.  He opens the section by acknowledging this: “The 
various motions of peculiar parts of vegetables evince the existence of muscles and 
nerves in those parts…though the fibres and nerves, which constitute these muscles, are 
too fine for anatomical demonstration.”88  Instead of anatomical demonstration, Darwin 
must resort to reasoned conclusions based on behavior.  The behaviors and abilities of 
several particular plant species lead him to the suggestion that plants must have muscles 
that can contract to produce movement as well as nerves that can sense—for instance, the 
Venus flytrap must be able to sense when an insect has entered the space between its 
leaves, and it must have “muscles” that it contracts to catch the insect.  From this 
premise, Darwin further suggests that plants must have “a common sensorium, or brain, 
where the nerves communicate;”89 if this were not the case, how could the part that 
senses communicate the presence of an insect to the part that moves? 
At this point, though, the existence of a common sensorium is a hypothesis.  In 
order to show its validity, certain questions would have to be “answered in the 
affirmative. Have vegetable buds irritability? have they sensation? have they volition? 
have they associations of motion?”90  Darwin follows with other reasoned arguments that 
plants do indeed possess all of these faculties.  At each step of the argument, Darwin 
reiterates the ways in which each piece of evidence points to the presence of something 
like a brain.  He seems to recognize, though, how outlandish this must seem, since he 
shifts from the bold claims of analogy that occur in parts I-VII toward a more timid or 
                                                          
88 Ibid., p. 132. 
89 Ibid., p. 133. 
90 Ibid., p. 133. 
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hedged version here.  He appears to want to claim a plant brain, but “brain” is too bold a 
word.  He settles for the oft-repeated phrase “brain or common sensorium,” followed by 
an explanation of what he means by this phrase.  The pattern is repeated again and 
again.91 
It’s tempting to write off Darwin’s outré argument for a plant “brain or common 
sensorium” as a misguided speculation based on scant or erroneous knowledge, and 
Darwin himself admits that he does not have enough information to locate it (he suggests 
that it might be located in the pith, but does not attempt to defend this suggestion as 
fact).92  However, a similar argument is being put forward by some scientists today.  
Interestingly, the sticking point still seems to be the language used to describe plant 
systems and processes.  Everyone agrees that plant cells are able to communicate with 
each other, but many scientists take issue with the term that has been applied to the study 
of how such communication happens: “plant neurobiology.” 
In 2005, Stefano Mancuso established the International Laboratory of Plant 
Neurobiology (LINV), and he, along with several colleagues, published an introduction 
to the concept of “plant neurobiology” in Trends in Plants Science in 2006.93  Shortly 
after, thirty-six fellow botanists published an open letter in Trends calling for Mancuso 
and others to cease using the term “plant neurobiology,” claiming that the term “does not 
add to our understanding of plant physiology, plant cell biology or signaling” since the 
authors can “stat[e] simply that there is no evidence for structures such as neurons, 
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92 Ibid., p. 139. 
93 Brenner, Eric D., Rainer Stahlberg, Stefano Mancuso, Jorge Vivanco, František Baluška, and Elizabeth 
Van Volkenburgh. “Plant Neurobiology: An Integrated View of Plant Signaling.” Trends in Plant Science, 
vol. 11, 2006, pp. 413-19. 
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synapses or a brain in plants.”94  The same issue of Trends includes a response from 
Mancuso and the original co-authors of the introductory piece, defending the term “plant 
neurobiology.”  They begin somewhat snarkily: “No one proposes that we literally look 
for a walnut-shaped little brain in the root or shoot tip or some myelinated super-
conducting nerve cells in plants.”95 They go on to argue that Alpi et al. have missed the 
point and state that “we are less concerned with names than with the phenomena that 
have been overlooked in plant science.”96  However, Mancuso and his colleagues do 
seem to be concerned with names, judging by the following question that they pose:  
If one wants to figure out how a sunflower plant is able to propagate an action 
potential over a distance of 0.3 m (a length of more than one thousand cells), then 
with what related phenomenon should we start our comparisons if not those of 
animals?97 
This statement, coupled with Baluška and Mancuso’s call for “removing the old 
Aristotelian schism between plants and animals”98 in 2009, suggests a deliberate and 
purposeful decision to take up the term “plant neurobiology” and indicates that it is far 
from an incidentally derived name that they are not much concerned with.   
 At bottom, this debate over terminology is based in two different questions.  Alpi 
et al. ask whether the same types of structures are found in plants and animals, and the 
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conclusion they arrive at is no.  Mancuso et al. ask whether the same functions are being 
performed within the processes of plant and animal cell communication, and the 
conclusion they arrive at is yes.  The disagreement is not about what structures exist or 
what functions are being performed, but about whether we should privilege structures 
over functions in our terminology and therefore in our investigations. 
 There is a third position within this debate as well, articulated by Anthony 
Trewavas.  Trewavas also responded directly to Alpi et al., arguing that “plant 
neurobiology” is a metaphor and that “all metaphors have value” and are “an essential 
adjunct to the imaginative scientific mind.”99  While it’s always refreshing to hear a 
scientist argue from a more rhetorical perspective, Trewavas’s positioning of “plant 
neurobiology” as a metaphor reads mostly as an appeasement of Alpi et al.  Trewavas 
does passionately defend the role of metaphor in science, but he defends it primarily on 
the grounds that metaphor can “stimulate the investigative imagination.”100  In other 
words, metaphor is a useful thought experiment and to use a metaphor should not be 
conflated with making a truth claim.  This position is based in the idea that 
“neurobiology” is a scientific term with a very specialized meaning, and to use it loosely 
would be to blur the distinctions between plant and animal.  This is true.  The thing about 
the argument being put forth by many plant neurobiologists, though, is that blurring such 
distinctions is exactly what they are trying to do.  As suggested by the aforementioned 
call to “remov[e] the old Aristotelian schism between plants and animals,” Baluška and 
Mancuso are concerned that this conceptual schism has contributed to a thin or 
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“obscured” understanding of the phylogenetic relationships between living organisms, 
and are therefore deliberately borrowing the term “neurobiology” and applying it to 
plants as an attempt to disrupt the schism.  So, while it might be a metaphor, it’s not 
merely a metaphor, nor is it merely being used to stimulate the imagination; it’s being 
used as a strategic argument against one of the oldest binaric distinctions within the life 
sciences: animal/plant. 
Even though photosynthesis (or lack thereof) offers the simplest and most basic 
distinction between plant and animal, Darwin’s Phytologia and the plant neurobiology 
debate both suggest that brains and their concomitant parts are frequently deployed when 
one wants to either bolster or trouble the distinction.  I want to suggest that the reason 
brains are a focal point for either argument is that the brain is the central figure on the 
dichotomous spectrum between mind and body.  Categorized as body but tightly 
associated with mind, the brain is the site at which mind and body meet, mesh, collapse, 
and conflate—the site at which it is least easy to distinguish mechanism from mentality.  
Brain is tightly associated with mind, which means that when researchers notice 
behaviors that suggest mindedness, they start looking for a brain (like Erasmus Darwin) 
or they deliberately begin making analogies to brains (like Mancuso and company).  But 
brain is also strictly categorized as a body part, which means that when scientists like 
Alpi et al. seek to reify the distinction between plant and animal, they can point to plants’ 
lack of brain and consider the question of plant mindedness as having been closed.  
However, the tight and direct association between mind and brain has already become 
troubled by concepts like emergence, which describes how complex systems like 
consciousness can be produced by the simple behaviors of non-conscious things, and 
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extended cognition, which describes how some creatures offload some of their cognitive 
burden into non-brain body parts or even into materials outside the borders of their 
bodies.101  If thinking and awareness can be dissociated from brains, then lack of brain 
doesn’t necessarily close the question of plant mindedness, after all. 
Mind 
In 2014, researcher Monica Gagliano and her team published a paper that sought 
to establish whether plants could learn.102  Other research had already shown that plants 
have a certain kind of “memory” that allows them to adapt, just as animals do.  What 
Gagliano’s experiment sought to identify was a “learned behavioral response” in addition 
to these previously demonstrated adaptive responses—that is, she and her team wanted to 
look for evidence of “behavior that an individual develops by being taught.”103  She 
chose Mimosa pudica as her subject, probably for the same reason that many other 
researchers choose this species as a test subject: when disturbed, it folds its leaves up 
rapidly, one of the relatively few instances of easily visible movement in plants.104  While 
the Mimosa’s leaf-folding behavior is believed to be an adaptation to help ward off insect 
predation, the behavior can be caused by a wide range of stimuli, including warming, 
shaking, and the touch of a human fingertip.  Since leaf-folding carries costs (both 
costing the plant energy to perform and temporarily reducing the plant’s ability to take in 
sunlight), the Mimosa must be able to filter stimuli, ignoring familiar ones that pose no 
threat, such as the sensation of a neighboring plant brushing against its leaves, while 
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responding both to familiar ones that do pose threats, such as insect feet, and unfamiliar 
ones that may pose a threat, such as human fingertips.  If the plant did not have the ability 
to filter familiar non-harmful stimuli, it would be constantly closing its leaves and this 
behavior would quickly become a detriment to the species’ success rather than 
advantageous. 
In essence, Gagliano wanted to find out whether she could teach the plant to 
ignore an unfamiliar nonharmful stimulus.  She chose falling as the stimulus, dropping 
potted Mimosas from a height of 15 cm, since this stimulus causes the Mimosa to fold its 
leaves even though it’s unlikely that any Mimosas would have adapted any kind of 
specific response to falling through the air and then landing.  In other words, it is an 
unfamiliar experience that the Mimosa reads as potentially dangerous, though the fall of 
15 cm does not actually cause it any harm.  To help establish whether any observed 
behavioral changes could indeed be considered learning, Gagliano tested different plants 
under different light conditions.  The idea was that, if learning was indeed happening, 
then the plants grown under lower light should be faster to learn to ignore the drop, since 
these plants would stand to lose more by folding up their leaves for no good reason and 
missing out on some of that sweet, sweet sunlight. 
If you made it through Chapter 2, you can probably guess what’s coming next: the 
Mimosas did in fact learn to ignore being dropped, and the plants grown under lower light 
conditions learned faster.  What’s more, “plants whose leaf-folding reflex had habituated 
through earlier training in one light treatment still exhibited the learned behavior in the 
new light condition almost a month later.”105  In other words, even under differing 
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conditions, the plants remembered to ignore being dropped even though they had not 
experienced such a sensation in nearly a month. 
Gagliano next set out to discover if plants can learn by association.106  She set up 
a Y-maze for young pea plants and trained one group to positively associate the wind 
from a fan with a source of light (the wind and the light always came from the same arm 
of the Y), while training another group to negatively associate the two (that is, the wind 
from the fan came from one arm of the Y while the light came from the other arm).  After 
training, the plants were tested to see if they would grow toward or away from the fan, 
depending on their training, without the presence of a light source.  Of the plants trained 
with a positive association between the light and the fan, 62% grew toward the fan; of 
those trained to negatively associate, 69% grew away from the fan. In both cases, the last 
position of the light source prior to testing was recorded and had no apparent effect, 
indicating that a significant number of plants did indeed learn to associate the position of 
the fan with the position of the light source, both positively and negatively.  In a follow-
up, Gagliano further found that this learning is greatly hindered by interference with the 
plants’ circadian rhythms—jet-lagged plants are worse at learning. 
Plants also exhibit behaviors that we might call kindnesses.  Since Susan Dudley 
and Amanda File published the first study on the phenomenon of kin recognition in plants 
in 2007, various plants have been shown to cooperate with close kin, especially siblings, 
while still competing with other, less closely related plants.  For instance, Crepy and 
Casal’s 2014 study found that thale cress will adjust the positioning of their leaves in 
order to make sure that they don’t block the sunlight for their nearby siblings, even when 
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doing so produces more “self-shading” and is therefore costly to the plant.107  Similarly, 
Klein, Siegwolf, and Körner found cooperation when they expected competition: their 
ground-breaking five-year study of a forest in Switzerland found that tall, healthy trees 
will share “substantial” amounts of carbon with other trees, even those of different 
species.108  The carbon-sharing occurs through the common mycorrhizal network that 
connects the trees’ root systems.  This is the same network—sometimes glibly called the 
“fungal internet” or “the wood wide web”—that has been popularized by the work of 
Suzanne Simard, who has found that “mother trees” use it to support their offspring, and 
that Douglas firs and paper-bark birches will share needed carbon with each other 
specifically during times of stress. 
Concrete resources are not all that’s shared between plants; they also share 
information.  In the next chapter, we will see that plants under attack emit distinct 
chemical signals which warn other plants to prime their own defenses. Research has 
shown that, in addition to this kind of plant-to-plant communication, at least some plants 
also engage in plant-to-animal communication.109  One example of such research is 
Kessler and Baldwin’s 2001 study in Science, which found that coyote tobacco plants110 
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by the same researchers. The study under current discussion is Kessler, André and Ian T. Baldwin. 
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that came under attack from hawkmoth caterpillars, leaf bugs, and flea beetles, emitted a 
particular blend of VOCs (volatile organic compounds).  This blend was found to attract 
Western big-eyed bugs (Geocoris pallens), a predator of all three of the attacking bugs.  
Kessler and Baldwin reported that by calling in this predator, the coyote tobacco plants 
were potentially able to reduce their attackers by more than 90%. 
In addition to learning, recognizing kin, sharing, and communicating, plants are 
also known to sleep,111 count,112 and succumb to anesthesia.113  Though we do not have 
any satisfactorily precise definitions of consciousness or of mind, these abilities and 
behaviors suggest that many of the capacities we closely associate with mind are to some 
degree present within creatures that have none of the structures associated with brains or 
central nervous systems.  Yet, to varying degrees and often indirectly (or non-
consciously), plants are figured as passive, mindless, mechanistic things, often by the 
very researchers whose findings suggest otherwise. 
Body 
Intentionality,114 as a capacity that “properly belongs” to the human, continues to 
be a point of debate in response to these kinds of findings.  We have long known that 
plants compete with each other, often fiercely, for nutrients and sunlight, but the idea that 
                                                          
“Defensive Function of Herbivore-Induced Plant Volatile Emissions in Nature.” Science, vol. 291, 16 Mar. 
2001, pp. 2141-44. 
111 Coghlan, Andy. “Trees Seen Resting Branches while ‘Asleep’ for the First Time.” New Scientist, 18 
May 2016. 
112 Böhm, Jennifer et al. “The Venus Flytrap Dionaea muscipula Counts Prey-Induced Action Potentials to 
Induce Sodium Uptake.” Current Biology, vol. 26, iss. 3, 8 Feb. 2016, pp. 286-95. 
113 Yokawa, K. et al. “Anaesthetics Stop Diverse Plant Organ Movements, Affect Endocytic Vesicle 
Recycling and ROS Homeostasis, and Block Action Potentials in Venus Flytraps.” Annals of Botany, 
mcx155, 11 Dec. 2017. 
114 I want to acknowledge that the term “intentionality” carries much conceptual baggage within literary 
theory and phenomenology; here, however, I’m taking up this particular term because it is most often the 
term of choice for botanists directly addressing certain questions in their field, not because I want to invoke 
authorial and phenomenological questions within ours. 
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they might cooperate with each other seems to strike many as a much more surprising 
behavior.115  Perhaps this is because we associate human strife, competition, and violence 
with our “baser nature,” conceiving our ability to cooperate as “overcoming” our low, 
animalistic impulse toward selfishness.  This hierarchization of cooperation as higher or 
more noble—more humanistic—than selfishness is a value system that persists even as 
we come to recognize that our tendency toward cooperation and sociality is shared by our 
nearest evolutionary relatives, and therefore could more accurately be figured as a 
product of our animality rather than a conquering of it.  Nevertheless, as we continue to 
consider them a “lower” life form, we find plant competition easier to swallow than plant 
cooperation. 
Similarly, we tend to consider the reception of information to be further from the 
human end of the hierarchy than communication of information, particularly the 
deliberate, targeted communication of information—plants might listen, but they 
certainly don’t tell.  In many cases, botanists overtly claim this distinction, as Baldwin, 
Kessler, and Halitschke do while defining “communication” in their research review of 
VOC findings: “Although ‘communication’ is a loaded term that means different things 
to different researchers, most would accept a definition with the minimal requirement that 
information be exchanged, regardless of ‘intent’ or fitness consequence of either 
party.”116  Here, the authors skirt the question of intentionality by raising it, ensuring their 
                                                          
115 For just one example, Tamir Klein, one of the researchers who published such findings, is quoted by 
Christina Selby: “The entire finding was a surprise, my co-author didn't believe it at first, we thought it was 
a root sorting error [sic].” Selby, Christina. “Trees Share Carbon: New Discovery May be Key to Saving 
Trees in a Warming World.” Mongabay.com, 10 Aug. 2016. 
116 Baldwin, Ian T., André Kessler, and Rayko Halitschke. “Volatile Signaling in Plant-Plant-Herbivore 
Interactions: What is Real?” Current Opinion in Plant Biology, vol. 5, iss. 4, 2002, pp. 351-4. 
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readers that they are not asking this particular question and simultaneously 
acknowledging that it’s worth asking.   
In many other cases, the dis-attribution of intentionality is accomplished via 
synonyms, scare-quotes, or grammar and vocabulary that otherwise distances plant 
subjects from as much volitional agency as possible.  Virtually every botanist interviewed 
about the communicative, lethal acacia trees comment that just because an attacked 
acacia emits ethylene and other acacias respond to the ethylene by priming their defenses, 
that doesn’t mean that the attacked acacia wanted to warn the others of greedy kudus; it’s 
probably emitting ethylene to warn the other parts of its own body and the other acacias 
just overheard.  Song et al. use the term “eavesdrop” to describe the use of mycorrhizal 
networks to transmit distress signals: “…plants can ‘eavesdrop’ on defence signals from 
the pathogen-challenged neighbors through CMNs [common mycorrhizal networks] to 
activate defences before being attacked themselves.”117  While the term “eavesdrop” does 
figure the listening plants’ behavior as somewhat intentional or at least agentic, it elides 
any suggestion that the signaling plants are intentionally warning their neighbors.  
Similarly, we tend to attribute the communication between plants and beneficial 
predatory insects to the insect’s ability to read the chemical emissions of the plant, rather 
than the plant’s ability to send chemical messages to the insect.  This is in keeping with 
our discussion in Chapter 2 of Jandér and Herre’s avoidance of the active verb “punish” 
in favor of the passive noun “sanctions” when plants are the agent but not when animals 
are the agent.  Language choices like those demonstrated here, taken together, establish a 
clear pattern of plants as mechanistic rather than intentional beings—they sense, and they 
                                                          
117 Song, Yuan Yuan et al. “Interplant Communication of Tomato Plants through Underground Common 
Mycorrhizal Networks.” PLoS ONE, vol. 5, iss. 10, 13 Oct. 2010. 
 69 
react to those sensations, but they don’t respond, decide, or intend to do any of the things 
they do. 
Brain 
This hesitancy to grant intentionality to plant behavior is exacerbated by science 
reporting that leans in the opposite direction, using intentionality as clickbait whether it 
makes sense to do so or not.  To cite one example: in the Scientific American article 
“Mother Plants Tell Their Seeds When to Sprout: Parents Pass Down ‘Memories’ of 
Recent Temperatures to Prepare Seed for Incoming Spring Weather,”118 the study 
described found that plants that experience warmer temperatures produce seeds with 
weaker shells so that germination occurs earlier, while those that experienced colder 
temperatures produced seeds with tougher shells, delaying germination.  These findings 
do not suggest anything like intentional communication (or “telling”) between the parent 
plant and the seedling, and while memory may be at work in the parent plant’s ability to 
remember recent temperatures and produce tougher or weaker shells accordingly, there is 
no indication in this study that those memories are “passed down” such that the seedlings 
also remember them, whether in the form of instinct or of knowledge.  In other words, 
this study’s findings are that the parent plant determines the germination time of its 
seedlings, but does so mechanistically, by making it harder for the seedling to break 
through the shell.  In this instance, it’s difficult to see what is being offered by 
“intentionalizing” this process, other than more fodder for the argument that 
anthropomorphizing plants is inherently inaccurate or misleading. 
                                                          
118 Lewin, Sarah. “Mother Plants Tell Their Seeds When to Sprout.” Scientific American, 1 May 2015.  In 
Lewin’s defense, the article notes that the original title was “The Culture of Germination;” contra that 
defense, the new clickbait title and the accompanying tagline are adapted from the first few sentences of the 
article. 
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The Secret Life of Plants, published in 1973, is the quintessential figure of such 
disparaged anthropomorphism, almost certainly because of its wide influence on the 
popular imagination.  Its title has gone viral, spawning variations such as The Private Life 
of Plants, The Secret Life of Bees, The Secret Life of Trees, and The Hidden Life of 
Trees,119 among many other book, article and blog post titles.  Further, The Secret Life of 
Plants still frequently shows up in botany debates—flung as a disparagement of another’s 
work or held at arm’s length as a method of distancing oneself from anthropomorphic 
pseudoscience.  A quick glance at the book will demonstrate why: if you make it through 
the flowery introduction, you arrive at a title page for Part I: Modern Research, followed 
by Chapter 1: Plants and ESP.  That’s right; the section on “modern research” begins by 
making the case that plants can read human minds.  The research it narrativizes is the 
work of Cleve Backster, a prominent figure in the history of the lie-detector test’s usage 
in interrogations.  Backster’s experiments, which included using a polygraph 
galvanometer to ask a plant to identify a suspect after witnessing the murder of another 
plant, among other similarly outrageous tasks and findings, have not been replicated and 
have gone down as a notable pseudoscientific oddity.  Though many well-respected plant 
researchers, such as Charles Darwin and George Washington Carver, are also cited 
elsewhere in the book, the authors frequently rely on the suspect authority of people like 
Backster, or on the personal spiritual reflections or even passing quasi-spiritual comments 
of rigorous scientists, much as Albert Einstein’s comment that “God does not play dice” 
is frequently used to lend Einstein’s scientific weight to creationism or predestination. 
                                                          
119 Respectively: a 1995 BBC documentary featuring David Attenborough, a 2001 novel by Sue Monk 
Kidd, a 2006 nonfiction book by science writer Colin Tudge, and a 2015 nonfiction book by German 
forester Peter Wohlleben. 
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As impossible as it is to take this book seriously, I must admit that I have some 
sympathy for the authors.  Neither Peter Tompkins nor Christopher Bird is a scientist, and 
their goal is not to provide an overview of plant science; rather, the goal of this book is to 
convince its audience that plants “are living, breathing, communicating creatures,” not 
“automata”120 as we so often perceive them, and that respecting them as such is necessary 
to save the planet from our own human destruction.  To that end, they take up what they 
see as cutting-edge research, fringe science that might shake people out of their 
assumptions about plants.  It’s easy to forget, too, that The Secret Life of Plants was 
published in the same decade that saw both Princeton and Stanford develop research 
programs and institutes for parapsychology,121 lending a degree of scientific rigor to 
questions about ESP, psychokinesis, and other now-absurd areas of study.   Backster, 
who kicks off the book with his laughable claims that his philodendron could read his 
mind, was an interrogation specialist who founded the polygraph unit of the CIA.  The 
polygraph itself, though no longer admissible in court, is still in use as an interrogation 
tool.  It’s quite likely that the plant “witness” who supposedly identified its comrade’s 
murderer did in fact have a measurable response when that person entered the room: 
since the volunteer “murderer” was instructed to “stomp the plant to death,” it seems 
probable that he ended up carrying some of the VOCs that plants release when under 
predation and that the “witness” responded to those VOCs, since that’s, y’know, what 
they do.  
                                                          
120 Tompkins, Peter and Christopher Bird. “Introduction,” The Secret Life of Plants, 2002, HarperCollins, p. 
xiv. 
121 The Stanford Research Institute, established in 1972 and active until 1991, and the Princeton 
Engineering Anomalies Research Lab established in 1979 and active until 2007. 
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The point of all this is that it’s easy to read this book ungenerously, and that doing 
so has produced an intense reaction on the part of most botanists to wildly flinch back 
from any suggestion that certain plant behaviors—especially communication—might be 
intentional.  Even those who are more willing to consider this possibility are careful to 
distance themselves from The Secret Life of Plants, or anything that smells similar.  My 
own impulse was to do the same, to recoil from any association with a work that 
apparently takes auras and clairvoyance seriously. 
However, the very project that I’m currently engaged in requires that I reconsider.  
Instead, I must acknowledge the affinities that my work shares with Tompkins and 
Bird’s: like them, I am interested in the ways that non-canonical science can challenge 
long-held assumptions, the ways that non-scientific knowledges can shed different light 
on scientific endeavors, and the ways that a close examination of plants and plant 
behaviors can radically shift the kinds of questions we ask about the world and our 
relationship with it.  Affinity is never totalizing, though, just as difference is never 
totalizing.  Though others will have to judge my success, I have attempted to be more 
discerning than Tompkins and Bird in my choices about which scientific works to take 
up, balancing methodological rigor with provocative findings and conclusions.  I have 
focused on the contributions that can be made by bringing rhetorical knowledge to 
scientific questions and concerns, as well as to the published science itself, while 
Tompkins and Bird attempted to do something similar with various kinds of “spiritual 
knowledge” or mysticism.  They seek to use plants to shift our assumptions and questions 
toward a humility or even worship that they believe will improve human-other 
relationships, while I—well, I suppose I’m leaving out the humility and worship. 
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Minded Response, Mechanized Reaction 
These last few paragraphs have been an attempt to distinguish between my 
reaction to The Secret Life of Plants and my response to it; or, rather, to set aside my 
reaction and deliberately, consciously, mindfully develop a response.  Within rhetoric, 
especially twentieth-century rhetorical theory, the weight of these two terms and the 
distinction between them cannot be overstated.  As teachers of rhetoric, we champion 
deliberate, considered, crafted response; while we may study “impulsive” reaction, we 
teach reaction as something to be avoided, or at most as raw material that is then to be 
crafted.  Outside of pedagogy, the distinction is at the heart of the notion of civil 
discourse: we must thoughtfully respond to other citizens; to be “reactionary” is to fall 
short of the democratic ideal.   
It is at the heart of Kenneth Burke’s distinction between action and motion,122 in 
which action is associated with symbolic systems (defined exclusively as human) and 
motion is associated with the nonsymbolic—all that falls into the realm of material, 
including the “intuitive signaling systems”123 of other animals like bees.  Humans have 
action, while everything else has only motion.  Or to put it another way: humans can 
respond, while everything else can only react.  More recently, Derrida’s The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, which this dissertation owes so much to, is essentially 160 pages that ask 
(and never answer) “whether one can know what respond means. And how to distinguish 
between a response and a reaction.”124  Following Derrida, Diane Davis’s Inessential 
                                                          
122 Burke, Kenneth. “(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 4, no. 4, 1978, pp. 
809-38. 
123 Ibid., p. 810. 
124 Derrida, Jacques. The Animal That Therefore I Am. Edited by Marie-Luise Mallet, translated by David 
Wills, Fordham UP, 2008, p. 8. Original emphasis. 
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Solidarity125 introduces us to prior rhetoricity, a concept founded not on symbolic 
communication but on “a more fundamental affectability, persuadability, responsivity.”126  
The coda of the book, in which Davis begins what will turn out to be a years-long interest 
in animals, cites Derrida’s troubling of the response/reaction distinction.  This troubling 
reflects back on all the previous chapters, resituating the centrality of “response-ability” 
(though without, as Davis puts it, “sink[ing] the ship” of her project).127  She calls for 
rhetorical scholars to “begin to question this distinction, this taken-for-granted border 
between the authentic response and the mere reaction.”128 
To all this, I merely want to add a few insights.  First, that rhetorical attention to 
plants requires us to more consistently include “mind/mechanism” within the 
constellation of response/reaction, action/motion, choice/drive, reason/instinct, and so on.  
Plant behavior is often not even granted so animate a descriptor as “reaction,” yet the 
logic of the clean distinction between responding and reacting is nevertheless at work 
every time plants are figured as mechanistic organisms.  Second, current brain research 
indicates that “response” is more “mechanistically” produced than previously thought,129 
such that carrying the question of mechanistic organisms from the realm of plants into the 
realm of humans requires us to reconfigure what we might mean by “mechanistic 
organism” in the first place, a reconfiguration that is potentially transformative of our 
                                                          
125 Davis, Diane. Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations. U of Pittsburgh P, 2010. 
126 Ibid., p. 2. My emphasis. 
127 Ibid., p. 165. 
128 Ibid. 
129 For some interesting examples, see Soon, C.S., M. Brass, H.J. Heinze, and J.D. Haynes. “Unconscious 
Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain.” Nature Neuroscience, vol. 11, iss. 5, 2008, pp. 543-
5; Fried, Itzhak, Roy Mukamel, and Gabriel Kreiman. “Internally Generated Preactivation of Single 
Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition.” Neuron, vol. 69, iss. 3, 2011, pp. 548-62; 
Morsella, Ezequiel, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, and Stephen C. Krieger. “Passive Frame 
Theory: A New Synthesis.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 39, 2016. 
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ethical relationship with plants if in turn we carry the question back into their realm once 
more.  In other words, plants may very well be mechanistic beings, but this carries very 
different meaning when we recognize that we ourselves are mechanistic beings—my 
brain makes decisions before my mind is aware of them, even if it feels like my mind is 
in charge.  What we might learn from these two insights together is that the distinction 
between a response and a reaction is that (minded) response is a type or subset of 
(mechanistic) reaction.  Distinguishing between the two makes sense for describing a 
particular utterance or behavior even as the distinction is shown to be utterly meaningless 
as a binary method of classifying living things; that is, separating living things into 
categories of “responsive” and “reactive” no longer holds water. 
Finally, I want to pose—not a question, but the possibility of a question about the 
prevalence of mechanism in contemporary thought.  While ruminating on Diane Davis’s 
thinking about Derrida’s thinking about Levinas’s thinking about response, I suddenly 
remembered a story that my undergraduate computers instructor told us one day.  Why?  I 
can’t be certain why.  Suffice it to say that this is merely how my brain reacted to the 
situation it was in.  The story is this: in the early days of computing, people who were not 
computer experts frequently asked the computer experts if they could get correct 
information or “right answers” out of the computer even if they made a mistake when 
entering data into it.  Apparently, this type of question was common enough to give rise 
to the axiom “garbage in, garbage out,” which is shorthand for the idea that your input 
must be accurate in order for the output to be accurate.  The Wikipedia page for the 
phrase “garbage in, garbage out” confirms both the story itself and my memory of it, 
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adding that Charles Babbage said he could not “apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas 
that could provoke such a question.” 
I want to articulate the line of thinking that followed as a provocation for some 
technologically-minded rhetoric scholar to take up, as it raises a set of questions that 
suggests a book unto itself.  In short, I started to wonder what kind of thinking would 
cause someone to ask whether the desired response could be gotten from a computer even 
if the computer was given wrong information.  After all, a computer is a mechanism; it 
cannot “figure out” what you might actually want and account for your errors.  The only 
things that can sometimes do that are living things; not only people, but also some 
animals can occasionally read my intentions even when my words are “in error.” 
Which led me to the question: Is it possible that what Mr. Babbage thought of as a 
“confusion of ideas” was instead the application of an organic, rather than a mechanistic, 
logic to a machine so complex that, to the observers, it seemed possible that it might 
behave as if it were alive?  Is our tendency to think of nonhumans as mechanistic beings 
something that we recently learned?  While we can of course trace the idea that animals 
are entirely or primarily automata back to at least Descartes, and the same idea for plants 
can be traced even further back to at least Theophrastus, the widespread, default tendency 
to think of all nonhuman living creatures as more mechanistic than minded seems to be 
more concentrated in the twentieth-century than elsewhere in human history.  Perhaps 
what seems like a monolithic binary in human thought about nonhumans is instead a 
fairly recent swerve.  Perhaps animal rhetoric could benefit from a history of the 
mechanization of creatures.  Though such a history is outside the scope of this 
dissertation, it has the potential to shed an entirely different light on both the present 
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chapter as well as the next, in which we take up the question of whether plants share one 
of the most basic creaturely affinities. 
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Chapter 4: Pain and Ethics 
The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? 
—Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles  
of Morals and Legislation 
The youth said, “I’ll break you, / Little rose on the heath.” 
 / Little rose spoke: “I’ll prick you, / So that you’ll forever think of me,  
/ And I don’t want to suffer it.” 
—Goethe, “Heath Rose” 
O if those fields could speak /  
Surely they’d stay silent 
—Sam Sax, “Seasonal Affective Disorder” 
Into the Swerve 
 Like us, plants die, and like us, they struggle to avoid it.  The exact nature of their 
struggles, however, is often thought of as being radically different from our own, such 
that we share nothing in common with them other than the drive to continue living.  In 
many ways this is the case, as most plants don’t have the same basic needs as me—food, 
shelter, exercise, a bar within walking distance, and so on.  However, recent botanical 
research suggests that, just as with animals, our assumptions about what capacities plants 
do and do not have are in dire need of an update.  It has been my contention in this 
dissertation that seeking affinity with plants and being willing to consider that some 
human “properties” might also “belong” to them has the potential to reconfigure our 
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concept of the human as well as our concept of botanicity.  In the spirit of pushing the 
boundary as far as it might go, the capacity under investigation in this chapter is not 
consciousness (plant consciousness has already been posited by some), nor speech (plant 
communication has long been considered in one way or another).  Instead, the capacity 
under investigation here is pain.  Of all the capacities that we resist ascribing to plants, in 
my experience, pain is at the apex. 
Everyone knows that plants do not feel pain; in fact, any suggestion that they do 
qualifies as the most egregious anthropomorphism.  I would like to make exactly that 
claim—or rather, I would like to follow in the spirit of Michelle Ballif’s adoption of a 
“certain…uncertainty regarding the border between the living and the dead”130 by 
positing an uncertainty about the border between the algesic and the analgesic—both of 
which are borders that, for most people most of the time, could not be more clearly 
defined.  The resistance to plant pain is so strong, however, that in order to arrive at 
uncertainty, I will here attempt to argue that they do feel pain—a kind of dissoi logoi of a 
knowledge so common that we usually don’t bother to articulate it: that is, the 
“knowledge” that plants can’t hurt.  I will not be calling for the founding of a Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Plants, as botanist Francis Hallé cheekily suggests;131 rather, 
this chapter ultimately seeks to trouble the ease with which we write half the creatures on 
earth out of one of the most influential questions in creaturely ethics: can they suffer?  
As previous chapters have indicated, there are many capacities that we resist 
attributing to plants, including agency, awareness, and sensation.  Resistance to the 
                                                          
130 Ballif, Michelle. “Zombies / Writing: Awaiting Our Posthumous, Monstrous (Be)Coming.” Writing 
Posthumanism, Posthuman Writing, edited by Sidney I. Dobrin, Parlor Press, 2015, pp. 79-98. P. 81. 
131 Hallé, Francis. In Praise of Plants. Translated by David Lee, Timber Press, 2002, p. 24. 
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notion of plant pain is even greater; however, our current understanding of plant behavior 
in response to both actual and potential bodily damage asks us to consider such a 
possibility.  Further, doing so has the potential to reconfigure our ethical relationships 
with human and nonhuman others.  When I use the term “ethics,” I refer less to any 
particular branch or subset of ethical study, and more to the fundamental ethicality of 
encountering otherness; within this definition, there is no action (including inaction) that 
can be “unethical.”  Others and otherness are always being encountered, are always 
affected, even by apathy or lack of awareness.  Frequently, our engagement with plants 
takes just this form of ethical inattention.  As we will see, though, when plants do come 
to our attention, acknowledging them as worthy of care or consideration meets startling 
resistance. 
The resistance to bringing plants into the discussion of ethics can sometimes come 
across as outright vitriol, particularly within the realm of animal rights or welfare.  
Jeffrey Nealon puzzles over this tendency in the preface to Plant Theory: Biopower & 
Vegetable Life,132 pointing specifically toward Cary Wolfe and Gary Francione.  Both 
thinkers are annoyed at what they see as the diminishing of their work on animal rights 
by those who, as Francione puts it, “claim that we should skip over the interests of the 
cow and worry about whether the carrot had a tough harvesting season.”133  As Nealon 
notes, this is an understandable reaction to the “vegetarian-baiting” that sometimes crops 
up in pop culture and mass media.  Although we might not condone it, we can probably 
understand the impulse to deride that which makes their own work seem absurd by 
association.   
                                                          
132 Nealon, Jeffrey T. Plant Theory: Biopower & Vegetable Life. Stanford UP, 2016. 
133 Ibid., p. xi. 
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However, to completely dismiss plants as undeserving of any ethical attention 
“seems to function as a subset of an old practice: trying to close the barn door of ethical 
consideration right after your chosen group has gotten out.”134  If this hostility were one 
side of a coin and acceptance were the other, then perhaps we could chalk it up to a 
champion-your-own-cause mentality and ignore it.  The problem is that the other side of 
the coin is not the acceptance of plants as deserving of ethical consideration, but the 
omission of plants from the discussion entirely, what (as mentioned above) Nealon 
describes within Derrida’s work as “a pattern of dedicated swerves around the question of 
vegetable life.”135  Interestingly, though, Nealon makes his own swerve later on in Plant 
Theory—not around plants themselves, of course, but around plant pain.  In setting up the 
exigence for “Chapter 2: Thinking Plants with Aristotle and Heidegger,” Nealon lists 
several ways in which “[r]esearch into ‘plant intelligence’…has complicated or flat-out 
refuted almost all of [the] traditional picture of plant life.”136  Within this list, which is 
provided in a parenthetical aside, Nealon mentions plant pain only to immediately qualify 
it within the same sentence: “there is even research to suggest that plants feel pain, or at 
least respond decisively to extreme danger.”   
The fact that Nealon includes the mention of plant pain suggests that, on some 
level, Nealon recognizes it as a question worth asking—even if, on another level, he also 
recognizes that the very suggestion comes across as absurd.  Even if this textual moment 
is tiny, brief, parenthetical, and seemingly unimportant, it is nevertheless telling about the 
difficulties of the question.  Nealon, like most of us who take up the theorization of 
                                                          
134 Ibid., p. xii. 
135 Ibid., pp. x-xi. 
136 Ibid., p. 30. 
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plants, is much more comfortable granting decision-making to plants—see his qualifier 
that they “at least respond decisively to extreme danger”—than granting the sensation of 
pain, even though decisiveness (or intent, or consciousness, or will) is fully associated 
with brains and therefore could be viewed as the bolder claim to make with regard to 
plants.  In other words, plants are “all body” and “no brain,” so one would think that we’d 
be more willing to grant them pain than to grant them decisiveness.  Part of the reason for 
this hesitation or swerve, whether dedicated or undedicated, around plant pain—of which 
Nealon is but one example—might lie in the ethical questions that must be faced if tissue 
damage produces similar painful feelings in plants as such damage produces in humans 
and other animals. 
Wounding 
That plants have bodily responses to actual tissue damage is not in question.  
They heal themselves of damage caused by herbivory, breakage, cuts, and abrasions.  
What is often not recognized is that plants also avoid potential tissue damage, according 
to their abilities. As Francis Hallé (among others) has pointed out, a sessile lifestyle 
results in the evolution of a biochemical avoidance system “as a substitute for being able 
to flee.”137  For someone who cannot run away from harm, the only option is to convince 
the harmer to run away.  For this reason, plants have developed chemical arsenals to deter 
predators—we can see everyday evidence of this not only in fatal plants, but also in 
plants like poison ivy that produce nonfatal irritants.  Even the disagreeable flavor of an 
unripe fruit is a biochemical function that helps prevent unwanted consumption.138 
So far, these examples of defense against damage do not, on their own, indicate 
                                                          
137 Hallé, p. 156. 
138 Consumption is, of course, not always unwanted in the botanical world. 
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that a plant can feel a particular instance of damage being done to it, since they are 
preventative measures that do not depend on sensation for their deployment.  For 
evidence of this, we must consider the ways that plants sense and respond to actual, 
rather than potential, wound infliction.  Researchers José León, Enrique Rojo, and José J. 
Sánchez‐Serrano have detailed the signaling pathways activated in plants upon receiving 
a wound.139 They found that an injury or wound is perceived by local cells, which then 
transmit signals throughout the body of the plant that activate both a localized healing 
response and a systemic deterrent response.  This systemic deterrent usually takes the 
form of an increase in the production of a chemical, like tannin, that deters insects or 
larger animals from eating the plant.  When plants sense an injury, they take action to 
repair the damage but also to distance themselves from the threat by driving it away, 
thereby avoiding further injury.  
There is also evidence that plants not only deploy general deterrence of injury 
(like the aforementioned poison ivy), and they not only respond to an injury after 
receiving it, but that they also use other senses to predict and prepare a targeted 
deterrence of an imminent injury before it actually happens.  For instance, botanists H.M. 
Appel and R.B. Cocroft found that Arabidopsis thaliana, or thale cress, can distinguish 
the sound of caterpillars feeding from other environmental sounds, and that the plants 
prime their defense systems whenever they hear such sounds, even in the absence of 
related sensory stimuli such as the weight of the caterpillar on their leaves.140  This 
suggests that an individual thale cress can hear its neighbors being injured and take action 
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to avoid becoming a victim itself.  Some plants, like the acacia tree, take this a step 
further and actively warn their neighbors of the imminent danger.141  When eaten by 
herbivores, an acacia tree produces tannin as a toxic deterrent to the animals.  
Simultaneously, the tree releases ethylene into the air.  Neighboring acacia trees that have 
not yet been approached by an herbivore will begin producing their own tannin defense 
upon sensing this ethylene warning signal.  Wouter Van Hoven discovered this 
phenomenon in 1990 while investigating the deaths of unusually large numbers of kudu 
antelope in South Africa.  These antelope were unable to engage in their normal browsing 
patterns due to fencing in the area, and were therefore forced to continue browsing the 
same acacia trees over and over.  The tannin produced by the trees eventually reached 
lethal levels, killing around 3,000 of the kudu.  The acacia will only put up with so much 
injury by herbivores before they defend themselves with deadly force.   
The coyote tobacco plant has a different, but equally extreme, method of dealing 
with unacceptable levels of damage.  Coyote tobacco plants usually rely on hawkmoths 
for pollination, attracting these insects in particular by opening at night and emitting 
benzyl acetone, and rewarding them by producing nectar that is high in sugar.  In addition 
to feeding on the nectar, the hawkmoths in turn exploit the tobacco plants by laying their 
eggs on them so that the plants’ leaves offer a food source for hawkmoth caterpillars.  
Although such herbivory is detrimental to the tobacco, the benefits of specializing in 
attracting hawkmoths seems to mitigate the risk—most of the time, anyway.  Researchers 
Danny Kessler, Celia Diezel, and Ian T. Baldwin found that when hawkmoth caterpillar 
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predation reaches infestation levels, coyote tobacco plants begin producing new, different 
kinds of flowers.142  These new flowers open in the morning rather than at night, have 
lower sugar content, are shaped more narrowly, and do not emit benzyl acetone.  These 
flowers no longer attract hawkmoths (and may in fact deter them, due to the narrower 
shape of the flower); instead, they attract black-chinned hummingbirds.  Although the 
tendency can be traced as having developed because of evolutionary pressures, the 
behavior itself is not an evolutionary change, over the course of generations, but a 
behavioral adaptation of individual plants.  That is, an individual coyote tobacco will 
fully switch between these two very different kinds of flowers within a single season.  A 
coyote tobacco plant gets fed up if its lover becomes too selfish and dumps them for 
somebody less toxic (although, like many humans, it often can’t resist going back). 
Resistance 
Throughout the previous section, I have referred to “injury” and “damage” but not 
to “pain.”  It’s time now to consider whether the ways that plants respond to actual or 
potential tissue damage indicate that we should assume that their sensory experiences are 
analogous to our own.  They have evolved mechanisms to prevent or mitigate certain 
kinds of injury.  On a cellular level, their bodies recognize when their tissue has been 
damaged and take action to heal it.  On a systemic level, they defend themselves against 
direct injury, they prepare themselves for imminent injury based on their perceptions of 
their immediate surroundings, and they warn their neighbors that something wants to hurt 
them.  Plants have a sensory experience of tissue damage, and seek to avoid it in the 
various and often complex ways that their capacities allow.  This is as much knowledge 
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as we feel we need in order to assume that animals are capable of feeling pain; while we 
can find our sensory receptors for pain, called nociceptors, in other animals, we cannot be 
certain that the sensory experience is the same for them as it is for us.  Similarities in 
behavior, not physiology, is the basis for our acceptance of the idea that many animals 
experience pain like we do.  If we account for different material, bodily realities, plant 
behavior in response to both actual damage and imminent damage suggests that we 
should consider whether plants can feel pain or something like it.  Instead, we sometimes 
allow our “knowledge” that plants can’t feel pain lead us to forget what we already know 
about their material bodily realities. 
For instance, Daniel Chamovitz writes in his widely popular book What a Plant 
Knows that “while plants feel touch, they don’t feel pain,”143 and he apparently bases this 
claim on the fact that plants don’t move away from damaging stimuli.  Chamovitz makes 
this claim while discussing a study conducted by Dianna Bowles.  Bowles was 
investigating whether a tomato plant uses a chemical signal or an electrical signal to 
communicate an injury to other parts of its own body, and the stimulus she used to 
produce the signal was a piece of hot metal held against one of the leaves.  Describing 
this study, Chamovitz insists that “the leaf did not feel pain.  The tomato responded to the 
hot metal not by moving away from it but by warning its other leaves of a potentially 
dangerous environment.”144  In other words, the tomato plant’s response to the hot metal 
against one of is leaves was to send a signal from the damaged leaf out to the rest of the 
plant’s body, which then caused the rest of the plant to engage its insect deterrent 
chemical response.  It’s interesting to note that Chamovitz is willing to overlook the fact 
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that a piece of hot metal against one leaf is a very different kind of dangerous experience 
than the kinds that plants have evolved to deal with, since recognizing this would help 
explain why the tomato plant in the study responded to hot metal by increasing its insect 
defense chemicals.  Hot metal does not resemble insect herbivory as a sensory 
experience, as far as we can tell.   
In fact, it doesn’t really resemble any of the dangerous situations that a tomato 
plant might find itself in during the normal course of its life.  The tomato has no defenses 
against hot metal, since it almost never encounters such a danger; however, it does 
recognize the hot metal as a danger and subsequently deploys the defense that it does 
have.  In humans and animals, one of the functions that pain serves is to keep us safe 
from new and unfamiliar dangers.  We instinctively avoid certain dangers, like animal 
bites, but we must learn about other ones, like touching a hot stove.  The pain produced 
by the hot stove causes us to react to it in the same way we react to an animal bite: we 
flinch and move away, and very young humans might even try to hit the stove.  The 
commonality between these two sensory experiences is that they both hurt.  It seems 
likely that there is also some commonality between the feeling a plant has when insects 
eat it and the feeling it has when a piece of hot metal is held against one of its leaves, or 
else the plant would not respond to both sensations in the same way.  It doesn’t seem 
unreasonable to posit that “pain” is an appropriate term for the commonality between the 
familiar feeling of being eaten and the unfamiliar one of being burned, regardless of 
whether we’re talking about tomatoes or toddlers. 
Instead of wondering whether the tomato plant felt pain, or why it reacted to the 
metal the way it did, Chamovitz has already decided that this is a capacity the plant 
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doesn’t have; further, he bases this assumption on the tomato’s inability to perform 
another action that it is incapable of performing.  His criteria for whether or not a being 
has the capacity to feel pain is whether it “moves away from” the source of the pain.  
This kind of logic is akin to arguing that a dog must not feel pain, since he doesn’t say, 
“It hurts.”  The dog can’t say “it hurts,” but he can yelp, and most of us recognize that 
these responses are similar enough to safely assume that the sensory feelings prompting 
each of them are also quite similar.  In the same way, a plant can’t move away from a 
source of pain, but it does have some specialized resources to try to make the source of 
the pain move away from it, and it reacts this way even toward an unfamiliar danger.  
Given the plant’s sessile mode of existence, this seems similar enough to consider it in 
the same category as a yelp or a flinch.  For Chamovitz, though, the certainty that plant 
pain does not exist overrides his knowledge of the plant’s materiality and produces this 
“dedicated swerve” around the entire question.  Though of course, you can’t swerve 
around something unless you recognize that it’s there in first place; in this sense, the fact 
that Chamovitz mentions plant pain at all, even to dismiss the possibility, is a greater 
recognition of the possibility than most of us have achieved. 
Chamovitz’s dedicated swerve may have something to do with his professional 
relationship with plants.  He is a geneticist specializing in plant research, focusing in 
particular on cancer treatment and food security.  In other words, the goals of his research 
are primarily oriented toward the use value of plants for humans.  This is not intended as 
a criticism, as the worthiness of both cancer research and food security research are pretty 
self-evident.  However, an orientation toward other beings as primarily valuable for the 
uses to which we can put them has historically produced questionable ethical 
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relationships, even within schools of thought that are known for their considerations of 
ethics.  For instance, Matthew Hall locates the distinction between Jainism’s inclusionary 
plant ethics and Buddhism’s exclusionary plant ethics in a foundational concern for their 
use value.145  While acknowledging that there are many different Buddhisms, Hall notes 
that in some early Buddhist texts there is “a subtle, yet deliberate backgrounding of the 
plant kingdom in connection with human use.”146  He cites leading Buddhist scholar 
Lambert Schmithausen’s description of these texts as attempting to “deliberately avoid 
arousing in lay people qualms in connection with a moderate utilization of plants for food 
and other basic needs.”147  Over time, the conflict that produced such “qualms” was 
solved by explicitly defining plants as non-sentient, meaning that plants were placed 
“outside the realm of moral consideration” as well as excluding them from “that group of 
beings who are the appropriate recipients of virtuous actions.”148 
For Hall, this solution to the problem of reconciling nonviolence with the 
necessity of eating is an inconsistency within Buddhist ethical philosophy that is made 
possible by an approach that begins by establishing difference.  He contrasts this with 
Jainism, which was able to reconcile a nonviolent doctrine with violent bodily necessity 
without denying plants a seat at the sentience table due to its tenet of “seeking out affinity 
with other beings in the face of clear and obvious alterity.”149 This particular approach 
toward ethics, the seeking out of affinity as the first and fundamental step of engagement, 
results in an orientation toward plants that does not privilege their use value above all 
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else, since “concentrating solely on the instrumental value of plants would be a denial of 
their affinity with humans as equally valid locations of being.”150  This contrasts sharply 
with the Buddhist method of “constructing and emphasizing discontinuity” and a “drive 
toward disconnection”151 that not only makes possible exclusion as a way of resolving the 
conflict between eating and nonviolence, but that encourages a conceptual understanding 
of plants that is rooted almost solely in their use value to humans and other animals, 
which in turn underwrites and justifies an absence of consideration for an ethical 
relationship between humans and plants.  While Jainism begins with a search for affinity, 
its philosophy is not inattentive to difference; rather, difference does not serve as the 
basis for conceptualization that renders an ethics unnecessary.  The practical ethics based 
on affinity that has developed within Jainism recognizes that pure nonviolence is an 
impossibility that should be strived for nonetheless.  Rather than claiming that eating 
plants is not “killing,” Jain ethics explicitly acknowledges that it is in fact killing, and 
should therefore be done with the utmost consideration of what is necessary.  Given all 
this, it is perhaps unsurprising that Jainism and Buddhism also differ in that Jain 
philosophy considers plants to be capable of suffering, while Buddhist philosophy 
explicitly denies them this capacity. 
Indefinability 
Proposing that plants might feel pain is not actually as radical as it might sound, 
as there is a history of debate over the pain-experiencing capacities of all kinds of 
creatures.  Invertebrates, fish, monkeys, the entire nonhuman animal kingdom, and even 
human babies as well as certain human “races” have been defined as lacking the ability to 
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experience pain at some point in the history of Western science.152  Even the pain 
experienced by speaking humans—who are capable of at least attempting to articulate 
such experiences—is notoriously difficult to define, as attested by the definition provided 
by the International Association for the Study of Pain: “an unpleasant sensory and 
emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in 
terms of such damage.”153  The extensive note accompanying this definition explains that 
pain is “always unpleasant and therefore also an emotional experience” in addition to 
being a physical one.  Defining pain as “associated with” rather than "caused by” tissue 
damage is an attempt to prevent assessors from dismissing a patient’s pain simply 
because no injury can be identified, and specifying that the associated tissue damage can 
be either actual or potential addresses the possibility that the pain is experienced before 
any tissue damage is perceptible.  The final part of the definition, “or described in terms 
of such damage,” functions to include phantom pain (as with amputated limbs), 
psychosomatic pain, or any other kind of pain that seemingly has no cause—if someone 
says “it feels like I’m being stabbed in the ribs,” the IASP recommends that the patient’s 
pain be treated as real, even if no cause is evident.  The IASP’s definition attempts to take 
into account the various difficulties that sufferers have historically had in convincing 
others to believe their pain is real. 
Elaine Scarry addresses this tendency toward disbelief early in her book on 
torture, The Body in Pain: 
For the person whose pain it is, it is “effortlessly” grasped (that is, even with the 
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most heroic effort it cannot not be grasped); while for the person outside the 
sufferer’s body, what is “effortless” is not grasping it (it is easy to remain wholly 
unaware of its existence; even with effort, one may remain in doubt about its 
existence or may retain the astonishing freedom of denying its existence; and, 
finally, if with the best effort of sustained attention one successfully apprehends 
it, the aversiveness of the “it” one apprehends will only be a shadowy fraction of 
the actual “it”)….Thus pain comes unsharably into our midst as at once that 
which cannot be denied and that which cannot be confirmed.154 
All of which is to say that we can never truly know another’s experience of pain.  
However, the same could be said of another’s experience of hunger, or of any experience 
at all.  Scarry identifies another quality of pain that sets it apart from hunger and other 
similar experiences: pain not only “resist[s] language but actively destroys it, bringing 
about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a 
human being makes before language is learned.”155  For Scarry, pain’s very resistance to 
verbalization is one reason why it is so urgent that we attempt to verbalize it, to 
externalize it and make it visible.156 
But what of the sufferer who cannot verbalize their pain, or perhaps anything at 
all?  The IASP addresses this possibility, albeit in reference to human pain only, in the 
note accompanying the definition referenced above, stating unequivocally that “the 
inability to communicate verbally does not negate the possibility that an individual is 
experiencing pain and is in need of appropriate pain-relieving treatment.”  Although the 
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IASP is defining pain for the purpose of treating specifically human patients, we can turn 
their approach toward nonhumans by taking up the spirit of their definition, which is to 
encourage us to err on the side of belief rather than disbelief.  For those who study the 
treatment of pain, the ethical consequences of dismissing real pain are far too great to risk 
those consequences simply for the sake of being “right” about its absence.  The IASP 
asks us to assume that pain really exists unless proven otherwise, and when the sufferer 
cannot articulate that pain, we must orient ourselves in such a way that “believing” their 
bodily responses is our default approach.  The difficulty of defining pain and verifying 
whether another being of any kind feels it, combined with the magnitude of the ethical 
consequences of defining another being as existing outside the possibility of painful 
experience, should make us very slow to claim certainty about such categorizations.   
S. Scott Graham’s The Politics of Pain Medicine charts a history of ontologies of 
human pain that may oil the hinges of the door I am propping open here.  Tracing the 
multiplicity of conceptualizations of pain from Hippocrates forward, and acknowledging 
the historical difficulties of defining exactly what pain is, Graham arrives at 
contemporary “hybrid” models of pain that “argue that pain is a phenomenon or 
collection of phenomena that defy the mind/body binary.”157  This way of thinking pain 
does not rest upon the ability to determine whether a yelp is “merely” an indication of a 
mechanistic reaction to damage or is an indication of true “experience” of pain sensation, 
since the distinction between these two interpretations makes no sense except from within 
the logic of the mind/body binary.   
We might question whether contemporary models of pain have actually gotten 
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outside mind/body dualism; to say that pain is “sensory and emotional”158 or that it is 
“always mental and physical”159 is to maintain that the mental and the physical exist as 
two distinct concepts.  However, the desire to collapse, bridge, hybridize, or otherwise 
trouble the mind/body binary with regard to pain suggests that an adequate definition of 
pain cannot be based on an ontology that simply equates body with mechanistic reaction 
and mind with true experience.  This matters because botanic response to tissue damage 
(and remember, tissue damage is the central figure within the IASP’s definition of pain in 
a human medical context) has primarily been thought of as a mere mechanistic reaction 
which does not indicate a sensory experience of pain.  The thale cress, the coyote 
tobacco, Chamovitz’s tomato, and all the other plants we both have and haven’t 
examined here, together suggest that it is no longer sufficient to accept a knee-jerk (that 
is, mechanistic) dismissal of plants as non-suffering creatures.  Graham’s hybrid models 
of pain, which push back against the mind/body binary in humans, paired with Chapter 
3’s argument that our concept of mind itself is troubled by plants, open a route to 
thinking about plants as capable of experiencing pain as well as the host of questions 
about our ethical relationship with them that must be asked if plant pain is indeed 
possible. 
(Re)Orientation 
It does not solve our problem, though, to simply import our human relationship to 
pain into the realm of plants.  Perhaps one reason that we remain so reluctant to consider 
plant pain is due to the fact that such a possibility forces us to recognize that there are no 
simple solutions to our historically problematic ethical relationships with nonhumans.  In 
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other words: at least on a personal level, there is a very simple solution to the 
unacceptable practices that make themselves known when we begin to pay attention to, 
for example, the American meat industry: we can stop eating animals.  This may not be 
easy for everyone to put into practice, but as a decision, it is a simple one: no more 
animals, period.  We cannot make the same simple decision as a response to the ethical 
concerns raised by writing plants into the realm of pain, since we cannot survive on salt 
and water.  The question of how we should ethically engage plants requires us to ask 
questions before we leap to provide answers, and they cannot be the same questions that 
have been raised when we have taken the time to ask how we might consume animals 
responsibly, since plants have a different relationship to pain and consumption than 
animals do. 
Due to their sessile lifestyle, plants have developed an orientation toward harm 
that is not based in pure avoidance. The previously mentioned examples of the acacia tree 
and especially the coyote tobacco demonstrate that plants are willing to accept a certain 
amount of predation when it suits their interests.  Most commonly, the interests that take 
precedence over the threat of harm are reproductive interests, as we also see in the animal 
kingdom when animals fight over mates, when mating behavior itself is painful or 
deadly, and when offspring are threatened.  Most plants rely on animals for pollination, 
which has resulted in a sort of exchange of benefits—the coyote tobacco prefers 
hawkmoths as its pollinator, so it accepts some predation by hawkmoth caterpillars.  If 
the damage, or the pain, becomes too great then the plant will shun its preferred 
pollinator and go with its second option. 
Since plants are physically at the mercy of their mobile collaborators, they must 
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find ways to persuade those collaborators to behave in a way that serves the plants’ 
interest.  The sole function of nectar seems to be to attract certain pollinators toward very 
particular areas of the plant’s body to ensure pollination.  Nectar does not seem to serve 
any function for the plant other than persuading animals to perform particular, often very 
specific behaviors.  Offering nectar, however, only costs the plant energy, while offering 
fruit costs energy and asks an animal to consume a body part.  I have been unable to find 
an analogous example within the animal kingdom.  While many animals, like lizards and 
starfish, can regrow limbs as a method of dealing with the possibility that their body parts 
may be eaten, and some parasites want to be swallowed whole in order to live in the gut 
of another animal, plants seem to be the only living things that grow a body part whose 
sole purpose is to seduce another living thing to take a bite.  A common misconception is 
that a fruit functions like an egg, providing nourishment for the seed to begin growing 
and suggesting that the fruit provides a direct service to the offspring of the plant.  
Although the decaying flesh of a fruit can end up providing nutrients for a sprouting 
plant, the flesh must fall off the seed before it can begin to germinate.  This is why you 
don’t normally plant a whole peach, but only the pit.  The primary purpose of a fruit, 
therefore, is to convince an animal to consume it along with the seed.  This ensures that 
the seed will germinate at some distance from its parent, reducing competition between 
genetically kin beings. 
Even so, fruiting plants still seem to attempt to reduce the pain caused by having a 
body part removed.  While the fruit is developing, the plant takes measures to ensure that 
it is not eaten prematurely: the unripe fruit usually remains green so that it is less easily 
distinguished from its surroundings, it usually doesn’t taste appealing, and its stem 
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remains strong and tough.  We are more familiar with the way ripening reverses the first 
two qualities, but many of us no longer pick our fruit directly from the plant, and may be 
less likely to recognize the last.  As a fruit becomes ready to be eaten, its stem gets 
smaller and drier, and the connective joints between fruit and stem and between stem and 
stalk become more loosely attached until the fruit may fall off the plant at just a touch, 
reducing the likelihood of tearing.  We might think of this as similar to a young human 
losing a tooth, in that the looser it gets, the less painful it is when finally pulled.  If it is 
never pulled, it will eventually come out on its own, painlessly or nearly so.  A fruit will 
also eventually fall, although falling is not its goal; one way or another, what it wants is 
to be eaten so that the seed it contains will germinate somewhere else. 
Of course, there are exceptions to all the botanical tendencies described here.  
Jacques Derrida bluntly reminds us that “each time a philosopher, or anyone else, says 
“The Animal” in the singular and without further ado…he utters an asinanity,”160 and the 
variation from species to species and from individual to individual is as great in the plant 
kingdom as in the animal kingdom.  The problems of discussing what a plant might 
“want” are further complicated by the fact that so many plant species are fully or semi-
domesticated—for instance, remember our old friend the garden cucumber, whose human 
cultivation is so ancient that we cannot say with anything approaching certainty what it 
might have looked or behaved like “in the wild.”  In this case and in many others, it is 
impossible to remove human influence from an analysis of the plant’s behavior, which 
means that it isn’t always obvious or easy to distinguish whether a particular trait is more 
indicative of botanic desires or of human desires.   
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What we can do, then, is to weigh the needs and desires of a plant against the 
needs and desires of humans, and to compare more-domesticated species, such as 
bananas and cucumbers, against less-domesticated species, like blackberries and 
persimmons.  For instance, the Red Delicious apple has been bred to produce a larger 
fruit than its wilder relative the crabapple, which has resulted in the Red Delicious having 
a tougher stem when ripe than the crabapple.  As a native of Europe and central Asia, the 
crabapple has less competition from other fruiting trees than a species native to the 
tropics might have, so the crabapple is able to compete without putting energy into 
producing large fruit; it therefore doesn’t need a tough stem that might be more likely to 
be damaged and hurt when something comes along and pulls the fruit off the branch.  
Domestication of the crabapple has skewed this cost-benefit balance, resulting in apple 
trees that produce fruit larger than strictly necessary for propagation.  On the other hand, 
humans tend to choose to domesticate those species that lend themselves to it, so that a 
fruiting tree which resists developing larger fruit and tougher stems to support that fruit 
might never become domesticated in the first place.   
In other words, no living thing exists within a vacuum, and plants, just like any 
other living thing, attempt to balance costs and benefits in such a way that they are best 
positioned to flourish within a constantly changing environment.  Many of them are 
willing to not only accept consumption but to actively and persuasively invite it; 
however, left to their own devices, they will find ways to do so while also minimizing the 
pain of such offerings.   
At the outset of this chapter, I claimed that the goal was to posit certain 
uncertainty about whether or not plants can feel pain, but I also claimed that the 
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resistance to that idea is so strong that achieving this goal required positing certainty that 
they can feel pain.  I have made the case for plant pain to the best of my ability; however, 
my hope is not that you will be convinced that plants can be experience the sensation of 
pain, but rather that even the most obvious conceptual “truths” about plants deserve to be 
troubled.  Perhaps more importantly, doing so ends up troubling—in very complex 
ways—some of the most obvious conceptual “truths” about ourselves and our 
relationships with others in the world.  Thinking about our ethical engagements with 
nonhumans may be yet another way of centering the human; however, as the next chapter 
takes up, it is not a simple case of anthropocentrism. 
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Chapter 5: Anthropomorphism and Anthropocentrism 
If we look past the conventions of animated feature films that allow for thinking, talking, 
language-using apes, we are left with thinking, talking, language-using apes. 
—Alex C. Parrish, “’Don’t Try to Kid Me, Man-Cub’:  
Re-Animaling Rhetoric in Theory and Practice” 
Of course what I felt then as an ape I can represent now only in human terms, and 
therefore I misrepresent it, but although I cannot reach back to the truth of the old  
ape life, there is no doubt that it lies somewhere in the direction I have indicated. 
—Franz Kafka, “A Report to an Academy” 
Tell me I’m a turtle. Make me feel better. 
—Nicole Walker, “The Inclusiveness of Metaphor” 
Prequel 
Consider this chapter a prequel. It is the origin story of a character that plays a 
significant role in the chapters that precede it, an origin story written after the stories that 
it offers an origin for, a prequel that only came to appear necessary through the course of 
developing the work that it follows.  The “character” here is anthropomorphism, and the 
necessity of a prequel for the anthropomorphism that appears in the preceding chapters is 
two-fold: first, it is one of the primary methods of reconceptualizing plants that is 
employed in this dissertation, yet this character’s motivations have not been made 
visible—anthropomorphism is running around doing all sorts of things to other characters 
as well as the plot, but so far it has no backstory.  My project is not alone in this; 
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anthropomorphism is the site of a particular tension within much posthumanist work, a 
tension that is often acknowledged but rarely investigated, as we’ll see later in the chapter 
when we turn to scholars like Nathan Stormer and Bridie McGreavy, Jane Bennett, and 
Bruno Latour.  The tension is rooted, on the one hand, in the fact that calling something 
“anthropomorphism” is always delivered as an accusation, and on the other, in a growing 
sense within posthumanism that anthropomorphizing is unavoidable, necessary, or useful.  
The desire to anthropomorphize coupled with the desire to deflect the accusation means 
that acknowledging that your own project even smells like anthropomorphism is always 
presented as a defense.  Since anthropomorphism itself is never the primary site of 
inquiry for these projects, the defense tends to be rushed, often taking no more than a 
paragraph. The result of this cursory treatment is that neither the critique nor the defense 
of anthropomorphism get more than, well, a cursory treatment—what has become a 
“main character” for me has been a cameo in other work.  The current chapter takes up 
anthropomorphism, and more specifically “the anthropomorphism accusation,” as 
primary sites of inquiry in order to articulate some of their effects and begin theorizing 
their role in posthumanism. 
I distinguish between anthropomorphism—using human terms to talk about 
nonhumans—and the anthropomorphism accusation—the value-laden assumption that 
using human terms to talk about nonhumans is always inaccurate and always to be 
avoided.  The anthropomorphism accusation is, to one degree or another, embedded in 
every discourse with the possible exception of art, and is so deeply embedded that it does 
not require explanation or argument; simply pointing out the existence of 
anthropomorphism is considered sufficient grounds for critique.  Though the argument 
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can be made that the accusation has the roots of its justification in scientific discourse, 
rhetoric and the humanities more broadly have developed out of the same humanist 
tradition that modern science owes its values to.  Science may adhere to the 
anthropomorphism accusation more strictly than rhetoric, but the accusation carries just 
as much weight when deployed in the humanities as in the sciences.  In other words, 
rhetoric may be slower to blow the whistle, but the rule is implemented just the same 
once the whistle is blown.   
Since metaphor is very much at the heart of this conversation, allow me what may 
seem like a detour in order to develop a metaphor for us to go forward with.  In HBO’s 
TV series WestWorld,161 one of season one’s major reveals, both to the audience and to 
the character Bernard, is that Bernard is a robot rather than a human. This reveal is 
accomplished when Bernard finds a schematic of his own mechanical body and responds 
“It doesn’t look like anything to me.”  It’s not the first time we’ve heard this line; several 
other characters who the audience knows as robots respond this way whenever they 
encounter something, usually an image, that in some way suggests that the theme park 
they live in isn’t real, or at least isn’t the whole of reality.  In hindsight, we have been 
offered clues that Bernard himself is a robot—so many clues, in fact, that the “reveal” 
wasn’t so much revelation as confirmation.  The hindsight-based hints that Bernard is a 
robot often take the form of his inability to see something, such as when he looks at a 
picture on Ford’s desk and sees two people in it, rather than three.  The third person in the 
                                                          
161 In case a brief description is helpful: WestWorld takes place in the future, at a theme park modeled on 
the American West and populated by robots who are largely indistinguishable from humans. One of the 
main appeals of this theme park is that humans are allowed to do literally anything to the robots with no 
risk to themselves, much like playing a real-life video game. The central conflict lies in the robots’ 
blossoming self-awareness, and in the coming consequences once they realize how they have been treated. 
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picture, the one that Bernard cannot see, turns out to be the real human being that Bernard 
is modeled after, and would therefore cause Bernard to begin asking questions that would 
eventually lead to his discovery that he is a robot rather than a human.  To make sure this 
kind of thing doesn’t happen, Ford has programmed the robots to be literally unable to 
see anything that would lead to these kinds of questions. 
I’m interested in all of this for a few reasons.  First: one of the necessary 
components here is that there is a sharp distinction between “real” reality and the 
constructed reality of the theme park.  The robots are designed to be as realistic as 
possible within this fictional setting, and the method used to achieve this is to program 
them to believe that the fictional setting is real, and that they are real people who live 
there.  In other words, the audience is made hyperaware of how realistic the robots are by 
being made hyperaware of the border around the park.  One of the reasons that Bernard’s 
origin is so unsettling and sinister is that it troubles that clear border: Bernard has so far 
been free from submersion in the fiction of the park itself, living his life out in “real” 
reality instead.  But here we discover that Bernard is not only a robot, but is also just as 
deeply submerged in an externally-imposed fiction as every other robot in the place; the 
fiction is imposed from the outside but exists within the robots’ own minds—getting out 
of the park and into “real” reality would not necessarily break it. 
Second: in order to maintain this submersion, anything that might break the fourth 
wall for the robots is blanked out of their view, both in the sense of their worldview and 
in the sense of their literal ability to see.  For most of the robots, this means that they are 
unable to see any evidence of the existence of the world outside the park or of the 
previous roles that they’ve played within it.  Bernard, again the exception, is not shielded 
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from evidence that, say, Tokyo exists, or that the park is just a park.  He is, however, 
prevented from seeing evidence that he is not human, including his inability to see the 
door to the lab containing such evidence.   
Third, and most relevant: the repeated verbal demarcation of this phenomenon is 
not “I can’t see anything” or “There’s nothing here,” but “This doesn’t look like anything 
to me.”  This particular phrasing suggests not simply a failure of vision, but a failure of 
metaphor—this doesn’t look like anything to me—and it situates that failure of metaphor 
within a particular perspective—this doesn’t look like anything to me.  It encapsulates the 
relationship between our ability to see, to notice something, and the referents that we may 
or may not have available for comparison. This is not about cognition, but about 
recognition, putting a name to and/or acknowledging the existence of something, an 
ability which is here framed as being dependent on a likeness or similarity that is itself 
dependent on perspective. 
So what we have here is an externally-imposed but internally-located blind spot 
that blocks recognition by preventing likeness from being established, in order to 
maintain a strict border around a constructed reality so that its constructedness is never 
acknowledged.  In this chapter, I argue that the anthropomorphism accusation is an 
externally-imposed but internally-located blind spot that blocks recognition by 
preventing likeness from being established, in order to maintain a strict border around a 
constructed reality so that its constructedness is never acknowledged.   
Sometimes the intention behind the accusation is a noble one, as when we wish to 
attend to difference and are cautious of figuring nonhumans from a presumption of lack.  
Often, the accusation is framed around a concern for accuracy—to anthropomorphize an 
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oxpecker by saying it is friends with a rhinoceros is inaccurate.162  In any case, accusing 
someone else of committing anthropomorphism should be suspect if only because it is 
such an easy critique to make; accusers often see no need to defend these critiques, but 
instead point out the presence of anthropomorphism and let it stand as though it were a 
critique that needed no defending, an obvious and inherent flaw in a writer’s work.  
Again, this anthropomorphism accusation, the simple identification of anthropomorphism 
as an obvious and unquestioned problem, is deeply embedded in scholarship across 
disciplines, though we see a particular anxiety about it in works that take up or rub 
against scientific discourse.   
Cameos: Anthropomorphism is Wrong 
 I would have liked to begin this analysis of the anthropomorphism accusation as a 
question of accuracy with an entire section on its presence in the sciences; however, the 
accusation is so embedded and nebulous that it’s difficult to find examples of scientists 
specifically raising the concern at all, and more difficult still to find scientific arguments 
laying out the perceived problems with anthropomorphizing.  Instead, the manifestations 
we tend to find are: 1.) language that bends around the accusation, demonstrating the 
accusation’s unseen presence like light bending around a black hole, or 2.) short, quick 
critiques of someone else’s indulgence in anthropomorphism. We have already seen some 
instances of the first, like Chapter 2’s Jandér and Herre, who go to such lengths to avoid 
saying that the fig tree “punishes” the wasp for cheating, instead opting for the 
presumably more accurate passivization of the tree that is achieved by the noun 
                                                          
162 This example is taken from Patricia A. Ganea, Caitlin F. Canfield, Kadria Simons-Ghafari, and Tommy 
Chou, “Do Cavies Talk? The Effect of Anthropomorphic Picture Books on Children’s Knowledge about 
Animals.” Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 5, 2014, pp. 1-9.  Within this study, the researchers tellingly 
labeled their two groups of picture books “Anthropomorphic Books” and “Factual Books.” 
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“sanctions.” We saw it again in Chapter 3’s open letter against the term “plant 
neurobiology,” which grounds its opposition in the inaccuracy of the “claim” that plants 
have neurons (which was never the claim).   
Here, I’d like to turn to a few examples of the second manifestation—short 
critiques of another’s anthropomorphic indulgence—in order to demonstrate some of 
their features.  For instance, Lucy G. Sullivan’s “Myth, Metaphor, and Hypothesis: How 
Anthropomorphism Defeats Science”163 is less an articulation of the ways 
anthropomorphism might interfere with the goal of scientific accuracy, as its title might 
suggest, and more a lament that Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene was responsible for 
a wave of careless anthropomorphizing in biology.  The specific term “selfish” is 
dissatisfactory to Sullivan, who sees it as supportive of the political-economic philosophy 
of utilitarian self-interest.  Her critique of biology works that have been “infected”164 by 
Dawkins’s anthropomorphism, however, focuses primarily on the inaccuracy of their 
scientific claims rather than on their politics.  In the one example that she does not take to 
task for inaccurate findings or interpretation of findings, Sullivan still dings them on 
accuracy by arguing that “if one must anthropomorphize, then the state of affairs appears 
to be better described as cooperation than as competition;”165 in other words, she offers a 
more accurate anthropomorphism than the authors, a move that she makes more than 
once.  Interestingly, each of her “more accurate” anthropomorphisms is a shift away from 
war imagery or competitive gaming (such as poker), and toward self-sacrifice and 
cooperation. 
                                                          
163 Sullivan, Lucy G. “Myth, Metaphor, and Hypothesis: How Anthropomorphism Defeats Science.” 
Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, vol. 349, iss. 1328, 1995, pp. 215-18. 
164 Ibid., p. 215. 
165 Ibid., p. 216. 
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On the surface, this seems in keeping with her discomfort about The Selfish 
Gene’s support of economic utilitarianism.  However, while we can certainly recognize a 
relationship between selfishness and war or selfishness and “winning,” neither war nor 
poker is particularly evocative of modern utilitarian philosophy or even selfishness per 
se.  Instead, Sullivan’s concern with all three invocations—selfishness, war or violence, 
and win-loss competition—shares a more overarching and vague moral overtone: 
altruism, peace, and cooperation are “right,” while selfishness, war, and competition are 
“wrong.”  For many of her examples, Sullivan offers an alternative story in which the 
nonhuman characters of birds, reproductive cells, or genes are actually seen to cooperate 
rather than compete.  In fact, Sullivan ends up claiming that “selfish-gene theory could 
well be entirely rewritten as a theory of cosanguineally based altruism.”166   
Setting aside that this is, at least in part, exactly how the theory was written in the 
first place, this sort of commentary indicates a preference for thinking about nonhumans 
in non-immoral terms, not just in amoral terms.  In other words, though Sullivan subtitles 
her piece “How Anthropomorphism Defeats Science,” she seems more concerned with 
how a particular version of anthropomorphism figures scientific subjects in a way that 
she deems “improper.”167  Further, she associates this anthropomorphic infection of 
science with creeping political motives, of which science should be “kept clean,”168 even 
while blaming the sociological interest in sexual competition on “the sexual antagonism 
fostered by feminism,”169 a provocative description which suggests that she herself has at 
least some degree of political motive.  The explicit concern for accuracy ends up 
                                                          
166 Ibid., p. 217. 
167 Ibid., p. 215. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., p. 217. 
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obscuring an implicit political dimension of the accusation. 
Setting up anthropomorphic inaccuracy as the whipping boy is not unique to 
Sullivan.  A 2010 op-ed by Julian Davies offers another example of this pattern within 
works by scientists that directly take up the question.  Published in EMBO Reports, 
Davies’s opinion piece titled “Anthropomorphism in Science”170 attempts a humorous 
critique of at least three distinct manifestations of anthropomorphism in microbial 
science.171  Like Sullivan, Davies uses the language of both accuracy and purity, arguing 
that “anthropomorphic thinking has misdirected biological enquiry” and that our 
knowledge of microbial communities “remains tainted by our anthropomorphism.”172  
Here, I’d like to focus on two particular moments in the text, the first a naming of his 
own language as anthropomorphic. 
Echoing Sullivan above, Davies criticizes the tendency for microbiologists to 
figure microbes in militaristic terms, such as “battlefields” and “chemical weapons,” 
arguing that this figuration blinds researchers to the cooperative behaviors of microbes.  
Davies suggests that the solution to this problem is to eliminate anthropomorphism from 
scientific work.  Davies, however, uses what he calls an anthropomorphism to argue 
against this practice while sticking to his argument that anthropomorphism needs to go:  
Does ascribing human militaristic means and ends to bacteria make sense?  There 
is enormous diversity in microbial phyla and the biosphere is an extraordinarily 
                                                          
170 Davies, Julian. “Anthropomorphism in Science.” EMBO Reports, vol. 11, iss. 10, 2010, p. 721. 
171 I say “attempts” because I want to make clear that the humorous style indicates that Davies’s argument 
is not actually trying to thoroughly address the problems he sees, but instead to gesture toward them.  I also 
say “attempts” because, at least for me, the humor here utterly fails and that failure interferes with the 
argument itself.  However, Davies is able to take the matter lightly because he is able to assume that his 
audience largely shares his assumptions about anthropomorphism in the first place, and it is those 
assumptions that I’d like to focus on here.  
172 Davies, p. 721. My emphasis. 
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complex collection of distinct organisms.  A given soil sample might contain 109 
microbes per gram with a thousand or more species living happily together (an 
anthropomorphic statement if there ever was one).173 
Again, Davies claims that anthropomorphism is the problem, even though it seems that 
he really only has a problem with certain kinds of anthropomorphism—and again, the 
“certain kind” is militaristic anthropomorphism, which he deems inaccurate.  His 
response is to simultaneously offer a more accurate anthropomorphism and to call for 
eliminating anthropomorphism altogether. 
Further, the “more accurate” version that Davies identifies as a particularly 
egregious anthropomorphism (“an anthropomorphic statement if there ever was one”) is, 
well, not all that anthropomorphic.  The only part of “living happily together” that we 
could even arguably apply on a humans-only basis is “happily;” certainly “living,” 
“together,” and “living together” are things that other creatures do all the time.  Some do 
continue to assert that animals do not experience emotion, but the number of experts 
holding that position are dwindling.174  While we may not have evidence that bacteria 
experience happiness, we do have evidence that happiness is not a uniquely human 
capacity. As with many so-called “anthropomorphisms,” this trait does not in fact 
“properly belong” to humans at all; if we truly were concerned with accuracy, we would 
have to describe this as a zoomorphism.  However, I have yet to see a single instance of a 
zoomorphism accusation; instead, we claim for our own any trait that we see as 
                                                          
173 Ibid. 
174 For a useful summary of such research, see Marc Bekoff, “Animal Emotions: Exploring Passionate 
Natures: Current Interdisciplinary Research Provides Compelling Evidence that Many Animals Experience 
Such Emotions as Joy, Fear, Love, Despair, and Grief—We Are Not Alone.” BioScience, vol. 50, iss. 10, 
2000, pp. 861-870. 
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improperly attributed, just as Davies here claims “living happily together” as properly 
belonging to humans by calling it an anthropomorphism. 
The second moment in the text that I’d like to draw attention to is Davies’s set of 
hypothetical examples of anthropomorphism in the microbial sciences.  To open up the 
discussion early in the piece, Davies refers to the susceptibility of microbial science to 
“sentimental anthropomorphism,” describing the scientific literature as  
littered with examples of bacteria having to ‘make a choice to use a particular 
substrate’ or a ‘decision to make a compound’ and even ‘needing something.’175   
The first two examples make a certain amount of sense, since intentionality is still widely 
considered to be a uniquely human trait (though, as I argued in Chapter 3, this position is 
problematic).  The third, though, is mystifying.  Even if we take Davies’s humorous 
approach into account, it is difficult to see how describing any living thing as “needing 
something” could possibly qualify as an anthropomorphism, or even as a zoomorphism.  
Suggesting that humans are the only creatures that might need something by calling that 
phrase an anthropomorphism is an extreme example of how the anthropomorphism 
accusation can become an easy, blanket critique that allows us to point fingers without 
defending, or even necessarily thinking too deeply about, our own finger-pointing. 
These two writers are not unique. Together, Davies and Sullivan illustrate a 
pattern that develops when we try to directly address the problem of anthropomorphism, 
particularly in the sciences where the accusation is embedded so deeply that the problem 
seems too obvious to require explanation.  While lamenting the inaccuracy of 
anthropomorphizing, we play fast and loose with the accuracy of the term itself.  
                                                          
175 Davies, p. 721. 
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Simultaneously, we can’t help but offer up anthropomorphisms that do the job better; if 
they aren’t accurate, then they’re at least less inaccurate.  Moreover, we tend to be quite 
selective about the targets of the anthropomorphism accusation, calling out certain 
instances while dismissing, failing to notice, or even actively deploying others, all while 
continuing to argue that anthropomorphism itself, as a whole, is bad.  Finally, woven 
within this concern for accuracy is a moral element that manifests more or less 
consistently: we are even more critical of anthropomorphizing nonhumans when the 
“human” qualities being attributed are ones we don’t like about ourselves, like violence 
or selfishness.   
Cameos: Anthropomorphism is Wrong 
Science historian Lorraine Daston pointedly addresses this moral element,176 
describing the scientific orientation toward anthropomorphism at the end of the twentieth 
century as not only a failure of accuracy but also a failure of morality:  
We regard anthropocentrism as the childish vanity that makes man the measure of 
all things, and as a violation of the ideal of aperspectival objectivity…It is 
because we believe that anthropomorphism is caused by anthropocentrism that we 
find it reprehensible as well as erroneous, arrogant as well as confused.177   
This moral dimension of the anthropomorphism accusation, the idea that 
anthropomorphism isn’t just wrong but also wrong, may help explain why writers like 
Sullivan and Davies end up with such similar targets for their accusations—
anthropomorphism at its most immoral takes up immoral human behavior and attributes it 
                                                          
176 Daston, Lorraine. “How Nature Became the Other: Anthropomorphism and Anthropocentrism in Early 
Modern Natural Philosophy.” Biology as Society, Society as Biology: Metaphors, Springer, 1995, pp. 37-
56. 
177 Ibid., p. 38-9. Original emphasis. 
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to nonhumans, doubling up on the wronging.   
Writers within science studies178 are explicitly aware of the moral dimension of 
anthropomorphism, especially when defending their own work against the accusation.  In 
their 2017 article “Thinking Ecologically About Rhetoric’s Ontology,” Nathan Stormer 
and Bridie McGreavy take a moment to deflect potential accusations of 
anthropomorphizing mud, clams, and other nonhumans in their investigation of the 
aquaculture of Frenchman Bay, Maine.179  Relying heavily on Jane Bennett’s defense of 
anthropomorphism (itself discussed below), Stormer and McGreavy quickly come to the 
following conclusion: 
 We cannot avoid anthropomorphism.  Critical anthropomorphism is not 
appropriative, not colonization by representation.  Unlike anthropo-centrism, 
anthropo-morphism is humanity as mutable form and makes possible “a 
comparison of powers that leads us to discover more in the body than we know, 
and hence more in the mind than we are conscious of” (Deleuze 1988, 90).  It’s as 
much about us becoming animal or becoming water or mud as about the animal 
becoming human, as we act with extra-creaturely materialities and they with us 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 233-309).180  
I have here quoted nearly half the discussion of anthropomorphism that appears in this 
piece, with the entire discussion taking up a single paragraph.  Such a cursory treatment 
                                                          
178 A loose interdisciplinary category that I’m here using to describe projects in both the humanities and the 
social sciences that make interventions into the processes, the tools, and especially the assumptions at work 
in scientific practice. 
179 Stormer, Nathan and Bridie McGreavy. “Thinking Ecologically About Rhetoric’s Ontology: Capacity, 
Vulnerability, and Resilience.” Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 50, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-25. 
180 Ibid., p. 9. Original emphasis. 
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is common, but it’s also problematic in that it tends to result in a reductive depiction of 
how anthropomorphism actually functions. 
 First, there is more work to be done on the presumably positive notion of 
becoming that is at play here.  Bear with me while I “anthropomorphize” this particular 
intellectual move by describing it in entirely human terms: what would it look like if we 
took a quality “belonging” to a more powerful group of humans and “extended” it to a 
less powerful group of humans, and defended such a gesture on the basis of a mutual 
becoming?  The very concept of transforming that is inherent in becoming should throw 
up some clear red flags when thought in terms of human alterity: engaging othered people 
should not be dependent on transforming them into something more like us, and the 
addendum that we ourselves are also becoming/transforming into something more like 
them, only raises this to benevolent racism (or sexism or ableism) at best.  While thinking 
about anthropomorphism does raise the specter of transformation/becoming, which then 
seems to offer a conceptual link to Deleuzean becoming, collapsing these three terms 
together does each of them a disservice and misses an opportunity to theorize the ways 
that these concepts interact, interconstitute, and interconflict with each other. 
Further, Stormer and McGreavy do not spend enough time here on the question 
they are addressing to make sure that their terms make sense—notably, appropriation and 
colonization do not make as much sense as it may appear on the surface.  
Anthropomorphism, “critical” or otherwise, is understood to take what “belongs” to the 
empowered, the human, and give it to the disempowered, the nonhuman.  Both 
appropriation and colonization are generally used to indicate a taking that moves in the 
opposite direction, from the disempowered to the empowered.  Therefore, to say that 
 114 
“critical anthropomorphism” isn’t appropriative or that it isn’t colonization is accurate, 
but only in the same way that labeling a bottle of water “gluten-free” is accurate—
technically correct, but somewhat disingenuously suggesting that some or all other 
versions do contain what is here claimed to be absent.  In attempting a quick deflection of 
the anthropomorphism accusation and a brief side-stepping of the moral dimension of the 
question, Stormer and McGreavy leave the anthropomorphism accusation intact, 
deflecting it from themselves to a certain degree but never actually challenging its 
premise.  
Which brings us to another complicating factor that must be dealt with here: 
anthropomorphism cuts both ways in that it can operate in the service of maintaining 
anthropocentrism or in the service of challenging it.  In the aforementioned “How Nature 
Became the Other,” Lorraine Daston argues against the common narrative that the 
rejection of anthropomorphism in seventeenth-century natural philosophy formed the 
basis of modern science, instead claiming that the twentieth-century rejection of 
anthropomorphism and the seventeenth-century rejection of anthropomorphism are 
motivated by opposite relationships to anthropocentrism:  “We [20th C. scientists] are 
antianthropomorphism because we are antianthropocentrism; they [17th C. natural 
philosophers] were antianthropomorphism because they were proanthropocentrism.”181  
The thrust of this argument is that the natural philosophers who vehemently opposed 
anthropomorphizing nature did so on the basis of human distinction and superiority, 
assuming that we are fundamentally different from and superior to every other entity and 
that extending explicitly human qualities to nonhumans constitutes a kind of blasphemy. 
                                                          
181 Daston, p. 39. Original emphasis. 
 115 
Daston’s investigation illustrates the complexity of anthropocentrism’s functions and 
manifestations, and lays bare the ways in which either embracing or rejecting 
anthropocentrism does not necessarily provide a roadmap toward embracing or rejecting 
anthropomorphism.   
Like “humor” or “sexuality,” “anthropomorphism” is a broad term covering a 
large array of specific manifestations, and it can be deployed either in the service of a 
dominant ideology or in challenge to that ideology.  For our purposes here, two of the 
primary attributes of anthropocentrism are: 1.) the tendency to interpret the world from a 
pointedly human perspective, and 2.) the tendency to assume that humans are unique 
among and usually superior to other living beings.  The anthropomorphism accusation 
often claims itself to be anti-anthropocentric, but it can only make that case for itself if 
we define anthropocentrism in the first sense of maintaining a default human perspective 
and ignore the second sense of assuming human uniqueness and superiority.  Davies 
thinks that attributing happiness to microbes is to speak of microbes in human terms.  
This marks happiness as a human capacity, functionally excluding other creatures and 
claiming happiness as our own human property.  Sullivan claims selfishness for humans, 
while Stormer and McGreavy claim for us the capacity for motive and the capacity to 
have something “matter”182 to you.  I have seen the anthropomorphism accusation leveled 
at having a “family,” having “interests,” “helping,” “choosing,” and “attacking”—and 
again, one of our authors even used “needing something” as an example of 
anthropomorphic language.  In many ways, the anthropomorphism accusation has 
become shorthand for telling someone that they are wrong, without the burden of 
                                                          
182 Stormer and McGreavy, p. 9. 
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explaining what exactly they are wrong about.  It carries such weight that many may 
never stop to consider whether birds can be selfish, whether clams can have motive, or 
whether bacteria do in fact have needs, and seemingly no one stops to consider that 
having needs is unquestionably not a uniquely human quality.   
Yet the double-claim of the anthropomorphism accusation is exactly that—not 
only this creature does not have X capacity, but also X capacity belongs to humans.  
Now, to be clear: I am not necessarily arguing with anyone who thinks genes cannot be 
selfish, or with anyone who thinks that bacteria cannot experience happiness or even that 
bacteria do not have needs (though I am more skeptical about that one).  I am arguing, 
however, that claiming those capacities and traits as properly human is vastly detrimental 
not only to our understanding of other creatures as well as ourselves, but also to our 
ability to ethically attend the world.  In our concern for making sure we do not impose a 
purely human perspective onto nonhumans—a task as impossible as it is necessary—we 
do not even realize just how great a swathe of capacities and abilities we are planting our 
flag atop.  If I’ve made this sound like colonization all over again, well—we’ll come 
back to that.  First, though, I want to spend some time characterizing a common move 
among those who seek to defend themselves against the anthropomorphism accusation, a 
move that attempts to carve out a space within anthropomorphism whereby it can be 
deployed ethically. 
Cameos: My Anthropomorphism is Not Wrong 
Stormer and McGreavy above offer us the first example, defining their own 
methods as an exception, as a “critical anthropomorphism” that isn’t immoral, which lets 
stand the presumption that unqualified anthropomorphism is immoral; specifically, that it 
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is “appropriation or colonization by representation.”183  As mentioned, they rely heavily 
on Jane Bennett’s defense against the anthropomorphism accusation in order to make 
their own. 
In a one-and-a-half-page section of Vibrant Matter titled “A Note on 
Anthropomorphism,”184 Bennett defends her interest in the agency of nonhumans from 
the anthropomorphism accusation by focusing on what anthropomorphism can do.  For 
Bennett, anthropomorphizing nonhumans can function to heighten attentiveness, which 
can in turn reveal the “distinctive, material complexity”185 of the nonhuman in question.  
In other words, Bennett sees anthropomorphism as a step in a process that begins with 
recognizing similarity but then turns to recognizing difference:  
In a vital materialism, an anthropomorphic element in perception can uncover a 
whole world of resonances and resemblances […] We at first may see only a 
world in our own image, but what appears next is a swarm of “talented” and 
vibrant materialities (including the seeing self).186 
She goes on to argue that “a touch of anthropomorphism can catalyze a sensibility [here, 
the sensibility of Charles Darwin] that finds a world filled not with ontologically distinct 
categories of beings (subjects and objects) but with variously composed materialities that 
form confederations.”187  Finally, Bennett boils her defense down to this: 
“anthropomorphism can reveal isomorphisms.”188   
Unlike Stormer and McGreavy’s focus on the transformative element of the term, 
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184 Bennett, Jane. “A Note on Anthropomorphism.” Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Duke 
UP, 2010, pp. 98-99. 





Bennett focuses on anthropomorphism as a type of metaphor, functioning to foreground 
likeness—resonances, resemblances, and isomorphisms—as well as the difference that 
underwrites the possibility of revealing or uncovering that likeness.  What Bennett’s 
defense does share in common with Stormer and McGreavy’s defense is a gesture toward 
exception.  Bennett frames the revelatory power of anthropomorphism within “a vital 
materialism,” and sets apart the “sensibility” of those like Darwin and herself as being 
capable of catalyzation by anthropomorphism.  Though the exception-gesture is much 
less central to Bennett’s defense, it does once more suggest that anthropomorphism 
normally functions differently than it is being claimed to function here, that the author’s 
method of anthropomorphizing is an exception to the rule. 
Bruno Latour spends more time theorizing anthropomorphism and eventually he 
challenges the position from which the accusation can be made rather than simply 
carving out space for his own deployment of anthropomorphisms. Even so, his challenge 
has refined over time, demonstrating just how deeply embedded our anxiety about the 
anthropomorphism accusation really is—even for a Latour, it takes years to offer a full-
throated critique.  In Reassembling the Social,189 Latour argues that all figuration, 
including anthropomorphism, is necessary within the social sciences.190  He emphasizes 
that the goal of these moves is not to conflate human with nonhuman, but to differently 
figure in order to generate new ways of thinking.  Latour also argues that figuration 
happens whether we like it or not, so he calls for practitioners of actor-network theory to 
more closely attend to the ways in which they can figure an actant, as opposed to 
attempting to remove figuration from their descriptions of actants.  In other words, since 
                                                          
189 Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford UP, 2005. 
190 Ibid., p. 54. 
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figuration cannot be elided, Latour advises us to more carefully choose how we figure.   
In the conclusion of the book, Latour returns to anthropomorphism in particular 
and directly addresses the problems with claiming it as a grounds for critique.  He says 
that to treat an object as a matter of fact is to anthropomorphize that object, since humans 
sometimes behave as matters of fact (i.e., indisputable unities) for political reasons, while 
objects never do.191  This counter-intuitive claim—that to treat an object as an 
indisputable, unified reality is to anthropomorphize it—flips the script on the 
anthropomorphism accusation by taking the idea seriously.  If anthropomorphizing an 
object means talking about it as though it had human qualities, then we can use it to 
describe any action that pretends objects are doing something that, in fact, only humans 
do.  For Latour, behaving as an indisputable, unified reality is something that humans do 
but that objects do not, so talking about objects as though they do behave this way 
qualifies as anthropomorphism. In other words, if anyone’s anthropomorphizing around 
here, it’s the accusers. 
Five years later in “An Attempt at a ‘Compositionist Manifesto,’”192 Latour has 
come to a much more radical stance on the issue, arguing that not only is 
anthropomorphizing objects perfectly acceptable, but that only an anthropocentric 
worldview would consider it a bad thing in the first place.  According to Latour, the 
ability to critique someone for anthropomorphizing is made possible only by the 
invention of the “unrealistic” assumption of “action without agency.”193  That is, 
“anthropomorphism” can make sense as a critique only if the accuser first assumes a 
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193 Ibid., p. 482. 
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strict divide between (human) subjects and (nonhuman) objects, and then further assumes 
that subjectivity is necessary for agency.  Latour argues that the second assumption is 
made in order that the first assumption can be maintained, which is why he calls this 
position “the most anthropocentric of all the modes of relation invented…to deal with 
associations between humans and nonhumans.”194  
Latour does not deny his anthropomorphism, nor is he here simply claiming that 
it’s unavoidable and should therefore be done attentively.  Instead, he argues that it isn’t 
anthropomorphism that is anthropocentric; the anthropomorphism accusation is what is 
anthropocentric, indeed the most anthropocentric move in posthumanist studies.  This is 
not quite the same argument as Daston makes above, in which the anthropomorphism 
accusation can be grounded in either an embrace of anthropocentrism, as with 
seventeenth-century natural philosophy, or in a rejection of anthropocentrism, as with 
modern science.  Latour instead aligns the anthropomorphism accusation firmly with 
anthropocentric thinking, and therefore indirectly aligns anthropomorphism itself against 
anthropocentric thinking. 
What is held in common by Latour, Bennett, Stormer and McGreavy, and other 
writers like them is a desire for an ethical anthropomorphism.  Their work with 
nonhumans, particularly with nonhuman agency, has led them to understand 
anthropomorphism as useful and necessary—useful because of the shifts in thinking as 
well as the sense of affinity it can produce, and necessary because “humanness” is 
intricately tied up with agency in our language.  Since the primary focus of their projects 
is not a rumination on anthropomorphism itself, the problem gets addressed within asides, 
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within cameos that seek to quickly establish grounds for why this anthropomorphism is 
okay so that the authors can move forward unencumbered.  That so many writers feel it 
necessary to pause for these quick cameos is indicative of the pressure of the 
anthropomorphism accusation.  At first, I also tried to preempt the accusation in this way; 
the current chapter began its life as a three-page section that was bounced around into 
every other chapter of this dissertation before I finally realized that it didn’t fit anywhere 
because it deserved its own treatment.  Like other posthumanist thinkers, I knew that I 
needed to address the anthropomorphism accusation, but I wanted to get it out of the way 
so I could get back to the “real question” of my project.   
I now wonder if the question of anthropomorphism and its concomitant 
accusation is, in fact, the “real question” of all posthumanist writing, if wrestling with 
this question to some extent is what qualifies a piece of writing as posthumanist.195  It is 
nothing less than the question of what counts as human and what does not, and what 
happens to the assumptions of humanism when that border shifts or blurs. 
Denouement 
 So we have a problem.  We want a route to ethical anthropomorphism, but we 
also want to take shortcuts to get there, and shortcuts just won’t work.  As we have seen 
with these several examples, attempting to deal with a question this large and nebulous in 
a transition or a “note” or some other quick aside ends up producing several problems.  
First, such defenses are full of missed opportunities for developing a thicker 
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understanding of anthropomorphism as well as the anthropomorphism accusation.  We 
don’t yet know how either of these moves can function or exactly what effects they can 
produce.  Further, these quick, get-it-out-of-the-way defenses operate under an exception-
logic almost without fail, leaving the anthropomorphism accusation intact but insisting 
that mine is an exception.  I am suspicious of this logic, if only because it answers an 
easy, “obvious” critique with an easy, “obvious” defense, and we have already seen that 
the critique is not nearly as obvious as it may seem. 
 At its most reductive, the critique that I have been calling the anthropomorphism 
accusation describes itself as being concerned with accuracy.  It is inaccurate, so the 
argument goes, to say that bacteria can be happy or that something might matter to mud 
and clams.  This concern for accuracy is belied, though, by the selectivity of the targets; 
we seem to be perfectly okay with saying that bacteria live in “communities,” for 
example, or that mud and clams “play a role” in their ecosystems.  In addition, the term 
anthropomorphism is itself often used inaccurately within these critiques, as it is 
frequently applied to traits or capacities that are already known to be shared by creatures 
other than humans.  In these ways, the stated concern for accuracy often works to obscure 
a political and/or moral dimension of the accusation, hiding the fact that particular 
humanizing metaphors are what we really take issue with and that our attack or rejection 
of them is motivated by ideology, not objectivity. 
 All of which is to repeat a statement from the first section of this chapter: the 
anthropomorphism accusation is an externally-imposed but internally-located blind spot 
that blocks recognition by preventing likeness from being established, in order to 
maintain a strict border around a constructed reality so that its constructedness is never 
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acknowledged.  We are told that anthropomorphism is to be avoided, and so we seek to 
avoid it and police it in others.  As Bennett rightly notes, anthropomorphism can establish 
a recognition of likeness, which the accusation functions to block.  The accusation’s 
insistence on accuracy as its fundamental value suggests that “non-anthropomorphic” 
language describes a pre-existing reality, when in fact the accusation constructs and 
reconstructs the reality of the human (and therefore of the nonhuman) each time it is 
deployed against an anthropomorphism and each time it prevents an anthropomorphism 
from being uttered. 
 The anthropomorphism accusation does not patrol the border between human and 
nonhuman; it builds the border.  It plants a flag on particular territories by claiming them 
as properly belonging to the human.  Anthropomorphism is said to be problematic in that 
it describes nonhumans in terms that properly belong to the human; however, it is only in 
the naming of an utterance as anthropomorphic, in the declaration “this is an 
anthropomorphism,” that human propriety is established.  If I say, for instance, that my 
dog is happy when his friends visit, I have not claimed happiness or friends for humans—
quite the opposite.  If, however, I or someone else declares that statement an 
anthropomorphism, that declaration then retroactively plants a human flag on the territory 
of happiness, friends, or both.  This is the primary reason that the current chapter is 
located where it is, as a prequel to the previous chapter: preemptively attaching the name 
anthropomorphism to my method of describing plants in terms like “breaking up with 
their pollinator” would have given the game away.  Earlier, I said that we’d come back to 
the question of colonization raised by Stormer and McGreavy.  In short, I agree with 
them: critical anthropomorphism is neither appropriation nor colonization.  No 
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anthropomorphism is appropriation or colonization.  The anthropomorphism accusation, 
on the other hand, is exactly that.  It colonizes by claiming some capacities as human 
property while its unidirectionality appropriates capacities by refusing to similarly defend 
them in the other direction—that is, while we colonize “warning” by accusing of 
anthropomorphism those who say that acacias warn their neighbors of danger, we also 
appropriate “putting down roots” by the absence of a term “dendromorphism” for the 
idea that humans put down roots. 
 If the anthropomorphism accusation rejects anthropocentrism by rejecting a 
human perspective, it simultaneously embraces anthropocentrism by embracing a 
superior and unique human essence.  Tit for tat, though: if language that gets called 
anthropomorphism rejects anthropocentrism by rejecting a superior and unique human 
essence, it simultaneously embraces anthropocentrism by embracing a human 
perspective.  Another way of putting this might be: there are two paths that can be 
considered anthropocentric; the embrace of human superiority is a path to the 
anthropomorphism accusation, and the embrace of human perspective is a path to what 
gets called anthropomorphism. 
There is no “ethical anthropomorphism.”  At least, there is no category of 
anthropomorphism that is purely and fully “ethical,” no approach or mentality that puts 
us into the realm of being ethically right and allows us to stop having to pay attention.  
It’s tempting, then, to capitulate to the anthropomorphism accusation and either avoid 
anthropomorphism altogether or to try to find an out.  For instance, rather than the 
conflation or transformation associated with anthropomorphism, Paul de Man’s 
 125 
prosopopoeia (as analyzed by Diane Davis) “bestows”196 humanness through figuration, 
and does so for humans and nonhumans alike.  My current investigation could embrace 
prosopopoeia as its central figure, describing itself as bestowing a semblance of the 
human onto the plant while maintaining that such a bestowal is all we can ever do for 
humans (and animals) as well.  I prefer, instead, the Robin-Hood gesture of what gets 
called anthropomorphism: “taking” a capacity that “properly belongs” to the human and 
handing it over to plants. 
There are many reasons for this preference.  Language that gets called 
anthropomorphism can establish likeness and affinity between humans and nonhumans, 
and, for better or worse, recognizing likeness and affinity tends to reduce the harm of 
othering (even if it smooths the path for a different kind of harm).  Ideally, though, we 
would not need to establish likeness in order to affirmatively engage otherness, and so 
this project has attempted to balance the ideal and the pragmatic by anthropomorphizing 
in order to recognize likeness and defamiliarizing that anthropomorphism in order to re-
recognize difference.  I have chosen to intensify anthropomorphism, not because 
anthropomorphizing is harmless, but because in this context and at this moment, I feel 
that the damage of embracing superior human uniqueness is greater than the damage of 
embracing human perspective, particularly with regard to plants.  Further, while it may be 
impossible to “get out” of either human uniqueness or human perspective, getting out of 
human uniqueness is, let us say, less impossible.  Finally, I prefer to anthropomorphize 
because the anthropomorphism accusation is so very entrenched in our discourse and, as 
we learned from Emily Martin, entrenched language habits both deserve and resist 
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disentrenchment; this project embraces and intensifies anthropomorphism because 
anthropomorphism is the path of most resistance. 
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Chapter 6: Outroduction 
A vegetable garden in the beginning looks so promising  
and then after all little by little it grows nothing but vegetables,  
nothing, nothing but vegetables. 
—Gertrude Stein, Wars I Have Seen 
It is posed and it is posed. / But in nature it merely grows. 
—Wallace Stevens, “Add This to Rhetoric” 
Consequences 
Here at the close, I’d like to gesture toward some of the work that this dissertation 
speaks to, but which I have so far set aside in order to narrow the scope of such a 
potentially wide-ranging project.  Just as the Introduction focuses on works that this 
project grows out of and takes up, this “outroduction” focuses on works that this project 
grows into—that is, works that have not been taken up in the previous chapters but 
instead exemplify the ways that Rhetoric and Plants has the potential to impact 
scholarship going forward.  First, though, I want to outline some of the consequences of 
thinking about plants and botanicity that the previous chapters have brought to the 
surface.  As an acknowledgement that this dissertation does not operate on a linear, 
teleological structure, this brief summary moves backward. 
Chapter 5: Anthropomorphism and Anthropocentrism argues that neither fully 
embracing nor fully rejecting anthropomorphism automatically gets you outside the 
enclosure of anthropocentrism; rather, there are different registers of anthropocentrism 
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and using language that gets called anthropomorphic resonates in one register while the 
anthropomorphism accusation resonates in another.  Further, Chapter 5 suggests that the 
question of anthropomorphism might be the fundamental question of posthumanism, 
concerned as it is with the border between human and nonhuman as well as with the 
effects of piercing or moving that border. 
Chapter 4: Pain and Ethics argues full-throatedly for a concept of plant pain, not 
primarily in order to convince readers that plants can feel pain, but rather to demonstrate 
the possibilities for new ways of thinking that become available when we are not limited 
by the knee-jerk avoidance of anthropomorphizing nonhumans.  As the case for plant 
pain demonstrates, anthropomorphism (or zoomorphism that we prefer to claim as 
anthropomorphism) is a powerful tool for cultivating affinity even when it’s an affinity 
we’d rather not share, whether because our ethical decisions get more complicated, as 
with plant pain, or because we’d like to think that “nature” is purer than humanity 
somehow.  Regardless, seeing others as being “like” ourselves is problematic in that it 
serves to erase difference, but seeing others as being radically unlike ourselves is also 
problematic in that it can serve to justify continuing to do to them whatever we find 
convenient, profitable, or pleasurable, and historically has served exactly that 
justification.  In instances where the default is to assume lack of affinity, 
anthropomorphism can help open our thinking out of this default. 
Chapter 3: Mechanism and Mindedness works through various registers of plant 
intelligence in order to trouble the concept of mechanistic reaction as it is often applied to 
nonhumans, in part by working to decouple mind from brain and in part by resituating 
deliberated human response as one species of mechanistic reaction.  This approach to 
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“mechanism” does not seek to define some beings as mechanistic and others as 
purposive.  Instead, it treats “mechanistic reaction” as one method of characterizing 
behaviors, and it treats “deliberate response” as another method of characterizing 
behaviors; no more, no less. The former is a characterization that functions to distance 
us—in this case, rational humans, but this holds no matter which group comprises the 
“us” in a given instance—from those behaviors and the beings that perform them.  The 
latter characterization aligns the behaviors (and the beings that perform them) with “us,” 
or with the aspect of ourselves that we’d like to continue holding up as unique and ideal: 
rationality.  However, if human “response” describes the same mechanistic phenomenon 
as “reaction,” with only a difference in how these phenomena are consciously 
experienced by us, then response cannot “properly” belong to humans nor reaction to 
nonhumans. 
Chapter 2: Sex and Ambulocentrism is likewise interested in metaphor, but more 
broadly.  Sex is probably the most well-understood of plant behaviors, so plant sex 
becomes a site for proliferating metaphors to describe plants differently. Taking up Emily 
Martin’s call to disentrench our deeply entrenched metaphors, we end up bestowing 
personalities on plants contra her call to avoid doing so.  As a result, we are able to 
acknowledge the complex agency of these rooted beings, which helps us uncover the 
ways that we tend to associate both agency and communication with mobility, especially 
locomotion, especially ambulation.  Ambulocentrism is a forceful component of 
rhetorical discourse, made visible by engaging creatures who do not go elsewhere. 
In addition to the chapter-by-chapter arguments, there are some threads running 
through and developing out of Rhetoric and Plants that are worth articulating here.  One 
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is that questions of ethics, of how we attend to others, have no simple answers.  If the 
ethical questions raised by this dissertation are taken seriously, then one consequence is 
that, for instance, dietary decisions can no longer be reduced to “I will not” or “I will 
only” eat creatures with such-and-such quality, whether that quality is pain, death, 
intelligence, intentionality, or whatever.  This version of dietary ethics is a momentary 
attention to otherness, in that the attention lasts only as long as it takes to make the “never 
creature X” rule.  Once in place, the rule allows us to stop attending to our eating, to go 
right back to consumption without care, just with some creatures set aside as taboo.   
This is not an attack on vegetarianism, or a dismissal of any decision not to eat 
creature X for whatever reason; rather, it is a call to remember that if you do choose to 
make such a decision, ethicality does not stop there.  It is possible, even likely, that my 
veggie burgers were made from soy beans grown in a monoculture, displacing or killing 
countless other plants, animals, and people.  It’s possible, even likely, that my almond 
milk contains almonds from a farm in California that uses an obscene amount of water in 
the midst of a crippling and ongoing drought.  It’s possible, even likely, that the cocoa in 
my chocolate bar was harvested by a child.  This does not mean that we should add soy, 
almonds, and cocoa to our list of things not to eat; rather, it means that if you want to eat 
ethically, you never get to stop, never get to a point where you’ve figured out the rules 
and you’re ethical now.  To attend otherness is to be present to it, and it therefore always 
happens in the present, as an ongoing endeavor. 
One crucial aspect of attending to otherness is attending to difference.  Much 
work has already gone into positing difference, rather than figuring difference as lack.  
But attending to difference also means differentiating—attending not just to differences 
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between others and ourselves, but between others and other others.  Taken to its extreme, 
this looks like Derrida’s cat, who “isn’t the figure of a cat,” who “doesn’t silently enter 
the bedroom as an allegory for all the cats on the earth.”197  I have not differentiated 
plants to such a degree, in part because of necessity: I can’t talk about the reproductive 
habits of this dogwood tree in my front yard, since no one has done an experiment on it 
as far as I know, and I have not lived here long enough to observe anything worth 
reporting on that front.  And besides, you don’t care about this dogwood (yet).  Plants of 
all kinds are so absent from the conversation that the first step seems, to me, to require 
more general terms than Derrida’s radical specificity.   
I have, however, been careful to avoid the other extreme, which collapses all 
plants into the collective singular: The Plant.  This degree of nondifferentiation allows for 
sweeping conclusions that all too often simply reiterate our previously held conceptions 
of plants, such as when Michael Marder, who specializes in plant-thinking, expounds on 
“the non-economic generosity of the plant-soul” which offers itself with absolutely no 
“expectations of returns from the other.”198  While full differentiation can be impossible 
or counter-productive in a project like Rhetoric and Plants, insufficient differentiation 
remains a problematic temptation.  I have attempted to counter it by differentiating by 
species and by anthropomorphizing the various plants that appear here, bestowing 
personalities as a method of establishing individuality.  There are other ways to strike this 
balance, of course; the idea is not to suggest a particular method of striking the balance, 
but to remember that it needs striking. 
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Speaking of anthropomorphism: yet another thread running throughout this 
project is that the question to ask of anthropomorphism is not if, nor even necessarily 
how, but why.  No rule set suffices for how to talk about plants.  If I wanted to 
differentiate while also establishing affinity, I had to throw out the rules: often I 
anthropomorphize, often I avoid it.  Sometimes I critique someone for too strenuously 
avoiding anthropomorphism, sometimes I critique someone for too capriciously indulging 
in it. The question is always: at this moment, what are we trying to accomplish?  What 
kind of plant, what kind of alterity, do we want to construct? Some moments answer that 
question in favor of anthropomorphizing, while other moments answer against.  That 
deciding is always happening, must always be happening. 
The basic assumption of this dissertation is that plants are creatures, but they tend 
to get conceptualized as objects.  This straddling of the animate/inanimate divide means 
that plants have enormous potential as a site of inquiry for many different schools of 
thought or subdisciplines.  In some ways, the various plant rhetorics reviewed in the 
Introduction can be thought of as contributing to those differing schools of thought, 
which may account for the fact that each acknowledges the others without necessarily 
engaging the others—if, like Matthew Hall, your interest is in the role of plants in various 
religious philosophies, then Elaine Miller’s book on plants as a figure for feminine 
subjectivity may not offer you much purchase.  If, however, we begin to think of these 
various plants works not only as botanic contributions to existing subdisciplines but also 
as a new subdiscipline itself—plant studies, say, as we have recently begun to recognize 
the category of animal studies—then the vast potential for new lines of thought offered 
by thinking and talking about plants becomes visible.  Here, I’d like to sketch out some of 
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those potential lines of thought as an invitation for further research by elaborating on 
potential botanic contributions to two or three existing pieces within new materialism, 
environmental rhetoric, and pedagogy. 
New Materialism 
Rhetoric and Plants developed out of animal studies, but it could just as easily 
have developed out of new materialism.  Their occupancy of the liminal space between 
animate and inanimate potentiates a contribution to the work that new materialist scholars 
have already been doing to both heighten our concern and care for the purely material as 
well as to acknowledge the fundamental materiality of the animate, work that shares 
much in common with Chapter 3’s troubling of the minded/mechanistic binary.  
Unfortunately, my research has shown that plants are largely absent from new 
materialism’s considerations, an absence that I see as a missed opportunity. 
For instance, Mel Y. Chen’s Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer 
Affect troubles the simple categorical distinction between animacy, aligned with mind, 
and materiality, aligned with body.  Animacies considers all material to exist on an 
animacy spectrum, rather than being considered either animate or inanimate—in other 
words, it is an investigation that seems particularly well-poised to broach the subject of 
plants.  Chen wants to think animacy as a scale on which “inanimates,” such as stones, 
“definitively occupy a scalar position (near zero);” that is, they do not lack or “oppose” 
animacy completely, but rather exist somewhere on the animacy spectrum.199  Like many 
other works of new materialism, Animacies is quite interested in humans, animals, and 
inanimate objects, but gives short shrift to plants, even when discussing a work that 
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specifically addresses all four of these “types” of bodies: Aristotle’s De Anima.  After 
paraphrasing Aristotle’s argument, Chen suggests, with great qualification, that we 
consider the affective nature of “vegetables”: “We might therefore say, if we took 
Aristotle to one end point, that it is possible to conceive of something like the “affect” of 
a vegetable.”200  This hesitation to grant affective capacities to plants is striking when it 
appears within a work that is willing to boldly place stones on the animacy scale.   
This may be easier to understand if we look to another moment in which Chen 
discusses “vegetables,” during her examination of the phrase “I just don’t want to be a 
vegetable,” the more common way of referring to the medical term “persistent vegetative 
state.”  Chen notes that we choose plants as our referent “as a disavowal of the next 
relevant position” on the hierarchical scale of animacy, and that comparing ourselves to 
stones or statues would not have the same impact: “some kind of animacy, some kind of 
thriving and sensitivity, must be preserved for the person’s denial to highlight the major 
locus of difference between what is desired [i.e., cognition] and what is undesired [loss of 
cognition].”201  However, Chen then goes on to discuss vegetables in such a way that it is 
difficult to tell whether or not Chen actually considers them higher on the animacy scale 
than stones: “vegetables, believed to be living, are not at the bottom of the animacy 
hierarchy, as stones seem to be; for instance, when humans and nonhuman animals eat 
them, they have specific effects and can be either nourishing or toxic to bodily 
systems.”202  Chen’s evidence that vegetables are higher on the scale than stones is that 
vegetables affect animals when eaten—a claim that applies to stones with equal accuracy. 
                                                          
200 Ibid., p. 4. My emphasis. 
201 Ibid., p. 41. 
202 Ibid. 
 135 
Given the context of her discussion and her willingness to hierarchize, Chen’s 
reduction of vegetal animacy to its participation as food in animal metabolisms seems 
like a severe oversight; however, with the follow-up claim that vegetables “are 
dependent, not freestanding plants, but partaking of plants’ nutrients,”203 it seems that 
Chen might not be using the term “vegetable” as a synonym for “plant,” as Aristotle’s 
translator did.  Instead, Chen might actually be taking seriously the distinction between 
“plant” as living being and “vegetable” as a common term for the part of the plant that we 
usually eat.  When Chen analyzes the phrase “I don’t want to become a vegetable,” she 
seems to be reading the term “vegetable” as “a particular kind of foodstuff,” rather than 
as “vegetation.”  If this is the case, though, then we must turn back to the qualification 
present in the earlier suggestion that “it is possible to conceive of something like the 
‘affect’ of a vegetable.”  If the vegetable referred to here is also being conceived as an 
item of food rather than as a living plant, then it would seem to share much in common 
with the stone that Chen unequivocally grants affect, agency, and animacy.  Why, then, 
the hesitation when raising the possibility that a vegetable—whether in the sense of 
“foodstuff,” or perhaps even more so in the sense of the living “plant”—might share 
these qualities?   
Chen is certainly not alone in her backgrounding of plants as living beings.  In 
Bodily Natures, Stacy Alaimo is more interested in the “fruits of the dirt” than in the 
fruits of the plant in her discussion of Ladelle McWhorter’s epiphany about her 
Doritos.204  Granted, the passage she cites is itself more interested in dirt than in the 
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tomato plants that gave rise to McWhorter’s deep and dirty thinking.  In short, the story is 
this: McWhorter, jealous that her new neighbors’ tomato plants were so much bigger and 
healthier-looking than her own, started to research composting methods and implemented 
one called “bastard trenching,” in which you dig trenches in the spot that will later be 
planted, toss in your compostable scraps, and cover those scraps with dirt; a year or so 
later, you plant over that spot.  Throughout the process of reading about and producing 
this compost, McWhorter comes to develop the deep realization that dirt is alive, not 
inert, and that if she wants healthy plants, she has to feed the dirt.  While snacking on 
Doritos and surveying her trenches, McWhorter considered and then immediately 
rejected the idea of tossing the Doritos crumbs into the trench, saying to herself: “I can’t 
feed that crap to my dirt.”205  This thought led to the epiphany that dirt and flesh—her 
own flesh—are “cousins,” and that it makes no sense to feed your flesh with something 
that you will not feed your dirt.  McWhorter ends this anecdote by flatly stating, “I 
haven’t purchased a bag of Doritos since.”206 
Though this Dorito epiphany is immediately concerned with the vitality of dirt, 
McWhorter spends several pages leading up to this story thinking about the materiality of 
plants, an interest that developed from gardening.207  She doesn’t delve deeply into plant 
lives or thoroughly analyze her relationship with them, but she does muse on bark as the 
main distinction between a bush bean and a catalpa tree, learns how to anticipate plant 
needs by observing their bodies, and so on.  Alaimo’s interest in recounting this tale, 
                                                          
205 McWhorter, Ladelle. Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization. Indiana 
UP, 1999, p. 167. 
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207 She is not alone in this. If I have convinced you to begin thinking about plants, but you find it difficult 
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unable to stop thinking about them. 
 137 
however, elides the plants almost entirely, noting that “although McWhorter begins with 
a simple desire for a tomato, her scenario moves in the opposite direction, extending her 
own flesh into the dirt, rather than merely incorporating the fruits of the dirt into 
herself.”208  Alaimo suggests that one reason why McWhorter does not spend time 
“trac[ing] the literal route through which dirt becomes flesh via the tomato”209 is perhaps 
due to the tendency of thinking about food to become thinking about incorporation, about 
how “food disappears into the human body, which remains solidly bounded.”210 
There are a few points that I want to make about Alaimo’s interest in 
McWhorter’s dirt; however, I want to preface those points by acknowledging the 
fascinating and valuable work that Alaimo is doing.  It’s not that I’m criticizing Alaimo 
for doing her project instead of doing mine; rather, I wish to note that a consideration of 
the role that the plant is playing within this scenario has the potential to open up Alaimo’s 
own interest into new and rich directions.  Alaimo, like Chen above and like Bennett 
below, figures food as an object, which, of course, it is.  However, Alaimo’s admiration 
for McWhorter’s dirt-flesh connection ignores that the tomato is itself flesh; the flesh of a 
living being, discorporated and desired and thus rendered food, object.  The living tomato 
plant is completely obfuscated in Alaimo’s retelling of this story, as it was not in 
McWhorter’s.  Alaimo is interested here in the transcorporeality of food, in the ways that 
eating “transforms plants and animals into human flesh,”211 because she is interested in 
the transcorporeality of human bodies.  Skipping from the dirt to the fruit and eliding the 
plant glosses one of these transformations—we might say not that eating transforms 
                                                          
208 Alaimo, Bodily Natures, p. 13. 
209 Ibid., p. 12. 
210 Ibid., p. 13. 
211 Ibid., p. 12. 
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plants and animals, but rather plant and animal flesh into human flesh and thereby make 
Alaimo’s transcorporeality even more trans- and even more -corporeal. 
Similarly, the vitality of food that Jane Bennett seeks to establish could be yet 
more vital, or vital in a yet another register, if we trace its materiality back to its once-
living form.  In the third chapter of Vibrant Matter, Bennett treats food as an “actant 
inside and alongside intention-forming, morality-(dis)obeying, language-using, 
reflexivity-wielding, and culture-making humans, and as an inducer-producer of salient, 
public effects.”212  Bennett convincingly argues that a conceptualization of food as 
sharing a common material vitality with humans could produce a set of practices that are 
less wasteful and more mindful: “If I am right that an image of inert matter helps animate 
our current practice of aggressively wasteful and planet-endangering consumption, then a 
materiality experienced as a lively force with agentic capacity could animate a more 
ecologically sustainable public.”213  However, as Bennett describes the consequences of 
her own analysis of the vitality of omega-3 fatty acids, “to take seriously the efficacy of 
nonhuman fat is, then, not only to shift one’s idea about what counts as an actor but also 
to focus one’s attention away from individuals and onto actants in assemblages.”214  
Bennett has good reason to want to shift attention away from individuals, since the 
“individuals” here are human ones, the particular people affected by food in particular 
ways, and she is interested in focusing attention instead on the agency of the food itself.  
Further, “individuals” are often conceptualized as purposive subjects rather than forces in 
an assemblage.   
                                                          
212 Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Duke UP, 2010, p. 39. 
213 Ibid., p. 51. 
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As this dissertation attempts to show, though, there is value in talking about 
nonhumans in human terms—for instance, as individual, purposive subjects—and one of 
the consequences of moving away from individuation is to move toward collectivization; 
“food” instead of the tilapia, green beans, and rice on your dinner plate, “forest” instead 
of the ivy that’s killing the hackberry tree in my backyard.215  Bennett has a pair of goals 
that are somewhat at odds with each other in her treatment of food: on the one hand, she 
wants to conjure the material vitality that we share with food, such that our consumption 
practices might change for the better.  On the other hand, she wants to maintain the 
primary focus of the book in which this argument is but one chapter, a focus on the 
activity or actancy of material things as distinct from living things.  While the latter goal 
may encourage de-individuation, the former goal would benefit from an additional 
attentiveness to the living creatures, animal and especially plant, whose body parts make 
up the vast majority of human food, as well as allowing for at least a passing glance at the 
ways that those same other creatures engage their own food.   
This is not to suggest that Bennett herself should have done things differently in 
this particular work, but rather to demonstrate some ways that Bennett’s interest in the 
material vitality we share with our food might be opened up in new directions by a 
consideration of botanicity.  It is without question that we are so deeply entangled within 
an ecosystem with plants from all over the world that “deep ecological entanglement” is 
an understatement.  Far more than animals, plants and plant body parts are constitutive of 
the material reality of humans everywhere—look around and consider all the plants, 
including the dead, that currently surround you.  Be sure to include not only wood and 
                                                          
215 This is intended as a callback to the Introduction, in which Eduardo Kohn’s How A Forest Thinks was 
demonstrated to ignore the plants that live in and largely comprise its titular forest. 
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paper, but also textiles, commercial dyes, hair- and skin-care products, and, of course, 
food.  If we can bring Bennett’s shared material vitality into our concept of plants, then 
we “could animate a more ecologically sustainable public”216 on a far greater scale than 
our eating habits. 
Environmental Rhetoric 
 It may seem unnecessary to make a case that plants should be included in 
environmental or ecological rhetoric.  Plants are a huge part of the very picture of “the 
environment” that most people hold; there is a reason we call it “going green,” after all.  
This may be because green spaces—woods especially, but also meadows, prairies, and 
even city parks—are usually what people have in mind when they imagine themselves 
“getting back to nature.”  In some ways, plants are nature in our minds; in the midst of a 
forest, we do not think of ourselves as in the midst of a bunch of creatures the way we 
might, say, in the midst of a herd of sheep.  For humans, trees are setting in a way that 
sheep are not.  They are environment both in the sense of the environmentalism 
movement and in the sense of surroundings for us to be in.  Plants can be a useful 
collaborator for environmental and/or ecological theory that seeks to shift our thinking 
about the environment from a resource-centered concept to a relationship-centered one, 
or rather to shift from thinking the environment as a hierarchy with humans at the top to a 
network within which we have a responsibility of care and contribution. 
Daniel A. Cryer’s “Withdrawal without Retreat: Responsible Conservation in a 
Doomed Age”217 takes up Thomas Rickert’s and Nathaniel Rivers’s notions of 
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withdrawal and Rivers’s notion of deep ambivalence in order to develop an 
environmental rhetoric that can more directly work in partnership with science and 
particularly with on-the-ground conservationists.  The essay takes to task those who 
critique conservationists and environmental discourse, instead proposing that 
environmental ethics should be building partnerships with them.  It further argues that 
anthropocentrism must be embraced, partly on the grounds that human intervention got 
the environment into its current predicament and we therefore have a responsibility to 
intervene on its behalf, but primarily on the grounds that we are the only ones who can 
respond to the crisis, a claim that Cryer develops out of Diane Davis’s concept of 
response-ability: “[O]wning up to anthropocentrism is, I believe, a crucial component of 
a human/nonhuman rhetoric, for response-ability can never be reciprocal.  The 
obligation to respond will always be on humans and never on nonhumans.  This one-way 
responsibility is the ineradicable “bold line” between us.”218  Like Cryer, I believe that 
we must own up to anthropocentrism; hence, for example, my defense of 
anthropomorphism.  However, while Cryer locates the necessity of owning up to 
anthropocentrism in the nonreciprocality of Davis’s response-ability—a nonreciprocality 
that Davis herself pointedly rejects and indeed is mystified by219—the reason, for me, that 
anthropocentrism must remain an acknowledged part of what we do is quite simply that it 
is a part of what we do, and therefore must be acknowledged.   
                                                          
218 Ibid., p. 9. Original emphasis. 
219 Davis, Diane. “P.S. on Humanism.” Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations, U of 
Pittsburgh P, 2010. See in particular pages 151-155: “The sacrificial readiness that breaks with “pure 
being” is attributable neither to practical reason nor to “pure reason,” as Kant would have it, but to a 
responsibility prior to freedom that any idiot would have in spades—but that for some reason (it’s still not 
clear why) not a single nonhuman animal would have at all (151, original emphasis);” “Let me say that I’m 
not convinced that the experience of the rhetorical imperative (as an imperative) is unique to human 
creatures” (154, original emphasis). 
 142 
I want to return, instead, to the first grounding mentioned above in Cryer’s work, 
the grounding that Cryer frames as more peripheral: that human intervention in 
thoroughly tied up with the current state of the environment, such that we have a 
responsibility to continue intervening on its behalf.  Coupled with the call to bridge the 
gap between theory and those who have similar concerns but operate outside the 
theoretical discipline, this “we’re-all-in-it-together” approach can be enriched and 
broadened by including plants in the “we.”  This is not a call for plant rights, though the 
impulse behind such arguments does indicate a similar push for inclusion.  Rather, 
making plants part of the “we” means considering how our own needs and desires might 
bump up against theirs.  As we have already pointed out, plants are already intimately 
involved with our concept of the environment, yet both plants and “the environment” 
share a tendency to become objectified.  Reconceptualizing plants as creatures can 
contribute to the work already being done by animal conservationists to produce a public 
understanding of ecological environmentalism as a form of caring for living things rather 
than conserving resources. 
Plants also offer a model for shifting the value systems that have contributed to 
our treatment of the environment as our own personal resource-box.  Nathan Stormer and 
Bridie McGreavy detail a few of these shifts in “Thinking Ecologically about Rhetoric’s 
Ontology,”220 which they describe as “three interrelated transitions from agency to 
capacity, violence to vulnerability, and recalcitrance to resilience.”221  The authors go on 
to explain: 
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The first transition defines capacity more fully in contrast to symbol use as human 
agency.  The second moves from thinking of rhetorical force as imposition, which 
is tied to violence, to a distributed sense of capacity derived from mutual 
vulnerabilities between entities.  The third suggests that the persistence of 
rhetorical capacities stems from systemic adaptability and sustainability 
(resilience), rather than individuated abilities to resist (recalcitrance).222  
If we were inventing a figure for the set of values described above—a body with 
capacities rather than symbolic agency, a body whose relationships with others is based 
in vulnerability more than in violence, and whose power or force takes the form of 
resilience rather than resistance—our figure would look very much like a plant.223  
Though scholarship within animal studies and object studies has done significant 
work toward decoupling agency from linguistic ability, Stormer and McGreavy remind us 
that there is still work to do with regard to decoupling rhetorical agency from language.  
Rhetoric and Plants has attempted to do so by emphasizing the persuasive and 
communicative force of the capacities plants have—without anything that we might 
recognize as even akin to language, plants both respond and call for response.  If 
rhetorical agency is aligned with symbol use, then we could not say with any certainty 
that plants have rhetorical agency.  They do, however, have rhetorical capacity, in 
Stormer and McGreavy’s terminology, and as such we humans have a responsibility to 
recognize an affinity with our own rhetorical capacity. 
Pedagogy 
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Finally, I’d like to gesture toward some of the ways that bringing plants into the 
rhetorical discussion can contribute to pedagogy, especially but not only composition 
pedagogy.  As noted in Chapter 2, our compositional idiom is overflowing with 
ambulocentrism, the tendency to speak in terms of going elsewhere.  Ironically, however, 
the more we have begun to pay attention to the embodied nature of writing, the more we 
have found ourselves seeking alternatives to this mammalian-body-centric idiom and 
wondering what else our bodies and our writing can do. 
For example, Rita Irwin’s “Facing Oneself: An Embodied Pedagogy”224 suggests 
that it of the utmost importance to find stillness in order to find self-awareness.  Irwin is 
approaching pedagogy within the context of teaching children, and it shows in her 
concerns.  For instance, while Irwin laments that “children in today’s classrooms have 
virtually no time to simply…learn to be still,”225 those of us who teach college freshmen 
might be much more concerned with how to animate our overworked, underslept 
students.  Nevertheless, the problem that Irwin is addressing is broadly applicable to all 
forms of teaching in contemporary American education: how to make sure that our 
pedagogy does not devolve into the straightforward conveyance of information.  For 
Irwin, solving this problem means “facing oneself,” becoming “awake” or self-aware, 
remembering that you have and are a body and that this remembering allows you to be 
fully present.  Irwin emphatically locates this process in stillness: 
It is in stillness that we allow ourselves to face ourselves. It is in stillness that it 
becomes possible to appreciate the sounds we have taken for granted in new 
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ways. It is in stillness that we can envision new ways of being in relationship with 
others. It is in stillness that we can begin to understand that in any pedagogical 
moment, it is an openness to complexity that allows us to enter into the 
experiences of our students. At that moment we are experiencing the beginnings 
of an embodied pedagogy.226 
It is important to note that Irwin’s stillness is significant precisely because of its contrast 
to the activity or “busyness”227 of teachers’ everyday lives, such that plant stillness does 
not function as a figure for her embodied pedagogy.  Plant stillness, or rather sessility, is 
rather an addendum, a new way of being in relationship with others in addition to Irwin’s 
becoming-still, an alternative stillness that is based in rooting rather than halting.  
 Irwin’s is a pedagogy of animation, of how to inspire or produce engagement.  
Karen Kopelson’s “Rhetoric on the Edge of Cunning”228 takes up quite a different 
pedagogical problem: how to overcome student resistance or, in other words, how to 
overcome an animation that actively moves away.  Specifically, Kopelson contends that 
student resistance is often forcefully encountered by teachers whose visible identity 
markers are read by students as indicating a politics they want to resist; “the teacher-
subject who is immediately read by students as belonging to any of the marginalized 
constituencies”229 such as women, people of color, and people of non-normative sexuality 
or gender. Kopelson argues for a cunning inhabitation of the neutrality that students 
expect from a classroom but not from a “minority” body, in order to slide through that 
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resistance.  In short, Kopelson argues that the manipulation of students inherent in such 
an artifice does not, after all, run counter to the principles of critical rhetorical theory, but 
rather embraces the principles of performative ethos, situated flexibility, and the 
constructedness of identity that critical theory has developed and embraced.  At bottom, 
inhabiting pedagogical neutrality is a powerful method of persuading students to come 
toward. 
 Plants have something to add to this analysis, since they are often engaged in 
persuading-to-come-toward.  Plants persuade most visibly to us when they are persuading 
pollinators to approach.  Though plants are rarely attempting to overcome resistance, 
they are often attempting to overcome dismissal, not a pushback but an absence of 
approach, which is in fact the form of student “resistance” most often depicted in 
Kopelson’s piece.  Plants usually accomplish this overcoming of the absence of approach 
by exposure of the self in the form of flowers.  Not to put too fine a point on it, the parts 
of plants that pollinators pay the most attention to, the parts that we ourselves tend to pay 
the most attention to, the parts that we notice and take away and decorate our lives with, 
are their exposed genitals.  As human creatures, the very parts of ourselves that we go to 
great lengths to keep hidden, plants expose to the world.  As human teachers, the parts of 
ourselves that we go to great lengths to keep hidden—our manipulations of students—
may be something that we should consider exposing.   
In other words, what plants can add to Kopelson’s pedagogy of artifice is 
exposure of the artifice.  In 2018, our students have much more information at their 
fingertips than they did when “Rhetoric on the Edge of Cunning” was published in 2003, 
including information about educational practices and political ideologies; many of them 
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see right through every one of our artifices, if only because they are aware that teaching 
is very much a game of artifices.  Teachers may all, to a greater or lesser extent, be Bugs 
Bunnys, but our students are not Elmer Fudds.  In my experience, students are more 
willing to play the game, to approach and join in my “antics,” if I do not try to hide that 
antics are what I am doing.  For instance, I may spend most of an entire class period 
coaxing my students to slowly and methodically improve the conclusion paragraph of a 
piece of student writing, only to close the class by announcing that this was all a trick 
question: that although their suggestions have made this conclusion better than it was 
before, the best way to improve this conclusion is to just delete it.  The crucial move, 
though, is this: to then explain to them that asking them this trick question is an efficient 
method for improving their local editing skills while also improving their global eye.  
This exposure of the teacherly artifice acknowledges that students know about and 
understand such artifices, rather than allowing students to think that I think they have 
been successfully duped (a recipe for resistance if I’ve ever heard one). 
This level of transparency, of course, may not work for everyone at every place in 
every moment, just as Kopelson’s inhabitation of neutrality may not work for everyone at 
every place in every moment; rather, the botanic pedagogy of exposure is yet another 
performance available to be inhabited.  And we must keep in mind, too, that it is only one 
possible botanic pedagogy, since full exposure does not describe every form of plant 
persuasion.  Some plants, like fly orchids, are deceitful through and through, while some, 
like pitcher plants, are violent and coercive.  What they tend to share in common across 
all of these strategies, though, is the very thing that teachers, and perhaps particularly the 
teachers of marginalized identity specified by Kopelson, so often find themselves at a 
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loss over: how do I get my students to want to move toward me?  There is much we could 
learn from plants, the reigning specialists of this kind of persuasion. 
One Last Story 
 A few years ago I was up in New Jersey visiting my partner’s family, and during 
the visit my mother-in-law treated me to a local woods tour.  The tour was conducted by 
an ethnobotanist named Marc who traveled about doing local tours like these, the goal of 
which was to introduce people to some of the amazing plants that live in their area.  Marc 
began the tour by asking us to sing a song with him, a traditional folk song whose tribal 
origin I unfortunately failed to write down, which was all about the circle of life and the 
interconnectedness of all beings in the world, including us.230  We then commenced a 
fascinating hike that covered maybe a half-mile square, learning about the edibility and 
medicinal properties of white pine, maple, and cattail, as well as Marc’s suggestion for 
dealing with invasive species like the barberry, which is to put them to use.231  Some of 
the other tour-goers were clearly there because they were interested in locavorism, while 
others, like me, were simply along for an interesting ride. 
 After the tour was over, my mother-in-law and I were chatting with Marc, and she 
mentioned to him that I was working on a dissertation about plants.  Like many, Marc 
assumed that the plants-rhetoric connection I wanted to make was located in non-Western 
or pre-industrial stories or myths about plants.  When I explained that, in fact, I directly 
focus on the privileged narrative, that of Western science, and offered the debate over 
“plant neurobiology” as an example, he responded in a way that, in hindsight, I should 
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have seen coming: “Hmm, I guess I can see what they’re trying to do with that metaphor.  
But you know plants don’t have neurons, right?” 
 I tell this story in closing because it so perfectly captures the two poles of thinking 
that my project has often been presumed to fit into.  Marc is both a scientist and (I use the 
term with great affection) a hippie.  He is capable of inhabiting, respecting, and 
identifying with both a scientific knowledge of plants and a folk knowledge of plants, 
such that his ethnobotany tours begin with a reminder of the intuitive wisdom of the earth 
and, at least when I was present, end with a Science-y insistence on the truth of scientific 
categories.  These two seemingly disparate ways of thinking can co-habit one person for 
the same reason that this same person has difficulty thinking beyond either of them: they 
are both treated as knowledges.  This dissertation has not attempted to produce a new 
knowledge of plants, has not considered the conveyance of information to be its primary 
goal or even its primary method.  Rather, Rhetoric and Plants has sought to produce a 
new perspective on plants, new ways of thinking and talking about plants that can open 
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